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ABSTRACT
INSTITUTIONS, DEVELOPMENTAL ALLIANCES, AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN KOREA AND BRAZIL (1950-1985).
Charles Paul Winebarger 
Old Dominion University, 1998 
Director: Dr. Kidane Mengisteab
This paper analyzes the comparative development of Korea and Brazil, 1950-85. 
These newly industrialized countries developed at above-average rates in comparison to 
other less developed countries. Korea developed more rapidly than Brazil. The paper 
contends that institutions, interest groups (especially firms) and the state, enter into 
developmental alliances. Alliances affect policies. Policies, then, affect development.
To gather characteristics on factors, a literature review is used. Since development 
is considered to be synonymous with industrialization, it is measured according to output 
growth, change in shares of GNP, and change in structure of industry.
Findings of the factorial characteristics reveal interesting trends in the 1950s' 
democracies of the cases. Both countries had semi-autonomous states, equivocally 
committed to industrialization. Industry was the growth point in each. Korea used local 
firms to industrialize; Brazil used foreign firms. In both cases, the state allied itself with 
firms. Policy in Korea and Brazil mostly favored industrialization. Both countries 
experienced comparable rates of industrialization.
Findings of the 1960s-1980s' bureaucratic-authoritarianisms (B-A) of the cases 
also reveal interesting trends. While the state became more autonomous with B-A in both 
cases, the Korean state became more autonomous than the Brazilian. Korea developed an 
unequivocal commitment to industrialization; Brazil retained its lukewarm industrial 
commitment. Brazil formed an alliance with public firms to modernize in the 1970s;
Korea turned to large local capital to effect this goal. Korea's policy was myopically 
pro-industrial; Brazil's policy was not as narrowly pro-industrial. Korea displayed 
phenomenally higher rates o f development during B-A than it exhibited in democracy.
By contrast, Brazil continued at a pace comparable to the democratic period.
The paper finds the following conclusions. Autonomous states with high
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
commitment to economic development maximize development. Firm types that optimize 
economic development are local, not foreign or public. Primary developmental alliances 
of state with firms augment development. Pervasive, pro-industrial policies expand 
development. To the extent that both case studies possessed these characteristics, they 
both developed rapidly. Since Korea possessed these qualities to a greater extent than 
Brazil, Korea developed more rapidly than Brazil.
Co-Directors of Advisory Committee: Dr. Justin Friberg
Dr. Kae Chung
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1CHAPTER! 
INTRODUCTION
The struggle of the poorer, agrarian nations to advance themselves to the ranks of 
richer, industrial nations is one of the most crucial of late twentieth century.1 The changes 
that such developing countries experience are not only economic but institutional. The 
case of development with which this paper deals is the "third" of three industrial revolu­
tions. England pioneered the "first" industrial revolution in the eighteenth century. 
England's industrial hegemony began to be encroached upon by its European and 
American emulators between 1850 and 1873 in what is known as the "second" industrial 
revolution. The third industrial revolution dates back to the end of World War II and has 
been labeled "late" development. Each industrial revolution has been more rapid than the 
last, has relied on heavier doses of state intervention, more complex firm types, and has 
used technology in a slightly different way to create industrial comparative advantage.2
The East Asian and Latin American "newly industrialized countries" (NICs) are 
exemplars of the third industrial revolution.3 There are a number of characteristics of this 
industrial revolution. One of them is that "late" industrializers create an industrial compar­
ative advantage by learning technology as opposed to inventing it or innovating upon it. 
Another is that late industrializers tend to develop unprecedentedly fast. A third is that 
this industrialization has occurred in the post-World War II era. Finally, late industri­
alizers tend to possess more interventionist states and larger firms than past industrializers.
The journal model employed was Kate L. Turabian, A Manuel for Writers of Term Papers. Theses. 
and Dissertations. 6th. ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1996).
lGustav Ranis, "Toward a Model of Development," in Liberalization in the Process of Economic 
Development, eds. Lawrence B. Krause and Kim Kihwan (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1991),
59.
2 Alice H. Amsden. Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 1989). 3-7. 12-13.20-23. The different ways the countries in each industrial revolution used 
technology to create comparative advantage in industry were as follows: Britain invented in the first industrial 
revolution. countries innovated in the second such revolution . and countries learned in the third revolution.
3The East Asian NICs are regarded normally to be Taiwan and Korea. Hong Kong and Singapore arc 
typically disqualified from this category because of their city-state and entrepot status as well as other unique 
characteristics. The Latin American NICs are considered to be Brazil. Mexico, and sometimes Argentina.
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2Within their regions, Korean and Brazilian industrializations are good examples of this 
industrial revolution. They have the best records of economic development in their 
respective regions as pertains to structural transformations. In Korea, the share of 
industry in GNP changed from 8.8% in 1953 to 43.2% in 1987; in Brazil, it changed from 
23.5% in 1950 to 34.4% in 1985. Likewise, changes occurred rapidly within manufactur­
ing. In 1953, Korean heavy industry accounted for 20% o f total manufacturing, but by 
1986, this share rose to 57.8%. Similarly, in 1949 Brazilian heavy industries made up 
27.0% of total manufacturing, but by 1988, this grew to 60.4%. Two questions spring 
from these remarkable transformations. First, what explains the very rapid structural 
transformation in both countries? Second, how was Korea able to grow faster and 
change its economic structure more rapidly than Brazil?
RESEARCH OBJECTIVE
The research effort analyzes two NICs, one from the Latin American region 
(Brazil) and one from the East Asian region (Korea). The research objective is to uncover 
the similarities and differences in the Brazilian and Korean development process. This will 
be done by disaggregating the factors influencing development. The major factors upon 
which this thesis will focus are institutions and economic policy. The study will analyze 
the regularities and differences among these factors as they have occurred in the cases.
Despite some differences in institutions, economic policy, and economic develop­
ment in the post-war period and even more striking differences in the 1980s, the East 
Asian NICs and the Latin American NICs cannot be assumed to be as different as 
previously thought. Alice Amsden, who has written one o f the most insightful, if 
controversial, books on Korean industrialization to date, describes these similarities.
The paradigm of late industrialization through learning generalizes to a 
diverse assortment of countries with different growth records. . . . Growth rates 
differ among late developing countries, but in all cases industrialization has come 
about as a process of learning rather than of generation of inventions or inno­
vations. Learning, moreover, has been based on a similar set o f institutions. .. . 
The conventional explanation for countries like Korea, Japan, and Taiwan have 
grown relatively fast is that they have conformed to free market principles.. . .  In 
fact, the fundamentals of their industrial policies are the same as other late 
industrializers.
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3In Korea, instead o f  the market mechanism allocating resources and 
guiding private entrepreneurship, the government has made most o f the pivotal 
investment decisions. Instead affirm s operating in a competitive market struc­
ture, they each operated with an extreme degree o f market control, protected 
from  foreign competition, [emphasis mine] Nonetheless, most economists who 
recognize these realities greet them with an unfailing faith in market laws. They 
suppose that while state interference in Korea is pervasive, the economy operates 
with a set of relative prices that are not greatly distorted. In fact, little evidence 
supports this presumption. . . . [N]ot only has Korea not gotten relative prices 
right, it has deliberately gotten them "wrong." Nor is Korea an isolated case. It is 
part of countries that I have termed late industrializers. . . .  In Asia, this group 
includes Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. Beyond Asia, other late industrializers are 
Brazil, Turkey, India, Mexico, and possibly Argentina4
COMPARATIVE APPROACH
In social science, the researcher attempts to discover meaningful generalizations in 
relation to the information at hand and the research problem. Among many methods for 
conducting social science research is the comparative approach, which focuses on two or 
more case study units. Korea and Brazil were selected as the two study units about which 
to derive regularities. Comparative studies of two countries, like this one, are not suitable 
for making generalizations about the nature of development in every late developing 
country in the world. Still, generalizations based on the case studies may be relevant to 
developing countries elsewhere and may reveal crucial aspects about the development 
process that another more aggregated study would overlook.
COMPOSITE HYPOTHESIS
The comparative approach, like many social science approaches, may begin with a 
hypothesis. The research analyzes a composite hypotheses. First, institutions, state and 
interest groups (particularly firms), form developmental alliances. Second, developmental 
alliances affect economic policy. In turn, economic policy is a prime determinant of eco­
nomic development. The interrelation of variables is summarized in figure 1. Before 
going deeper into the substance o f  this figure, a word should be said about its layout. The
4Amsden. Giant. 4, 139-140. For more information on how the Korean government intervened to 
“get the prices wrong.” see Chapter 3 of this work.
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4reader may notice that the boxes for "shared characteristics" are larger than the boxes for 
"unique characteristics." This implies that the "shared characteristics" of Korean and 
Brazilian economic development are more numerous and stronger than any "unique 
characteristics" either one o f the cases possess independently. This sentiment is empha­
sized by the use of bold type for "shared characteristics" and normal type face for "unique 
characteristics." In addition, lines with arrows are used to illustrate the relationships 
between variables. Again, the heavy arrow-line originates from the "shared character­
istics" box and points toward another "shared characteristics" box indicating that the 
driving force behind the industrialization process are the "shared characteristics" that both 
case studies possess. The dotted lines for "unique characteristics" in Korea and Brazil 
only suggest that the relationships between "unique characteristics" were not the primary 
source explaining development in these countries, but they do serve to illustrate that subtle 
differences in the independent variables may explain the subtle differences in the dependent 
variables. The different weights of the dotted arrow lines help the eye discriminate the 
(dotted) arrow line running from the "unique characteristics" of Brazil from the different 
weighted (dotted) arrow line running from the "unique characteristics" of Korea.
These arrow lines suggest one-way relationships between the variables. For 
instance, the "shared characteristics" of "institutions" ("state" and "firms") come together 
to have similar consequences ("shared characteristics") for the developmental alliance in 
Korea and Brazil. However, Korea has "unique characteristics" in its "institutions" that 
lead to "unique characteristics" for the "developmental alliance" in Korea: this is why the 
distinctive (dotted) arrow line points from the "unique characteristics" boxes for Korean 
"institutions" to the "unique characteristics" box for the Korean "developmental alliance." 
Likewise, Brazil has "unique characteristics" about its "institutions" that Korea does not 
have that lead to "unique characteristics" of the "developmental alliance" in Brazil: this is 
why the distinctive (dotted) arrow line points from the "unique characteristics" boxes for 
Brazilian "institutions" to the "unique characteristics" box for "developmental alliance" in 
Brazil. In short, the institutional "shared characteristics" led (indicated by arrow line) to 
"shared characteristics" in the "developmental alliance." The "shared characteristics" of 
the "developmental alliance" led to "shared characteristics" in the "economic policy." The












Figure 1. Composite hypothesis about the 
process of development: Korea and Brazil
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6"shared characteristics" of "economic policy" led to "shared characteristics" in "economic 
development." The same relationships hold true for "unique characteristics" of these inde­
pendent and dependent variables in Korea, on the one hand, and Brazil, on the other.
Common to all studies of comparative political economy is the assumption that 
institutions, developmental alliances, and economic policies affect economic development. 
This figure designates institutions as the first variables. The most important institutions 
involved in development are the state and firms.5 In these countries, the differences and 
similarities in these institutions led to differences and similarities in the developmental 
alliance. In turn, the differences and similarities in the countries' developmental alliance 
led to differences and similarities in countries' economic policy. Further, the differences 
and similarities in economic policy resulted in differences and similarities in economic 
development in the case studies. One underlying assumption concerning these hypotheses 
is that similar characteristics among the variables (institutions, the developmental alliance, 
and the economic policies) caused similar characteristics in the dependent variable, 
economic development. Another underlying assumption is that the similarities among the 
independent and dependent variables are greater than the differences. World crises and 
world opportunities are intervening variables of this study of international political 
economy. Intervening variables receive some attention in the body of this work but are 
not a main focus of this paper.
The major variables, described above, are disaggregated according to their 
characteristics or sub-variables. As shown above, institutions can be broken down into 
smaller categories (the state, firm, and other interest groups). The first institutional 
variable to be considered is the state. A state may be very interventionist, moderately 
interventionist, or noninterventionist. A state can be very technocratic, moderately 
technocratic, or not technocratic at all. These qualities are analyzed according to a 
literature review.
Likewise, the institutional variable of the firm  is broken down into sub-variables.
5In certain instances, other interest groups beside firms can play a critical role in the developmental 
alliance and. consequently, have an important impact on economic policy and, in turn, economic development. 
However, since such interest groups are normally limited in their power within the developmental alliance, 
they are not described in figure 1. However, they will be described later in the text.
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7A firm may be foreign, domestic, or public. A firm may be large and diversified, 
moderately large and rather diversified, or small and undiversified. A few firms can 
dominate the market with no competition, oligopolies can occur in some sectors with a 
moderate amounts of competition elsewhere, or firms can share roughly equal shares of 
the market and more competitive conditions can arise. Firm concentrations (ie., shares of 
big business output in relation to total output) and compositions (ie., the shares of foreign, 
domestic, and public output to total output) are available in statistical form and such 
sources will be referenced, but they are analyzed here according to a literature review.
The final institutional variable, other interest groups, is not considered important 
enough to be mentioned in the institutional category. However, such interest groups 
beside firms are discussed briefly within the body of this paper. Interest groups can be 
divided into myriad sub-variables. However, the focus on interest groups only includes 
those which directly affect economic development. They include other productive sectors 
such as agriculture and services. They include labor. They even include the external 
interest groups such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United States.6 
The IMF and the US had great influence on economic policy that corresponded to their 
roles in financing development in Korea and Brazil. The IMF also played a key role 
influencing policy in Brazil that coincided with its role as spokesman for renegotiating 
debt from foreign banks. Even though these interest groups played large roles in certain 
instances, they were usually not more than secondary members of the developmental 
alliance. Such interest groups are analyzed briefly in a literature review.7
The developmental alliance is another variable. The developmental alliance is the 
relationship of the state to society at large as well as certain social sectors. A state may be 
allied to industry alone, to industry as well as other interest groups, or to another interest 
group or other interest groups besides industry. These aspects are analyzed according to a 
literature review.
Economic policy is another variable and is also be analyzed according to its
6The United States will be referred to in the future as the US.
7 A bit more time will be spent on the influence of external interest groups, since these were
moderately influential on Brazil and Korea's developmental alliances.
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8characteristics. Economic policy may be devoted entirely to the promotion of industrial 
expansion, to industrial expansion as well as the expansion of other sectors, or may not 
devote itself to industrial expansion at all. It may be inward-oriented or outward- 
oriented.8 The extreme form of inward orientation is autarky; a less extreme form is 
import substitution. The extreme form of outward is export push; a less extreme form is a 
laissez faire economy.9 Both import substitution and export push can be extreme, 
moderate, or light. Export push and import substitution can operate in varying 
combinations. Economic policy can also operate through microeconomic means, 
macroeconomic means, or some combination of the two.10 This variable is analyzed 
according to a literature review.
Economic development is the dependent variable. Economic development can be 
led by agricultural, industrial, or service growth. This thesis does not look at the 
"traditional" stage of economic development which is led by agrarian growth. Nor does it 
look at the "post-modern" stage of economic development defined by the service sector 
leading economic development. It looks at the "modem" stage of economic development 
distinguished by high rates of industrial growth. The statistics on industrial, agricultural, 
and GNP growth are provided for this purpose. By considering the modem stage of 
economic development, this thesis identifies industry as the sector which should 
experience the greatest growth of shares within GNP. Statistics on sectoral change of 
industry, agriculture, and services within GNP are given with this intention. Finally, 
modem economic development is described by a high growth of the shares of heavy 
industry vis a vis light industry within total manufacturing. This will be rendered
o
Colin I. Bradford Jr., "Policy Interventions and Markets: Development Strategy, Typologies, and 
Policy Options," in Manufacturing Miracles: Paths of Industrialization in Latin America and East Asia, eds. 
Gary Gerefli and Donald L. Wyman (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1990). 33.
While it may be more correct to refer to trade-linked developmental policies as export push instead 
of export oriented industrialization (EOI), the latter and more conventional terminology is used here.
10Microeconomic intervention refers to the means by which the state can command relatively small 
productive units, firms and sectors, to act as prescribed. Macroeconomic intervention refers to state regulation 
of macroeconomic prices such as exchange rates, interest rates, wage rates, consumer prices, and the like. Such 
intervention affects the economy in a broad way with uncertain influence on the small productive unit. Micro- 
economic and macroeconomic policy tools are both effective means that a developing state can use to promote 
development, but microeconomic tools are the more effective, albeit the more dangerous, of the two.
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9statistically as well. In addition to the statistics, relevant insights are given by the author 
and through the literature. In sum, this thesis defines successful economic development as 
it occurs in late industrializing NICs demonstrating successful economic development as 
encompassing rapid industrial and GNP growth, rapid growth of the percentage of the 
industrial sector within GNP, and a rapid growth of structural weight of heavy industry 
sector within total manufacturing.
CASE STUDIES
Korea and Brazil were chosen by the author because of their interesting similarities 
and differences in interest groups, developmental alliances, economic policies, and eco­
nomic outcomes as they occurred in the 1950s-1980s' period. On the side of similarities, 
both countries developed rapidly in the context of late development as inferred by their 
inclusion under the groups of countries, the NICs. Despite Brazil's and Korea's impressive 
records, both experienced economic crisis in the early 1980s. Both used macro- and 
micro-interventions to promote their objectives and both used macro-interventions much 
more widely during the 1950s. Macroeconomic distortions subsided significantly during 
the early bureaucratic-authoritarian (B-A) regimes in both Korea and Brazil.11 Such 
distortions reappeared in the early 1970s when each underwent a secondary ISI phase. 
Greater orthodoxy in micro- and macro-interventions is evident in both countries in the 
1980s, and Brazil became more like Korea in that it pursued greater export promotion (ie., 
both countries liberalized and stabilized their economies). Both underwent painful 
"adjustments" where their industrial structures were transformed. Both have used the 
policies of import substitution to further their developmental aims. Moreover, the 
sequence of import substitution policies was similar: The 1950s and the 1970s were 
periods of ISI for both countries. Both formed primary alliances with the industrial 
sectors and used monopolized firms to build economies of scale in order to move up the
11 See the origin of this theory' in Guillermo A. O'Donnell Modernization and Bureaucratic- 
Authoritarian ism- Studies in South American Politics (Berkeley: Berkeley University Press, 1973). B-A 
theory initially was applied to Latin America, particularly Brazil and Argentina. It claimed that the 
authoritarian state shielded the economic bureaucracy from societal pressures so that economic policy would 
be more technocratic and attenuate the potential for capital accumulation. This theory has also been applied to 
Korea in numerous studies as will be shown later.
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rungs of modern industry more rapidly. Both have used strong, interventionist states to 
speed development. Moreover, these states experienced similar regime shifts: both were 
nominally democratic in the 1950s and both turned to bureaucratic-authoritarianism (B-A) 
from the 1960s until the 1980s.
Herein also lie subtle, but important, differences. Korea suffered less economic 
hardship than Brazil in the 1980s in the wake of the second oil crisis, and Korea's rate of 
industrial growth was superior to Brazil's in the democratic and bureaucratic-authoritarian 
(B-A) phases. During the 1950s, Brazil experienced a much more rapid industrial 
modernization than Korea. Brazil's more rapid modernization in this period is explained 
by the different developmental conditions of these countries' economies and the policies 
that interacted with these conditions as development evolved in in each country. Korea 
was blessed with a fairly modem industrial infrastructure that it inherited from the 
Japanese, even though much of it was destroyed during the Korean War. What remained 
o f these facilities lay fallow during the 1950s while Korea embarked in a conscious effort 
at aid-financed import substitution industrialization in light manufactures. Brazil had just 
finished its 20-year period of "unconscious" primary ISI, or ISI in light manufactures.12 In 
the 1950s, Brazil began a period of "conscious" secondary ISI, or ISI in more modem 
industries; and thus policy was directed at upgrading the structure of manufacturing.13 In 
the 1960s, Korea engaged in primary "export oriented industrialization" (EOI), or EOI 
in light industries, while Brazil went through a period of orthodoxy. Brazil loosened its 
monetary policy which resulted in a period of capital accumulation in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, while Korea continued its capital accumulation via primary EOI orientation. 
After a decade of such "deepening" (or secondary ISI) in each country in the 1970s,
Korea, in the early 1980s, switched over to secondary EOI under its own volition with 
positive economic results. Meanwhile, Brazil strained to increase its exports under 
prolonged and acute foreign dependence and economic crisis. While Korea and Brazil may
I2This ISI period is called "unconscious" because government policy was not fully technocratic nor 
was it always aimed at maximizing expansion of domestic industry.
l3This ISI period is called "conscious” because government policy had become more technocratic and 
it was consciously aimed at maximizing expansion of domestic industry'.
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have both liberalized and stabilized their economies, Brazilian policy seemed to be devoid 
of a development plan outside these aims which caused the Brazilian economy to fall into 
a deep recession. On the other hand, Korea promoted a development plan that superseded 
liberalization and stabilization and allowed this economy to continue to develop rapidly.
The implications of these analogous and divergent characteristics of Brazil's and 
Korea's evolving economic models elicit some esoteric academic interest, but they might 
hold the keys to solving the riddle of underdevelopment in other less developed countries 
(LDCs). Policymakers in developing countries can learn from the economic models of 
Brazil and Korea. Such learning can positively affect policymaking and policy imple­
mentation and can also help maximize economic development in these countries. Care 
must be taken in applying these models to other LDCs. This is because different countries 
have different political, institutional, and economic factors or conditions which may not 
mesh easily with the models studied here. Moreover, models that were appropriate in the 
past may be less appropriate for today's international economic and political context. 
Judgment and creativity must be used in adapting, if at all, these models to other countries.
A number of assumptions follow from the study of Brazil and Korea. The 
fundamental and underlying assumption is that the shared characteristics in these variables 
as they occurred in the case studies allowed both these countries to develop rapidly, while 
the subtle differences in these variables as they occurred in these countries allowed Korea 
to develop more rapidly than Brazil. Other assumptions flow from this basic assumption. 
These will be broken down into those concerning two periods of development. These 
assumptions about development in Brazil and Korea in their 1950s democratic phase are:
(1) in both countries most of the characteristics of the states and the nature of its 
policies in these countries were not so different, outside of the obvious 
difference that Korea was undergoing primary "import substitution industri­
alization" (ISI) and Brazil was promoting secondary ISI at this time;
(2) while both states built primary alliance with industrial elite, the state alliance 
with the agricultural elite was stronger in Brazil than in Korea;
(3) the firm types began to diverge greatly in these countries at this time, ie., 
foreign capital came to dominate the dynamic sectors in Brazil while Korea 
relied on domestic firms to industrialize; and
(4) in neither the Korean nor the Brazilian case would such rapid industrialization 
have taken place had it not been for the large amounts of foreign finance pro­
vided by the United States (aid in the Korean case and loans in the Brazilian).
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The assumptions about the development process in Brazil's and Korea's bureaucratic- 
authoritarian (B-A) phases of the 1960s-1980s are somewhat more complex:
(1) Brazil and Korea both had autonomous states, but the state in Korea was more 
autonomous;
(2) Brazilian and Korean states both intervened heavily in the economy, but the 
Korean state was more interventionist;
(3) Brazilian and Korean states both produced pro-industrial policies, but the 
Korean economic policy was more myopically industrial;
(4) Brazil and Korea both used microeconomic as well as macroeconomic policy 
tools, but Korea tended to rely more on microeconomic policies than macro- 
economic policies while Brazil tended to do the opposite;
(5) Korea's microeconomic tools tended to be more effective in maximizing 
development than Brazil's;
(6) Brazil and Korea are cases where industrial firms dominate the center of the 
economy, but Korea has relied on domestic firms while Brazil has tended to 
rely on foreign and public firms;
(7) Brazilian and Korean firms are highly oligopolized, but Korean oligopolization 
is more extreme;
(8) Brazil and Korea were unable to industrialize on the basis of domestic savings 
alone and had to borrow heavily abroad, but Korea was better able to service 
this debt because of its larger revenues in exports and because it was able to 
acquire better terms on its debt.
The next chapter provides a setting for describing and interpreting the historical 
development of Brazil and Korea. It adopts the market failure theory and applies market 
failure theory to the variables (institutions, developmental alliances, and economic policy) 
as they occur in Brazil and Korea and relates this theory to the analysis of the dependent 
variable (economic development) which is described statistically.
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CHAPTER H 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Research efforts concerning the comparative political economy of any or all of the 
East Asian and Latin American NICs are well advised to address the theoretical underpin­
nings and empirical evidence which has gone before. To understand the foundations of 
the research problem and its place within the context of such comparative development, it 
is essential to review similar studies. The purpose of this section is to compile those 
issues basic to the study of the comparative political economies of Brazil and Korea.
TWO THEORIES
There is an immense body of literature addressing the comparative political 
economies of development in the East Asian NICs and the Latin American NICs.1 The 
literature on the subject has been increasing with explosive rapidity of late.2 The reason for 
this interest revolves around the fact that the East Asian NICs have developed more 
rapidly than their Latin American cousins. This contrast is particularly striking in the 
1980s when the Latin American NICs were racked by a prolonged crisis, while the East 
Asian NICs, after a brief stall in their growth engines, resumed their rapid economic 
development on a scale comparable to the "miracle" years of the 1960s through the 1970s.
Economists, mostly neoliberals, were the first to analyze this contrast.3 The two
*For a partial list see the third subsection of the bibliography in this volume.
2Rhys Jenkins. "The Political Economy of Industrialization: A Comparison of Latin American and 
East Asian Newly Industrializing Countries," Development and Change 22. no. 2 (1991): 197.
3The classical economists from which the neoliberalist’s thought originates from the minds of Adam 
Smith. Thomas Malthus. John Stuart Mill. Walt W. Rostow, and David Ricardo. Some more recent examples 
of neoliberalist thinking in the context of East Asian and Latin American development are Jagdish Bhagwati. 
Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: Anatomy and Consequences of Exchange Control 
Regimes (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1978); Bela Baiassa. Newlv Industrializing 
Countries in the World Economy (Oxford: Pergamon, 1981); Bela Baiassa. Policy Reform in Developing 
Countries (New York: Pergamon, 1977); Anne O. Krueger, Development of the Foreign Sector and Aid 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1979); Anne O. Krueger. Liberalization: Attempts and 
Consequences (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger for the National Bureau of Economic Research, 1978); Anne O. 
Krueger. "Import Substitution Versus Export Promotion." Finance and Development 22. no. 2 (1985): 20-23; 
John Fei and Gustav Ranis. "A Model of Growth and Employment in the Open Dualistic Economy: The Cases 
of Korea and Taiwan." Journal of Development Studies 11, no. 2 (1975): 32-63; Helen Hughes, ed..
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means by which a country can intervene into its economy are through microeconomic and 
macroeconomic policies. Neoliberals argued that if developing states would just allow 
macroeconomic prices to settle at equilibrium and avoid public budget deficits, their 
economies would develop most rapidly.4 This would come about because the guiding 
hand of the market would distribute resources perfectly according to a country's compar­
ative advantage allowing a maximization of growth potential. They also predicted that if 
this were not done, macroeconomic price distortion could lead to dire economic crises in 
the balance o f payments and inflationary arenas. Economists called leaving macroeco­
nomic prices to the market "getting the prices right." In terms of state intervention, 
neoliberals interpreted the East Asian NICs and the Latin American NICs as polar 
opposites. Applying their western, neoliberal theories, they attempted to show that 
the states of the East Asian NICs confirmed their idea that governments which do not 
intervene in their economies and let the free market be the distributor of resources tend to 
develop more rapidly. Further, they believed that governments which do distort the 
distribution of resources in the free market lag behind in development. They argued that 
the states in the Latin American NICs conformed more closely to this latter group. They 
hypothesized that the fact that the East Asian NIC’s states were more authoritarian vis a
Achieving Industrialization in East Asia (New York: Cambridge University Press. 1988): Helen Hughes. 
"Explaining the Differences Between the Growth of Developing Countries in Asia and Latin America in the 
1980s." in Industrial and Trade Policy Reform in Developing Countries, eds. Ramesh Adhikari. Colin 
Kilpatrick, and John Weiss (Manchester: Manchester University Press. 1992): Gustav Ranis. "Employment. 
Income Distribution, and Growth in the East Asian Context: A Comparative Analysis," in Export Oriented 
Development Strategies: The Success of Five Newlv Industrialized Countries, eds. Vittorio Corbo. Anne O. 
Krueger, and Fernando Ossa (Boulder: Westview Press. 1985): Gustav Ranis. "Challenges and Opportunities 
Posed by Asia's Superexporters: Implications for Manufactured Exports from Latin America." in Latin 
America’s Economic Development: Institutionalist and Structuralist Perspectives, eds. James L. Dietz and 
James H. Street (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987); Ranis. "Model;" Jeffrey Sachs. "External Debt 
and Macroeconomic Performance in Latin America and East Asia." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 
no. 2 (1985): 523-73: Jenn-Jaw Soong. "The Political Economy of Development in the Newly Industrializing 
Countries: A Comparative Analysis of Taiwan. South Korea. BraziL and Mexico" (Ph.D.. diss. University of 
Florida, 1991); William G. Tyler, Manufactured Export Expansion and Industrialization in B raz il Kieler 
Studeren. no. 134 (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr. 1976): World Bank. Brazil: Industrial Policies and Manufactured 
Exports (Washington D.C.: World Bank. 1983): and World Bank The East Asian Miracle: Economic 
Growth and Public Policy (New'York: Oxford University Press. 1993.
"^Equilibrium to the neoliberalist does not mean a state of neutrality. Thus, equilibrium exchange 
rates should undervalue the domestic currency, equilibrium wage rates should be set low. equilibrium interest 
rates should be set high, and equilibrium rates of monetary expansion should mean a tight monetary policy.
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vis the states of the Latin American NICs helped explain why the former was able to 
maintain market equilibrium to a greater extent than the latter.
This group argued against microeconomic intervention, a more radical form of 
intervention, more vehemently than they did against macroeconomic intervention. This is 
because at least macroeconomic policy allowed the operation of a distorted market, but 
microeconomic intervention could potentially destroy the workings of the market 
altogether. Since the East Asian NICs developed faster than the Latin American NICs, the 
logic ran, these East Asian countries must have had less government intervention.
The industrial firm is the other interest group upon which this thesis focuses. As it 
turns out, a certain firm structure can also distort the free market. A monopolization or 
oligopolization of the various means of production can also restrict the markets ability to 
function normally. Monopolies and oligopolies will not compete to produce new product 
lines at competitive prices if their competition is limited. Occasionally, a neoliberal claims 
that the concentration of the East Asian NICs must have been less concentrated than its 
Latin American counterpart, since development occurred more rapidly in the former.5 
This occurs less often, however, since it runs counter to the empirical evidence.
About the relationship of different types of firms (ie., foreign, local and public) to 
development, neoliberal theory is even quieter pertaining to the comparative development 
of the East Asian and Latin American NICs. Public firms are seen as generally more 
inefficient than private firms because they consider the political motive over the profit one. 
In any case, public firms violate the economic law that government should stay out of the 
market. Generally, foreign firms are seen as positive since they are viewed as an avenue of 
technology transfer. In any case, a developing country should not hinder foreign direct 
investment (FDI) since to do so would impede the free flow of capital and impair the 
market. Domestic firms of a developing country are seen as no better or worse than
5See Soong. "Newly Industrializing Countries." 304. 306. 307. Soong writes: "The ISI strategy- 
accentuated another absurdity in Brazil and Mexico, namely, an unhealthy concentration of wealth among 
certain social groups and regions.. .  [T]he bulk of government financial support accrued to big enterprises, 
which could manage without it because capital for them was not scarce. In contrast, small-scale industries, 
always along labor intensive lines, starved for capital... Korea’s and Taiwan's EOI adopted labor intensive 
industries." What Soong fails to mention is that the East Asian NICs also went through a secondary ISI phase 
where these states also granted special favors to big business. Moreover, special favors to big business in the 
East Asian NICs were certainly not unheard of even during the EOI phase. This was especially true of Korea.
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foreign firms. If domestic firms can compete with foreign firms, they should be left 
untouched, but if foreign firms can produce more efficiently than domestic firms then the 
market will dispatch with them.
Recently, an alternate outlook has emerged, primarily expressed by political 
scientists.6 They claim that state intervention into the economy was good, not bad. Some
’’For some good works describing the differences in Latin American and East Asian state strength, see 
Gereffi and Donald Wyman, eds.. Manufacturing Miracles: Paths of Indnstrialization m Latin America and 
East Asia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Peter B. Evans. Dietrich Rueschemeyer. and Thelma 
Skocpol. eds.. Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1985): Jenkins "Compari­
son;" Peter Evans. "Class, State, and Dependence in East Asia: Lessons for Latin Americanists." In The 
Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism, ed. Fredric C. Deyo (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
1987); Nigel Harris, The End of the Third World: Newlv Industrializing Countries and the Decline of an 
Ideology (Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1986); Stephan Haggard. Pathways From the Periphery: The Politics of 
Growth in the Newlv Industrialiring Countries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1987); and Tom Hewitt. 
Hazel Johnson, and David Wield, eds.. Industrialization and Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
1992). The last work, in particular, focuses on Korea and Brazil. For this see Chris Edwards. "Industrializa­
tion in South Korea." in Industrialization and Development eds. Tom Hewitt. Hazel Johnson, and David 
Weild. (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1992); Tom Hewitt, "Brazilian Industrialization." in Industrializa­
tion and Development, eds. Tom Hewitt. Hazel Johnson, and David Weild (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
1992): and Rhys Jenkins. "(Re-)Interpreting Brazil and South Korea." in Industrialization and Development 
eds. Tom Hewitt. Hazel Johnson, and David Weild (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1992).
For the overriding importance of a strong state in Korean and East Asian development see Amsden 
Giant; Richard P. Appelbaum and Jeffrey Henderson, eds.. States and Development in the Asian Pacific Rim 
(Newbury Park: Sage Publications. 1992): Ha-Joon Chang, "The Political Economy of Industrial Policy in 
Korea." Cambridge Journal of Economics 17. no.l 119931: 131-157: Fredric C. Devo. ed.. The Political 
Economy of New Asian Industrialism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1987); Stephan Haggard and Chung- 
In Moon. "The South Korean State in the International Economy: LiberaL Dependent or Mercantile?" in The 
Anatomies of Interdependence, ed. John Ruggie (New York: Columbia University Press. 1983): Clive 
Hamilton. Capitalist Industrialization in Korea (Boulder: Westview Press. 1986); Chalmers Johnson. "Political 
Institutions and Economic Performance: The Govemment-Business Relationship in Japan. South Korea, and 
Taiwan." in The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism, ed. Fredric C. Deyo (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1987); Leroy P. Jones and U Sakong. Government Business, and Entrepreneurship in 
Economic Development: The Korean Case. Studies in the Modernization of the Republic of Korea: 1945-1975 
(Cambridge. MA: Harvard University Press for Council on East Asian Studies. 1980): Hagen Koo. ed. State 
and Society in Contemporary Korea (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1993); Suk-Chae Lee. "The Heavy and 
Chemical Promotion Plan (1973-79)." in Economic Development in the Republic of Korea: A Policy 
Perspective, eds. Lee Jay Cho and Yoon Hyung Kim (Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press. 1991): Russell 
Mardon. "The State and Effective Control of Foreign Capital: The Case of South Korea," World Politics 43. 
no. 5 (1990): 111-138; Edward S. Mason et al.. The Economic and Social Modernization of the Republic of 
Korea. Studies in the Modernization of the Republic of Korea: 1945-1975 (Cambridge. MA: Harvard 
University Press for Council on East Asian Studies. 1980); Richard Luedde-Neurath. Import Controls and 
Export Oriented Development: A Reassessment of the South Korean Case (Boulder: Westview Press. 1986); 
Yung Whee Rhee, Bruce Ross-Larson and Gary PurselL Korea’s Competitive Edge (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1984); Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of 
Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1990); and Gordon White 
and Robert Wade, eds.. Development States in East Asia (London: Macmillan, 1988).
For works that consider a strong state integral to the development of Brazil and Latin America, but 
(often) complain that the state was still weak to obviate certain market failures. Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
and Enzo Faletto. Dependency and Development in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press.
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economists joined this group and developed a rationale for government intervention into 
the economy, particularly in the context o f late development. They claim the assumption 
of a perfect market may have been appropriate in the case of developed countries; but in 
the case of late developing countries, market imperfections block the perfect distribu-tion 
of resources. They contend that if markets were left to themselves, they would thwart 
rapid development. Industrialization could be best served by states intervening to "get the 
price wrong" so that capitalists, because of a price subsidy, would invest in risky but 
developmentally important areas. Conversely, the state could make the investor forego 
pure consumption or speculative investments which contribute little to development.
1979); Werner Baer. "Political Determinants of Development" in Politics. Policies and Economic 
Development in Latin America, ed. Robert Wesson (Boston; Stanford University Press. 1984); Werner Baer. 
The Brazilian Economy: Growth and Development. 3d ed. (New York: Praeger. 1989); Werner Baer and 
Joseph S. Tulchin. eds.. Brazil and the Challenge of Economic Reform (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press for the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 1993); Antonio Barros de Castro. "Renegade 
Development: Rise and Demise of State-Led Development in Brazil." Democracy. Markets and Structural 
Reform in I -atin America: Argentina. Bolivia. BraziL Chile, and Mexico, eds. William C. Smith. Carlos H. 
Acuna. Edwardo A. Gamarra (Miami: University of Miami, 1994); David Collier, ed.. The New 
Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1979); Ruth Berins Collier. 
"Popular Sector Incorporation and Political Supremacy: Regime Evolution in Brazil and Mexico." in Brazil 
and Mexico: Patterns in Late Development eds. Sylvia Ann Hewlett and Richard S. Weinhart (Philadelphia: 
Institute for the Study of Human Issues. 1982); Peter Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of 
Multinational State, and I.ocal Capital in Brazil (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1979); Albert 
Fishlow, "Origins and Consequences of Import Substitution in Brazil" in International Economics and 
Development: Essays in Honor of Raul Prebisch. ed. Luis Eugenio di Marco (New York: Academic Press. 
1972); Albert Fishlow. "Some Reflections on the Post-1964 Brazilian Economic Policy." in Authoritarian 
Brazil: Origins Policies, and Future, ed. Alfred Stepan (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1973); Albert 
Fishlow. "A Tale of Two Presidents: The Political Economy of Crisis Management." in Democratizing 
Brazil: Problems of Transition and Consolidation . ed. Alfred Stepan (New York: Oxford University Press. 
1989); Albert Fishlow. "The Latin American State." Journal of Economic Perspectives 4. no. 3 (1990): 61-74; 
Sylvia Ann Hewlett. "The State and Brazilian Economic Development: The Contemporary Reality and 
Prospects for the Future." in The Future of Brazil, ed. William H. Overholt (Boulder: Westview Press. 1978); 
O'Donnell Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism; Edson de Oliveira Nunes and Barbara Geddes. "Dilemmas of 
State-led Modernization in BraziL" in State and Society in Brazil: Continuity and Change, eds. John D. Wirth. 
Edson de Oliveira Nunes, and Thomas E. Bogenschild (Boulder: Westview Press. 1987); O'Donnell 
Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Jose Serra. "Three Mistaken Premises Regarding the Connection between 
Industrialization and Authoritarian Regimes." in The New Authoritarianism in I.atin America, ed. David 
Collier (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1979); Kathryn A. Sikkink. "Developmentalism and 
Democracy: Ideas, Institutions, and Economic Policy Making in Brazil and Argentina. 1954-1962" (Ph.D. 
diss.. Columbia University. 1988): Thomas E.Skidmore. Politics in Brazil. 1930-1964: An Experiment in 
Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press. 1967); Thomas E. Skidmore, "Politics and Economic Policy 
Making in Authoritarian Brazil. 1937-71." in Authoritarian Brazil: Origins. Policies, and Future, ed. Alfred 
Stepan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); Thomas E.Skidmore. The Politics of Military Rule in 
Brazil. 1964-1985 (New York: Oxford University Press. 1988); and Thomas E.Skidmore,"Brazil's Slow Road 
to Democratization: 1974-1985," in Democratizing Brazil: Problems of Transition and Consolidation, ed. 
Alfred Stepan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
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Intervention into macroeconomic prices is only one way governments can 
intervene. Another is through microeconomic intervention or command. Market failure 
theorists hypothesize that if macroeconomic intervention is good, microeconomic inter­
vention, which envisions heavier doses of state intervention into the economy, must be 
even better. Jones and Sakong are two neoliberals which find Korea's extensive use of 
microeconomic controls vexing and, ironically, find themselves as unwilling proponents of 
microeconomic intervention rather than macroeconomic intervention. They write: "This 
paradox must now be explained. . . . Our answer is that Korea is a 'hard state'. . . . [The] 
two major determinants o f hardness [are] . . . the ability to enforce obligations via 
compulsion and the ability to direct administrative discretion toward desirable ends."7 
This is contrasted with the "soft" state where microeconomic intervention will not work 
because obligations are not enforced and administrators are not directed to work toward 
desirable ends. The conclusion of these authors is that macroeconomic intervention "is 
limited to overcome market imperfections . . . [and that] command is far quicker . . . but 
very risky and accordingly must be administered with skill or luck or both. . . . The 
question is, then, not whether command is necessary for rapid development, but the 
wisdom of the ends towards which it is directed and the degree to which it is enforced."8 
Market failure theorists questioned whether the East Asian and Latin American NICs were 
as different in terms of state intervention into the economy as neoliberal theorists claimed.
Market failure theorists point to wise intervention in both the Latin American and 
East Asian NICs as a reason for their shared experience at rapid economic development in 
the postwar period. They propose that the East Asian NICs intervened more profoundly 
in their economies through microeconomic means and, not inconsequentially, through 
macroeconomic means. While the Latin American NICs may have intervened more 
heavily by macroeconomic means than their East Asian counterparts, these Latin American 
states did not possess the state capacity to command the private sector in the way that the 
East Asian NICs did. Consequently, the East Asian NICs developed more rapidly than the 
Latin American NICs. The humor in the fact that it was the economists, who contrived to
7Jones and Sakong. Government. 132. 133.
8 Ibid.. 134.
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describe state intervention as bad, and political scientists, who tried to paint state 
intervention as good, is not lost on Fishlow: "Even while political scientists have been 
trying to bring the state back in, economists have been trying to take it out."9
Market failure theorists also argue that a certain industrial structure was 
conducive to development. They see domestic firms as preferable to foreign firms. When 
domestic firms owm the technology they acquire, the countries are not dependent on 
foreign firms for the technology. Another concern is that foreign firms tend to remit their 
profits, but domestic firms keep their profits at home where they can be reinvested. They 
contend that, at least in maximizing industrial modernization, a large (domestic) firm is 
essential to improve productive efficiency, facilitate the acquisition of and research into 
technology, and be competitive on a world market against firms o f a similar scale abroad.
These theorists claim that the East Asian NICs developed more rapidly since they 
closed their markets to foreign investment and promoted the expansion of domestic firms, 
while the Latin American NICs relied heavily on foreign firms as well as public firms. 
Foreign firms allowed substantial development in Latin America, just not as rapidly as had 
occurred in East Asia. They often suggested that the public firms in the Latin American 
NICs and East Asian NICs helped these countries overcome market failure and thus were 
slow to criticize the tremendous public firm expansion in Latin America. Both the Latin 
American NICs and East Asian NICs had a large firm size with a highly oligopolized mar­
ket, and this contributed to their a ability to develop rapidly. They also claimed that the 
East Asian NICs had larger firm size operating in a more oligopolized market than the 
East Asian NICs, which helped explain their more rapid development vis a vis the Latin 
American NICs. In sum, these NICs share a number of common traits, including very 
interventionist states, extremely large firms with a high degree of oligopolization, and a 
common comparative advantage in industrialization (ie., learning).
THEORETICAL SHORTCOMINGS
This review of the literature points to the fact that the differences in the economic
9 Fishlow. "State." 61. The work to which Fishlow refers is Evans. Rueschmeyer. and Skolpol. 
Bringing the State Back In.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 0
development of the East Asian NICs and the Latin American NICs attracted first attention 
to these comparative political economies. It is partially due to the excessive concern with 
the differences in the comparative political economies of these regional NICs that other 
issues have been neglected. Namely, the East Asian NICs and the Latin American NICs 
have basic commonalities to their political economic that are just recently being described.
There are more subtle weaknesses of the neoliberal approach. It fails to recognize 
the importance of state intervention in promoting development. Further, it often fails to 
recognize the profound state intervention into the economy in the East Asian NICs, while 
overplaying the substantial amount of such intervention in the Latin American NICs. This 
flaw follows from the related flaw that neoliberal scholars tend to espouse macroeconomic 
intervention to the exclusion of microeconomic intervention. This approach often fails to 
address the issue of market distortion created by oligopolization in the East Asian NICs or 
how it slowed the development of the development of a nation whose rates of develop­
ment are unprecedented. Neoliberalism also frequently fails to address the various 
influences of the different types of productive social groups on economic policy and 
economic development.
While the alternative approach, market failure theory, may be right about the 
regularities or common aspects in East Asian and Latin American NICs political 
economies, this approach has some subtle shortcomings. First, it tends to underplay the 
real relationships that can be derived from the neoliberal analysis of market prices on 
economic development. Acknowledging the fact that high macroeconomic price 
distortions exist in the East Asian NICs, one neoliberal correctly counters market failure 
theorists' minimization of free market forces by stating that the East Asian NICs "clearly 
got one very important price right, the exchange rate, but that is as far as Korea and 
Taiwan got in the 1960s and 1970s. Another market where prices were not distorted 
throughout the region was the labor market."10 The fact is that, in some areas, free market 
macroeconomic prices do work according to classical neoliberal interpretations and should 
not be discounted out of hand. In other areas, such prices may work differently to neo-
I0Dwight H. Perkins. "There Are At Least Three Models of East Asian Development." World 
Development. Special Issue. The World Bank’s The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy 
22. no. 4 (1994): 659.
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liberal's classic interpretations or may not work at all due to market failures. It is up to the 
researcher to ascertain which is which. Moreover, macroeconomic intervention has an 
effect on development and should not be subjugated entirely to microeconomic interven­
tion. Both types of interv ention have potential costs and their advantages and these must 
be weighed carefully by the academic community and Third World policymakers. Along 
these lines, there is substantial evidence that, if not handled with extreme care, large 
macroeconomic price distortions do cause eventual crises in the areas o f balance of 
payments and inflation as demonstrated by the Latin American NICs in the 1980s. 
Similarly, there is substantial evidence that, if not handled with obsessive caution, direct 
government intervention can result in economic catastrophes such as the fall of the Soviet 
Union, the crisis in North Korea, or the Chinese situation during the Cultural Revolution. 
Specifically, the alternative approach must acknowledge the limitations of the public firm 
as addressed by the neoliberal. Public firms may have their place in overcoming market 
failure, but their overuse may result in an economy with large productive inefficiencies or 
may, if prices are lowered for political reasons, contribute to economic collapse.
There are four major shortcomings of both neoliberalism and market failure 
theory. First, many analysts from both schools neglect to recognize the similarity between 
neoliberalism and market failure theory. Lall's review of the East Asian Miracle by the 
World Bank contends that once one concludes that in developing countries, markets are 
imperfect, neoliberalism becomes market failure theory. Following this reasoning, she 
further contends that once market failure is accepted, there is no economic reason to reject 
state economic intervention as misguided.11
A second shortcoming of both schools falls on the political side. Both schools 
often implicitly view authoritarianism as a sufficient, if not a necessary, condition to ensure 
technocratic expertise is realized as effective economic policy. This is true whether the 
scientist categorizes a successful authoritarian state as noninterventionist (as a neoliberal 
might) or interventionist (as a market failure theorist might). The failure of each theory to 
recognize explicitly the linkages between the connection of authoritarianism and
u Sanjaya LalL "The East Asian Miracle: Does the Bell Toll for Industrial Strategy?" World 
Development Special Issue, The World Bank's The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy 
22.4 (1994): 647.648. See also World Bank. Miracle.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
22
development or the fact that both schools share common ground on such linkages is a 
definite flaw in both. "Occasionally the need for a 'strong state' in order to implement the 
policy package [of the neoliberal or market failure theorist] is mentioned, but both theories 
are somewhat coy about the links between their theories and authoritarianism."12
A third shortcoming of research goes to the heart of the approach of political 
economic research generally and of the approaches of the neoliberal and market failure 
theory as they deal with the specific area of the East Asian and Latin American NICs 
comparative political economy. The objective of research into political economy is to 
view interest groups lobbying the state. The state constructs its economic policy in 
relation to the power of these interest groups. In turn, the approach o f political economy 
is to view economic policy as an important variable affecting economic development. (For 
an example of this approach as will be used analyzing the cases of South Korea and Brazil, 
see figure 1.) However, interest groups are not the sole influence on economic policy.
I2Jenkins. "(Re-)Interpreting," 197. This source is quite pertinent to the matter at hand since it 
objectively looks at the way the two theories views Korea and Brazil and critiques both. Despite this coyness 
of which Jenkins speaks, many authors offer words of caution to developing countries seeking to emulate the 
bureaucratic-authoritarian (B-A) model. Below are a few examples of such caution dealing with Korea in its 
authoritarian "growth-first" mode. Amsden. Giant. 18 cautions against late developers emulating the authori­
tarian model: "It is unclear whether the strong economic measures taken by the Korean state could have been 
taken under political democracy, although Japan, the statist European countries, and recent events in Korea all 
suggest that such measures and political democracy are comparable. What is clear is that, without strong 
central authority, a necessary although not sufficient condition, little industrialization can be expected in 
'backward' countries. Haggard. Pathways. 256 seems to comply. Wade skirts the issue of authoritarianism 
while emphasizing that not all countries may have the capacity for state leadership found in East Asia, a 
followership state may be worth pursuing though it is not preferable to a leadership state. See Robert Wade. 
"Industrial Policy in East Asia: Does it Lead or Follow the Market," in Manufacturing Miracles: Paths of 
Industrialization in 1 atin America and East Asia, eds. Gary Gereffi and Donald L Wyman (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 1990). 261-262.
A conflicting body of evidence exists on regime type and economic performance. For general 
reference, see William G. Dick. "Authoritarian versus Nonauthoritarian Approaches to Economic Develop­
ment." Journal of Political Economy 82 (July/August 1974): 817-827; Robert Marsh, "Does Democracy 
Hinder Development in Latecomer Developing Nations?" Comparative Social Research, no. 2 (1979): 215- 
249; and Erich Weede, "The Impact of Democracy on Economic Growth: Some Evidence From Cross­
national Analyses," Kvklos. no. 36 (Fasc. 1 1983): 21-40. For inconclusiveness of the evidence in Latin 
America, see the conflicting analyses in David Collier. New Authoritarianism- Jonathan Hartlyn and 
Samuel A. Morley. eds.. 1 -atin American Political Economy: Financial Crisis and Political Change.
(Boulder Westview Press, 1986); OT)onneU, Bnreaucreatic-Authoritarianism: Karen Remmer. "The 
Politics of Stabilization: IMF Standby Programs in Latin America, 1954-1984," Comparative Politics 19 
(October 19%): l-25;Thomas E. Skidmore. "The Politics of Economic Stabilization in Post War Latin 
America." in Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America, ed. James M. Malloy (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977); and John Sheahan. Patterns of Development in f.atin America:
Poverty. Repression, and Economic Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1987).
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Periodic world crises and opportunities, both intervening variables, can profoundly 
condition a country's economic policies. Likewise, such intervening variables also affect 
economic development directly as well as indirectly (ie., through economic policy).
A related shortcoming in relation to the East Asian and Latin American NICs has 
to do with the conception of interest groups lobbying the state and forging developmental 
alliances with it. The strongest argument that can be made for interest group pressure 
determining economic policy is in the context of true democracy. This connection is 
hardly straightforward in the cases of the East Asian NICs and the Latin American NICs.
In these cases, the condition of a representative government was not even obtained during 
these countries' periods of democracy, much less during their B-A regimes.
SOME LIMITED ADVANCES
What has been described above is not to deny a recognition of a limited, albeit 
vital, progress in the study of the comparative political economy of the East Asian NICs 
and the Latin American NICs. Advances in the state of such knowledge about the nature 
of the development process are partially a function of greater numbers of better qualified 
researchers. These researchers have discovered the positive influence that the state and 
private institutions can have on economic development. Considerable improvement has 
also been made in regard to the recognition that neoliberalism and market failure theory 
share much intellectual space both in political and economic areas. These respective 
schools are not mutually exclusive, but converging and interactive.
Above, study of development by way of the political economy double hypothesis 
(see figure 1) was also said to have some problems with extraneous variables. In addition, 
this hypothesis had trouble showing a clear relationship between interest group influence 
on the state and state policies. Even admitting the problems, this is a useful model. Even if 
the democracy is not truly representative and even if the authoritarianism is extreme, the 
state forges alliances with certain groups. Policy responds to those groups, either directly 
or indirectly. That policy, in turn, affects economic development. While the nature of this 
relationship and the nature of factors involved is a subject of debate, few would discount 
that such a relationship does exist or that such factors are important. Intervening variables
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can be dealt with and weighed according to their relative influence on economic policies 
and economic development. By acknowledging the existence of the above-mentioned 
intervening variables and indirect linkages between interest groups and policy, this paper 
attempts to largely overcome these defects.
This paper tries, by looking at only a case from each region instead of all four East 
Asian and Latin American NICs, to avoid some of the stereotypification of the differences 
of countries of East Asia and Latin America that has occurred elsewhere. Particularly, this 
paper adopts the perspective of the market failure theorist that, in matters of state strength 
and intervention, the NICs are more alike than different. Moreover, it argues that wise 
state intervention can help late developing firms overcome market failure. Even the most 
conservative o f neoliberals would probably admit that macroeconomic intervention is a 
necessary evil, though he or she would suggest that it be used with great care and discon­
tinued as soon as possible. However, macroeconomic intervention is inherently slower 
than microeconomic intervention and many developing countries cannot afford to wait.
Still, even greater care must be taken in the way microeconomic intervention is applied 
than that which is true of macroeconomic.
This paper also embraces the assumptions of market failure theory that the nature 
of industrial firms is a critical determinant of development. It contends that the oligopo­
lized firm has a competitive advantage on the world market. It finds domestic firms to be 
the more preferable mode of dominance in production for the developing country rather 
than foreign firms. But it takes a neoliberal view of public capital dominating the econo­
my, though it would not argue that public firms do have their place in late development.
Though this paper tends to side with the market failure theorists on most issues, it 
submits that there is an inherent validity to most of the relationships described in the 
neoliberal. These relationships hold true to the greatest extent in the developed countries. 
In some cases, they work in developing countries and in others they do not. Sometimes 
these relationships work in different and even opposite ways than what the neoliberal 
postulates. It also recognizes the complementary nature of each of these theories to the 
other. Both theories are valid within their own context. Above, this paper analyzes how 
two theories interpret the comparative developmental process of the East Asian NICs,
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including Korea, and the Latin American NICs, including Brazil. In the next section, this 
paper analyzes in more detail how the theories which will be used in the remainder of this 
paper, market failure, explains the comparative developmental process of the case studies. 
In accordance with market failure theory, the section below contends that the common 
features in Brazil and Korea's comparative political economies far outweighed the 
differences, though it admits that certain differences remain. The subtle, but critical, 
differences in institutions, developmental alliances, and economic policies are posited as 
the reason Korea developed more rapidly than Brazil.
MARKET FAILURE THEORY AND THE CASE STUDIES
This section focuses on the major institutions (the state and the firm) engaged in 
industrialization in Korea and Brazil and the alliances these institutions forge. It also 
looks at the economic policies in these countries. Finally, this section considers economic 
development as it occurred in the case studies. The sections on institutions and economic 
policies are intended as a literature review to help the reader understand these regularities 
and differences. This section on such comparative economic development is in statistical 
form with some interpretive analysis. Below, the paper begins with a discussion striking 
similarities and lesser differences of the two major institutions (the state and firms) 
associated with the development process in Brazil and Korea. Within the text of the two 
subsections on the state and firms, the paper suggests the strong similarities and subtle 
differences in the developmental alliances these institutions form in the case studies.
MAJOR INSTITUTIONS 
The State
The first institution this thesis will study is the state. The single most contentious 
issue in academic circles in recent years has been whether an interventionist state promotes 
development or hinders it. As mentioned above, neoliberals claim that since the free 
market is the perfect distributor of wealth among different sectors of the economy, state 
economic intervention stymies economic development. Thus, neoliberals tend to contrast 
the interventionist state of Brazil (or those of Latin America) with the noninterventionist
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state of Korea (or those of East Asia).13 However, as discussed previously, other scholars 
have recently offered an alternative (or market failure) view. They believe that, 
particularly in developing countries, market failures either prevent new comparative 
advantages from being realized or impede development to the extent that societal welfare 
is not maximized. Consequently, the state should intervene in the economy to mediate 
market forces in a way which promotes economic development. Amsden gives a good 
description of how market failures affect late industrializes and how the state in such 
cases has worked to remedy such failures.
The inherent conflicts of the market apply to all users, rich and poor alike, 
but the conflicts are sharpest among the least well endowed. Countries with low 
productivity require low interest rates to stimulate investment and high interest 
rates to induce people to save. They need undervalued exchange rates to induce 
exports and overvalued exchange rates to minimize the cost of foreign debt 
repayment and of imports—not just raw materials, which rich and poor 
countries alike require, but also intermediates and capital goods, which poor 
countries alone but are unable to produce. They must protect their new industries 
from foreign competition, but they require free trade to meet their import needs. 
They crave stability to grow, to keep their capital at home, and to direct their 
investment toward long term ventures. Yet the prerequisite to stability is growth.
Under such disequilibriating conditions the state's role in late industrializing 
countries is to mediate market forces. The state in late industrialization has inter­
vened to address the needs of both savers and investors, and of both exporters and 
importers, by creating multiple prices. Some interest rates are higher than others. 
Importers and exporters face different prices for foreign currency. As far as the 
state in late industrialization has intervened to establish multiple prices in the same 
market, the state cannot be said to have gotten the relative prices "right" as 
dictated by supply and demand. In fact, the state in late industrialization has set 
the relative prices deliberately "wrong" in order to create profitable investment 
opportunities.14
Thus, the new literature contends that while the Brazilian state may have identified and 
intervened to overcome many market failures, the Korean state identified and intervened 
to overcome more market failures than Brazil. Thus, while Brazil was able to develop 
rapidly, Korea was able to develop faster.
As this thesis analyzes and establishes its position on the comparative magnitudes
13Rhys Jenkins. "Comparison." 197-198.
14Amsden. Giant 13-14.
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of the differences and similarities in Korean and Brazilian developmental models, it must 
determine whether the states in Brazil and Korea were more different than alike (as the 
neoliberal view contends) or whether the states in Brazil and Korea and other late 
developers were more alike than different (as the market failure view contends). This 
thesis has found more evidence in favor o f the latter view on this count. Below, much of 
this section is devoted to the task of establishing its position on the (small) amount of 
difference between state interventionism in Korea and Brazil. It does this by eliciting 
observations by leading scholars defending this contention. The case for widespread 
economic intervention may be easier to document for Brazil than for Korea. This is 
because, while the Brazilian state's intervention into the market is common knowledge, 
"[t]he 'alternative' literature emphasizing the role of the state in the Korean development 
experience is still in its infancy."15 This paper contends that the East Asian NICs (includ­
ing Korea) and Latin American NICs (including Brazil) were not so different in that they 
both possessed states willing to intervene in the economy so that the state could distort 
prices to make certain forms of economic activity more profitable than others.
Still, the nature of the state was not identical in these countries. In Korea, General 
Park Chung Hee assumed the presidency in the wake of the 1960 military coup. Both the 
strong nature of the state and the ideological base for its strategy "should at least partly be 
understood as an action of the conscious actions taken by the military regime of Park 
Chung Hee, which fundamentally shaped the political economy of the country for decades 
to come."16 But the die had already been cast. After Park's assassination, the military 
regime was quickly reestablished, after a short interruption by a democratic regime, by the 
rulership of Chun Doo Hwan which lasted for the next eight years and bore striking like­
ness to the Park model, despite some moves toward liberalization (more apparent than 
real) and a concrete dedication to orthodox macroeconomic policy.
Since Park had been educated in Japan and the Japanese had either trained or 
educated the preponderance of the members of the bureaucracy, Japanese economic phil­
osophy is a logical place to begin. While Japan is cited as a bastion of Western capitalism,
ISChang. "Industrial Policy." 131.
16Ibid.. 151.
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this is a gross overgeneralization. Far from studying neoliberal theories, Japanese acade­
mia in the mid-twentieth century was centered on the theories of dependent development 
proffered by Karl Marx, Joseph Schumpter, and Friedrich List. The Korean ideology of 
anti-communism sat uncomfortably with the technocratic belief in "guided capitalism."
A number of important ideas followed from this education. The state in both cases 
emphasized industry with its developmental policy and such development was cased as a 
struggle against an unfriendly market, that if left undisturbed, would lead only to slow 
growth. While the Koreans may have internalized the Japanese model, they also refined 
and condensed it. Thus Korea, like Japan, did not trust macroeconomic intervention into 
the economy because of the uncertain influence on particular sectors. Instead, the Asian 
model emphasized intervention into individual sectors and firms (microeconomic inter­
vention). The state annually set parameters for how much prices in specific commodities 
would be allowed to rise. "It is not clear to us what could be more 'stifling', if so many 
firms have so little freedom to decide what and how much to produce at what price."17
The Japanese economic philosophy, also unlike neoliberalism, did not view 
competition as healthy. On the contrary, oligopoly was encouraged so that social waste 
could be avoided. But such capital accumulation was to be carried out by local firms, 
since Korea followed Japan's lead in distrusting large agglomerations of foreign invest­
ment. Domestic firms would have to undertake the difficult task of learning so the fruits of 
technology could be enjoyed by national firms and the national economy, not by foreign 
firms and foreign economies. East Asian corporatism required the state to ensure that 
profits be reinvested at home to expand the domestic industrial empire, instead of having 
foreign firms export their profits so that they could contribute to empire building else­
where. Similarly, there was no contest concerning the distribution of wealth between the 
working and the capitalist class. Since the state emphasized industrial investment, wealth 
would not go to labor for consumption but would go to investment. Complementing this 
anticonsumption bias, exporting was simultaneously encouraged so that rents from the 
world market, not the domestic, were realized to the greatest extent possible. Out of this 
Japanese model, the Park administration forged alliances with traditional industrialists to
17Ibid.. 138.
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become exporters and with progressive entrepreneurs to become industrially diversified. 
The state disciplined both traditional firms and more modem ones to serve in their 
respective roles.18 The state required exporting of both types of firms. The state-owned 
banking system became the major instrument of discipline in B-A Korea.
Quite apart from the Korean situation, the initial Brazilian military government had 
an almost dichotomous belief in orthodox principles of the free market, on the one hand, 
and of state intervention into the market, on the other. This dichotomy lead to policy 
inconsistencies within single military regimes as well as larger inconsistencies between 
successive military regimes. While the Korean state commanded nearly every detail of its 
economy, the Brazilian state was more comfortable with a mix of intervention and mar­
kets. Such a detailed plethora of microinterventions as occurred in the Korean case was a 
little too radical to sit well with the Brazilian state's orthodox counterpart. Castello Branco 
and his bureaucracy had been educated in Brazil and in America. Castello Branco's 
domestic education had come from the Brazilian Military College. The military' college 
emphasized anti-communism and distrusted heavy intervention into the economy.19 Eco­
nomic philosophy in Brazil was mixed with some elements believing in heavy doses of 
state intervention so that the national destiny of Brazil to be a great power could be 
effected with greatest speed. On the other hand, most economic philosophy in America 
follows the principles of orthodoxy or neoliberalism. Thus, a deep rift existed in Brazil 
over the "correct" economic philosophy Brazil should utilize in its development plans.
A number of ideas flowed from the technocratic elite in the Brazilian state. From 
the belief in liberal democracy flowed the belief that Brazil, though authoritarian, should 
not be ruled by a single dictator. Consequently, Brazil was ruled by four major presidents 
during the twenty years of military rule. The policy of each had little to do with the its 
successor. Castello Branco tried to deal with the problems of foreign debt, balance of 
payments deficits, and inflation by infusing the economy with a policy of extreme neolib­
eralism which crippled growth and did not slow inflation. Medici loosened monetary
18Ibid.. 148 and Amsden, Giant. 69. 74.
l9The exception to this free market ideology of the Brazilian military lay in their belief in expansion 
of public enterprise and in their increasing conversion to larger doses of macroeconomic intervention.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
30
policy which not only slowed inflation but also brought about the most rapid capital 
accumulation Brazil has ever seen. Geisel heavily manipulated macroeconomic prices to 
encourage a period of industrial modernization. Figueiredo tried to deal with the foreign 
debt crisis, balance of payments deficits, and inflation by resorting, like Castello Branco, to 
extreme neoliberalism which crippled economic growth and did not slow inflation.
The dichotomy in economic ideology was not only felt between different regimes 
but within each of them as well. Out of an attempt to rationalize between the philosophies 
of state nonintervention into the economy and state intervention, Brazilian heterodoxy was 
bom. To rationalize this dichotomy, Brazil opted for macroeconomic intervention instead 
of microeconomic intervention. With macroeconomic intervention, market forces were 
still allowed to operate, but they did this under a distorted price structure. Firms would 
still be able to carry out their basic investment decisions "freely" within this distorted 
market. Under microeconomic intervention, the state would have been required to tell 
private firms what to produce, at what price, and how much of it to produce. However, 
the state in both Korea and Brazil did direct firms in the destination of the goods pro­
duced. While the Korean emphasis was on directing its goods to foreign consumers, 
Brazilian emphasis, under its ISI economy, was on directing its products to domestic 
consumers. Consequently, in the Brazilian setting, a conflict emerged between how much 
wealth to distribute to consumers and how much wealth to distribute to producers. Since 
the state in the latter part of its B-A period left this decision unresolved and did not use its 
indexing system effectively to control price increases and wage increases, a fight for shares 
of wealth emerged in Brazil which became a leading source o f Brazilian inflation.
Like Korea, Brazil encouraged an oligopolized firm structure to emerge, though 
not quite so oligopolized as the Korean case. The forms this oligopoly took were also 
different. Brazil had been more cosmopolitan toward foreign capital in the 1950s, and this 
resulted in most oligopolized firms in the dynamic sectors in foreign hands in the 1950s 
and 1960s. To avoid market failure in the 1970s, Brazil wished to, but could not, direct 
the investment of foreign firms as easily as the Korean state could direct the investment of 
its local firms. In the wake of the 1950s' massive FDI inflow, Brazil also no longer had a 
dynamic local capitalist class. Consequently, the Brazilian state created or expanded
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public firms to enter some heavy, basic, and infrastructural industries.
However, the legacy of profound foreign capital penetration in Brazil was not the 
only deciding factor in the expansion of the public sector: the fact is that the state's 
ideology in Brazil would not permit it to tell the private sector what to produce and so it 
introduced public firms for this purpose. While the major microeconomic tool in Korea 
was the state-owned banking system that directed local firms to behave in desired patterns, 
the major microeconomic tool in Brazil was the state-owned firm. This created a second- 
best world in both cases: in terms of maximizing development, local firms would have 
been the preferable device to modernize industrial structure as opposed to foreign capital 
or public capital. Public firms are often less efficient producers than private, and foreign 
firms cannot be directed to maximize national development to the extent that local firms 
can. Brazil's partial faith in the market caused it to use macroeconomic policy to a greater 
extent than microeconomic policy and caused it to use different (and less effective) 
microeconomic tools as well. State ideology and intervention in both Brazil and Korea 
was directed toward the promotion of the industrial elite. But the different brands of 
ideology and intervention in Brazil and Korea led to a different set of industrial elite in 
each country. While Korea's stronger state promoted a level of industrial concentration 
and shaped the behavior o f its producers, Brazil's weaker state did not work effectively 
with its industrial producers. However, differences in state strength in Korea and Brazil 
was one of degree and not of kind: Brazil and Korea both had strong states.
Not only was the relative strength of Brazil and South Korea more similar than 
different, but the variations in such strength seem to conform to variations in state 
developmental policy. Cumings writes: "[Park’s B-A] regime was the political 
consequence of timing and sequence in industrialization, and the requisites of ‘late-late’ 
development in the 1970s. It was comparable in important ways to the Brazilian case, 
especially during its growth spurts (1968-74) and its ‘deepening’ (1974-78)."20 Hence,
20Bruce Cumings, "The Abortive Abertura: South Korea in the Light of the Latin American 
Experience," New Left Review , no. 197 (January/February 1989): 7. Market failure theorists who associate 
development with authoritarianism are likely to be part of the B-A theoretical camp. This camp includes both 
Latin American and Korean scholars: the original coonceptualization o f B-A theory was O'Donnell 
Bureaucratic-Authoritarianiam. In this work, he related the theory of B-A to a number of Latin American 
countries. Of all theses countries. O'Donnell claimed that Argentina and Brazil demonstrated the closest fit of
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proper attention will be given in the following chapters to the implications of major regime 
changes for economic development in the following chapters.
Aside from the issue of the coincidence of changes of economic policy and changes 
in political regime types is the issue of whether authoritarian governments are better able 
to industrialize more rapidly than democratic ones. Korea developed most rapidly under 
conditions of authoritarianism, while Brazil seems to have industrialized just as rapidly (or 
more so) under conditions of democracy as they did under authoritarianism. Granted, the 
Brazilian democracy accomplished its rapid industrialization via a heavy influx of foreign 
firms, which proved a sub-optimal result in the long-run. However, there is more to the 
story of industrialization than purely political considerations. These countries industri­
alized with an interaction of political and economic actors which is explored below.
Industrial Firms
Above, this thesis has emphasized the importance of the similarities in the state (in
model to country. Though a seminal work, it had its critics. In fact, editor David Collier, New Authoritarianism 
elicited scathing critiques of the model form esteemed contributors. Even now this work is considered one of 
the classic studies of Latin America. Also, see James M. Malloy, ed.. Authoritarianism and Corporatism 
in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977) and especially the contribution by 
O'Donnell, "Corporatism and the Question of the State." Also see Guillermo O'Donnell. "Reflections on 
the Question of Change in the Bureaucratic Authoritarian State." Latin American Research Review. 12. 
no. 1 (1978): 3-38.
After the early work of O'Donnell. some have tried to show the relationship between change in 
industrial strategy and regime "hardening." The state in South Korea is said to grow more authoritarian as it 
shifts to a new industrialization strategy so that it can be objective in deciding how to maximize national 
development. Otherwise, it is said the state might run the risk of pandering to the complaints of industries 
which were subsidized under the previous industrialization strategy but excluded from subsidization under the 
new one. In any case, such a shift might lead to distributional conflicts or. in other words, objections horn 
entrenched interests and lead to societal unrest which might call a  police state into action. Bruce Cumings was 
among the first to elaborate the merits of the bureaucratic-authoritarian model in terms of South Korea. See 
Bruce Cumings, "The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy: Industrial Sectors. 
Product Cycles, and Political Consequences." in The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism, ed. 
Fredric C. Deyo (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1987); Bruce Cumings, "Abortive Abertura,"5-32: Bruce 
Cumings, "World Systems and Authoritarian Regimes in Korea. 1948-1984." in Contending Approaches to the 
Political Economy of Taiwan, eds. Edwin A. Winkler and Susan Greenhalgh (Armonk: M. E. Sharp. 1988); 
Hyung Baeg Im, "The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in South Korea," World Politics. 39. no. 2 
(January 1987): 231-257; Han Sang-jin, "Bureaucratic Authoritarianism and Economic Development in Korea 
during the Yushin Period." in Dependency Issues in Korean Development, ed. Kim Kyong-dong (Seoul: Seoul 
National University. 1987); Jan Jip Choi, "Political Cleavages in South Korea." in State and Society in 
Contemporary Korea, ed. Hagen Koo (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); Cotton contends that the B-A 
perspective is inappropriate in James Cotton. "Understanding the State in South Korea: Bureaucratic- 
Authoritarian or State Autonomy Theory?" Comparative Political Studies 24. no.4 (January 1992): 512-531.
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terms of autonomy and interventionism) in explaining similar outcomes in terms of 
economic policy and economic development in Korean and Brazil. Moreover, the above 
has underscored the importance of subtle differences in the state (in terms of autonomy 
and interventionism) in explaining (mostly) subtle divergences in terms of economic policy 
and economic development. While the rationale, as discussed above, of heavy state 
intervention is to correct for market failures, the presence of other groups besides local 
capital inhabiting a dominant position in industrial production will be considered a market 
failure. While this thesis will discuss both market failures of public and foreign domination 
of a country's productive structure, Lall does a good job describing the reasons that 
foreign firm domination can be considered a market failure and thus should receive state 
intervention to prevent such an outcome.
[It has been noted long ago] that the free market may fail to ensure optimal 
innovative activity because of imperfect appropriability of information and skills. 
Developing countries, however, face an additional problem. It is generally easier 
to import foreign technologies fully "packaged," where the process is commercially 
proven, and where the supplier provides the hard and software, does the startup, 
training and adaptation, and manages the operation and marketing. In its extreme 
form, fu lly internalized technology transfer takes the form  o f wholly foreign- 
owned direct investment (FDl) [emphasis mine]. This is an effective and relatively 
less risky way to access foreign technology, but it leads to little technology acqui­
sition in the developing country apart from production skills. The movement from 
production to innovative activity involves a distinct strategic decision which 
foreign investors tend to be unwilling to take in developing countries. There is 
generally less investment in design, development and innovation in foreign firms 
compared to local firms, and the externalities generated by the technological 
activity that does take place tends to be captured by the investor rather than the 
host economy.
There is, in other words, a risk o f market failure in capability deepening 
because o f learning costs, very similar in nature to infant industry considerations. 
To ensure socially optimal allocation, it may be necessary to restrict techno­
logical import in "internalized” form s and promote those in "externalized" form s 
(licensing and equipment): here the buyer has to do much more "homework" and 
so can develop broader and deeper capabilities [emphasis mine].. . .  In order to 
bear the risks, costs and expenses of locally absorbing . . . very complex technol­
ogies, it may be necessary to promote large firm size. Technological deepening 
can be a legitimate goal of industrial policy, since development of indigenous 
design and innovative capabilities have many beneficial externalities .. . [like]
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the development of local suppliers and subcontractors.21
While the state was very important in determining these outcomes, the industrial 
firms were, of course, very important in the determination of economic policy and eco­
nomic development. Corresponding to the model proposed above, this thesis will contend 
that major similarities in the influence of the industrial firm in determination of state eco­
nomic policy led to pro-industrial policies in Brazil and Korea. These pro-industrial 
policies furthered industrialization in Korea and Brazil contributed to high rates of 
industrialization in Korea and Brazil. Moreover, the centrality of industrial production 
among other interest groups meant that industrialization would progress rapidly in both 
countries. Nevertheless, the differences among the types of capital in Korea and Brazil led 
to policy and developmental differences in these countries.
In essence, this section on the industrial firm is the complement of the former 
section on the state. While the former section attempted to show how the autonomy of 
the state had important implications for development in Korea and Brazil, this section 
describes how limits on that autonomy also had important implications for policy. While 
the previous section focused on the state, primarily, and firms, secondarily, this section 
focuses on firms, primarily, and the state, secondarily. In both cases, the firm and the state 
are given special attention, because of their centrality in industrialization. The rise of state 
intervention and the rise of a particular type of firm were interactive in Korea and Brazil.
First, the influence that industrial firms in Brazil and Korea did have on their 
respective states and the policies they produced must be addressed. As argued above, this 
influence was indirect in both cases but perhaps more direct in Brazil than it was in Korea. 
Comparing the nature of the state-firm relationship in Korea ("Korea, Inc.") with the 
nature of the state-firm relationship in Brazil ("triple alliance") should serve to define the 
major similarities and subtle differences of these pacts between the state and producers in 
the reader's mind. Jones and Sakong describe "Korea, Inc." well: "If the corporate 
analogy were applied to Korea, it would be far closer to the truth to say that the President 
chairs a policy board composed of ministers, with businessmen as operationally 
independent managers or production units. The success of the conglomerate depends on
21Lall. "Bell Toll." 649.
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the performance of the managers whose counsel is valued . . . ,  but they are emphatically
not members of the board. . . .  The government's wishes are tantamount to commands,
and business does not dare take them lightly."22 Likewise, Jenkins compares and contrasts
Brazil to the East Asian model.
The Latin American bureaucratic authoritarian regimes may have aspired to the 
type of state autonomy found in East Asia but they came to power in conditions in 
which many existing groups already exercised considerable influence over the 
state. . .  . Within Latin America, the Brazilian state, particularly under the military 
. .. Brazil was closer to the 'East Asian model' than either Mexico or Argentina.
. .. However, the . . .  model of development in Brazil in this period was based on 
a "triple alliance" between multinational, state and local capital. . .  . Such obser­
vations serve to reinforce the argument that relative autonomy of the state is 
the crucial factor in explaining rapid industrial development in the Newly 
Industrializing Countries.23
The type of firm has an impact on the state’s autonomy and ability to intervene. The
Brazilian state was not as autonomous as the Korean because the Brazilian state competed
with an alternative source of power, the multinational. The multinational was an
alternative power source because it could simply leave the country if state intervention too
greatly conflicted with its interests. Moreover, this alternative source of power was able
to influence the state in critical ways which did not maximize national development. As
suggested above, local capital did not represent an independent power source. In Korea,
local firms allied themselves to the state in their mutual interest in accumulation, but they
could not pretend to have the type o f power to contradict the state's wishes, at least in the
early stages of development, that foreign capital had in Brazil. Korean local capital was
tied to Korean soil and to the wishes of the Korean state in a way that Brazilian foreign
capital was not. Perhaps a good way to illustrate the difference between Korean state and
industry, on the one hand, and the Brazilian state and industry, on the other, is that in the
former relationship the state commanded much more discipline than in the latter. " Where
Korea differs from  most other late developing countries is in the discipline its state
exercises over private firm s.. .  . Discipline may be thought of as comprising two
•yy
Jones and Sakong, Government. 67,68,69.
^Jenkins. "Comparison." 203, 225.
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interrelated dimensions: penalizing poor performers; and rewarding only good ones.”24 
Rewarding firms with good performance in exports, new product introduction, or R&D 
served to intensify the degree of oligopolization. The Korean state rewarded good 
performers with subsidized loans and further licenses to expand. However, the Korean 
state penalized blatantly poor performers by refusing them subsidized loans, redistributing 
their industries to more deserving firms, or refusing to bail them out of bankruptcy.
In Korea, the dominant firm type has always been local capital and such capital 
was always in the minds o f the political elite as it formulated developmental strategy. In 
the 1950s, huge amounts of aid were channelled to light industry generally and were used 
to select members of the industrial elite, some of whom would become leaders of the 
Korean conglomerates (the chaebol)?5 Although the Brazilian industrial structure may 
have changed more rapidly than Korea's the rates of industrial transformation were higher 
in Korea than Brazil.
The alliance structure after the military coup of 1961 remained basically the same 
between the Rhee and the Park regimes but, between these two presidential administra­
tions, the power of firms vis a vis the state shifted decidedly in favor of the latter. After a 
perfunctory chilling of relations between the state and these industries (many of the 
wealthiest business leaders were charged with corruption and were awaiting sentencing), 
the Park regime reestablished warm relations with this group. "At the time of the military 
coup, inflation was down momentarily due to a strong stabilization package adopted in 
1957, but GNP was stagnant. The military regime divided its attention to minister to two 
influential groups: cotton textile firms . . . demanding relief from excess capacity; and the 
progressive "millionaires," or chaebol, in disfavor with the public and the press for having
24Amsden, Giant. 14. 15.
25Ibid.. 40. 41. Amsden uses a United Nations study to substantiate her assertion that light and heavy 
industry grew at a phenomenal rate in Korea. In this UN study, Korea not only was ahead of the pack, but it 
was way ahead. Korean annual percent change in heavy and light manufacturing output were estimated at 20% 
and 18%, respectively. Yugoslavia and West Berlin were its closest competitors. In heavy and light 
manufacturing. Yugoslavia showed 16% and 12% change, respectively, while West Berlin showed around 
18% and 11%. All other countries (including Brazil with around 14% change in heavy industry and 3% 
change in light) fell in a tight configuration behind Yugoslavia and West Berlin on the high side and the US on 
the low side (with -1% change in heavy and light manufacturing). Ceylon is the single exception on the low 
side with -1% and -8% change in heavy and light industry, respectively. See United Nations, Patterns of 
Industrial Growth. 1938-1958 (New York: UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 1960).
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accumulated illicit wealth. Out of ministrations to influential groups . . . came Korea's 
accumulation model."26
The state gave the cotton textile firms the relief they needed, albeit by an avenue 
they were reticent to take. Through a combination of subsidy and coercion, the state 
directed trade policy which pushed light manufacturers to export intensively. If trade 
policies were created with traditional firms in mind, investment policies were promulgated 
with the chaebol in mind. The chaebol, again, through a combination of subsidy and 
coercion, were pushed to enter new industries and acquire new technologies. Such policy, 
though complementary, is easily periodized: trade policy directed toward traditional firms 
was most heavily stressed in the 1960s, while investment policies directed toward the 
chaebol were most widely stressed during the 1970s.
In Brazil from the 1950s to the early 1970s, the dominant industrial firm type was 
the foreign firm. The dominant type of industrial policy was secondary ISI. Baer explains 
the relationship in this country between the economic policy and the dominant firm type, 
the multinational, at that time. In this context, Baer clearly outlines why the state-foreign 
firm alliance in Brazil was such that an export-oriented path that Korea took was not an 
option. "ISI depended on foreign investments, and a major incentive to foreign capital was 
the large protected domestic market. Had the Brazilian government conditioned the 
establishment of foreign-owned firms on the massive exportation of Brazilian-produced 
goods, the multinationals might have refused to move into Brazil. Only after inducing 
foreign firms to invest massive funds in Brazilian production facilities did the government 
have the power to pressure them into exporting."27 Granted, the state alliance with the 
foreign firms was not the only reason Brazil showed little concern over export expansion 
at this time. This was because ISI was supposed to reduce Brazil's trade dependence. 
However, trade dependence in Brazil was more transformed than reduced.
In the 1970s, deepening in Brazil promoted state firm acquisition of a massive 
amount of economic power in short order. Foreign credit was often channelled to state 
firms and secondary ISI supported them as they came to dominate public utilities,
26 Amsden. Giant. 64.
27Baer. "Political Determinants.” 57-58.
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chemicals, mining, steel, and transport services. Baer contends that the accumulation of 
economic power by the state was not part of some grand design but arose from a number 
of ad hoc policies designed to react to "international economic crises; the desire to 
control the activities of foreign capital. . . ;  and the ambition to industrialize rapidly in a 
backward country."2* In a way, the last two points are complementary. Since foreign 
firms were reluctant to enter new industries besides consumer durables and because the 
state was limited in its power to force such modernization on such firms, the state found 
itself left with little alternative but to enter these new areas itself. This was especially true 
since local firms had been relegated to the more technologically backward areas of 
industry. But local industry, having witnessed its displacement in the 1950s by foreign 
firms was by no means happy that it was being displaced again by public firms. Fishlow 
explains why the Brazilian method of modernization was less successful than the Korean 
method in terms of differing levels o f state autonomy in Brazil and the East Asian NICs.
[The developmental problems Brazil experienced in the early 1980s arose 
from the persistent]. . . weakness of the Brazilian State. . . . This goes against the 
conventional wisdom that sees only large doses of public participation in the 
economy. . . .  Yet the Brazilian State neither commanded nor effectively cooper­
ated with the private sector. It had no secure control over real resources. Rather 
the Brazilian public sector experienced progressive fiscal difficulty over this period 
diminishing its capacity to guide needed structural adjustment. Credit subsidies and 
other incentives proliferated, but required an increasing inflationary tax to finance 
them. Intervention had a diminishing impact; its generalization was a symptom of 
weakness. State enterprises were a direct instrument but they foundered on the 
need to increasingly secure their resources from abroad. Increasingly parastatals 
became the means of obtaining resources for other activities rather than agents for 
priority real investment. Weakness was self-fulfilling. Larger and larger efforts 
were necessary to persuade the private sector in the validity of signals emanating 
from policymakers. As subsidies multiplied in response to private demands, the 
relative inducements required to undertake the relative reallocation became 
blurred, while deficits increased.
The conclusion from the successful Asian development experience in the 
last two decades is not only that export promotion can yield favorable results in 
and expanding world economy, but also strong State intervention can be positive. 
In the Latin American case, the problem has been that intervention has frequently 
yielded negative outcomes. This is because the intervention often reflects state 
weakness rather than strength. State priorities can be diluted and deflected by
2*Ibid.. 66.
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decisions o f private interests who are opposed; when pursued, they become more
costly by reason of the lack of cooperative support.29
The influence of the Brazilian of private sector led to pricing concessions (which worsened 
inflation directly) and led to outright fiscal gratuities when the state could least afford it 
(which worsened inflation indirectly). Though the state had its goals for deepening via 
state firms, this was diluted by societal influence. But the two devices that Korea used to 
their full potential were state allocated industrial licenses and state allocated credit at 
differential prices. While Brazil used both these devices, it failed to do so to the measure 
that Korea did and, more importantly, it failed to exert discipline over economic agents.
This thesis also implies that not only did industrial firms contribute to economic 
policy which affected economic development, it suggests that the type of industrial firm 
had a direct impact on industrialization, itself. The different types o f firms are local, 
foreign, and public. The effect of firm types on industrialization is predicated on the 
different type of logic each type of firm uses. Evans states that the logic of the multi­
nationals (MNCs) means that they "will maximize their profits in terms of a global 
strategy, not a local one."30 Bounded rationality, which is an important part of the global 
strategy, conditions choices "about what products to produce, where to produce them, 
and how to produce them."31 The bounded rationality of the MNCs, which originated in 
the center countries, postulates that profits should be kept close to home. Thus, the MNCs 
may be hesitant to come to the peripheral countries, in the first place, to modernize 
production in the periphery over time or to share technology with local firms in these 
countries. This globalist strategy conflicts with the nationalist logic of the developmental 
state and, to a lesser extent, with the logic of the local firm. "The point is that when . . . 
[MNCs] were wrong, they tended to be wrong in the direction of overestimating the 
riskiness of investment in the periphery. The classic entrepreneur is just the opposite. . . . 
Bounded rationality makes the foreign investor a poor candidate for the entrepreneurial 
role. . ..  Multinationals have . . . every motivation to keep the innovative side of their
^ishlow . ”Tale.” 110-111.
30Evans. Dependent Development. 36.
31Ibid.
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businesses as close to home as possible. As long as they are free to make that choice, the 
industrialization on the periphery will remain partial."32
Nevertheless, in Brazil and in other instances of dependent development, there has 
been a force that has tried to condition the globalist logic of the multinational to be more 
accommodating toward the dictates of national development. For Evans, this force could 
not come from local capital which had "no opening for either political domination or 
economic hegemony. Its position and privileges were always contingent on its ability to 
make alliances with other elite groups."33 Instead, the state was the critical institution 
disciplining the multinationals.
Regardless of the ambiguities in relation to the national bourgeoisie, the 
centrality of the state to accumulation on the periphery is incontrovertible. . . . 
Unless the state can enforce a priority on local capital accumulation and push for 
local industrialization effectively, there is no effective sponsor for peripheral 
industrialization. . .  .
. . . The problem is to redirect the global rationality of the multinational 
when it conflicts with the necessities of local accumulation. The state must 
continually coerce or cajole the multinational into undertaking roles that they 
would otherwise abdicate. The power and the flexibility of the multinationals 
suggest that making the returns to desired local investments more attractive is the 
least problematic way o f assuring such a response, but this pure incentive method 
has other costs. It usually means shifting some of the local surplus to the multi­
nationals at the expense of either the national bourgeoisie or the state itself.
Relying too heavily on coercing the multinationals is also costly. Not only are 
they likely to withdraw from entrepreneurial ventures, but they are likely to try 
to mobilize some form of political intervention both internally and externally. 
Achieving an effective blend o f coercion and incentive [if MNCs dominate] 
is not likely to be easy, [emphasis mine]34
However, the Korean situation tends to contradict some of Evan's suppositions 
about the local sector because the state built up a strong local capital sector. In Korea, 
economic development could be enhanced because of the stronger harmony of interests 
between local capital, which looks more favorably toward entrepreneurship and the 
nationalist logic of development, and the developmentalist state, which employs such logic
32IbicL. 176-177. 36. 37.
33Ibid.. 39.
^ i d . ,  43.44.
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in its policies. The less difference between the parties' logic of the developmental alliance, 
the greater harmony there will be as these parties work to realize national economic devel­
opment, itself. In addition, technology, once "learned" by the national firms, is their 
property and the profits they received from such production stay at home. The compar­
ative research conducted here also suggests that the export push in Korea was facilitated 
by the dominance of local firms. After all, foreign firms normally enter a country to jump 
over barriers and cater to the domestic market of the late developing country. Much 
effort must be expended to reorient this logic.
While Korea may not substantiate Evan's contentions about the weakness of local 
capital, Korea is certainly, like Brazil, a case where the dominant force behind the 
conditioning of global rationality of the multinationals came primarily from the state. The 
relative absence of multinationals enhanced the state's ability to discipline its firms to work 
within the laws of national development: "There are fewer multinationals in Korea than in 
almost any other late-industrializing country ..  . [which] almost certainly made it easier for 
the state to discipline private sector firms, not the least o f all in the buildup of a domestic 
science and technology capability."35 Mardon describes how the Korean state relegated 
foreign direct investment (FDI) to a minor role to foreign loans and adroitly exploited 
foreign capital to complement its developmental designs (which included a dominant posi­
tion of local capital in the economy). The Korean case serves as a contrast to the relative 
absence of controls on foreign firm penetration in Brazil in the 1950s and thereafter.
Foreign capital and technological inflows were coordinated with develop­
ment plans. Projects for which domestic technical knowledge was adequate were 
closed to foreign penetration, while those for which foreign technical assistance 
was necessary were designated open to foreign penetration. These plans and the 
designated"closed" and "open" sectors were strictly adhered to in the implementa­
tion of industrial development because the Korean leadership feared that financially 
strong and technologically advanced foreign firms would undermine the develop­
ment of domestic firms and the ability of the state to control key economic and 
political decisions.
The government therefore . . . [guided] foreign capital inflows into a 
pattern that would enhance the implementation of development plans while it did 
not hinder the advancement of domestic enterprises. Foreign investment was 
considered to benefit the Korean national interest only when it produced in a
35Amsden. Giant. 147.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
42
manner that complemented official planning. . . . Foreign investment was not 
considered beneficial when it competed with domestic firms on the Korean 
market. . . .
. . . [Within the open sectors, all] foreign investments entering Korea 
must negotiate elaborate investment agreements with the government which 
attempts to specify conditions under which foreign investment may operate. These 
conditions may include (1) a joint venture to be formed with a Korean partner, 
through which the latter will obtain over a period of time, financial and operational 
control over the enterprise; (2) an agreement as to the levels of capital investment, 
output and export, the level and the type o f technology transfer, the provision of 
raw materials, and the access to foreign markets that the foreign investor will 
provide; and (3) an agreement of divestiture of foreign-held equity to the domestic 
partner at a specified future date. The effectiveness of these strategies varies by 
sector and by case; it depends on the governments perception of how necessary a 
particular foreign investor is . .. and on how attractive the Korean market is to 
the foreign investor.36
Another assertion this thesis will make, and this contradicts much of structuralist 
thought, is that an over-reliance on direct public industrialization will not maximize 
economic development, nor will it minimize developmental contradictions. Evans 
particularly applauds the role of state enterprise in the process of peripheral economic 
development to condition the behavior of multinationals toward national development.37 
However, hindsight and the comparative perspective allow us to question the viability of 
state enterprises in effectively promoting nationalist development. In recent years, Brazil's 
massive investments in state industrial enterprises have come under attack. These state 
enterprises have failed to perform as it was hoped and have suffered severe difficulties in 
the wake of the second oil crisis. On the other hand, Korea's local private enterprises have 
rapidly recovered from the second oil crisis and have continued to be the basis for rapid 
industrialization in this country. It may be, as the example of Korea illustrates, that local 
private firms under the guidance o f a strong state with major leadership commitment to 
growth is the ideal model to hasten national economic development.
There is one basic reason that local capital is preferable to public capital. As was 
the case with the hypothesis concerning the ideal foreign-local mixture, the hypothesis 
concerning the public-local mixture also demands that the differing types of logic used by
36Mardon, "Control of Foreign Capital," 116, 127.
37Evans, Dependent Development 46-47,213-227.
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the these different firm types be examined to determine which variant of logic is most 
conducive to maximize development in cases of late industrialization. The problem with 
state firms being the dominant locus of industrial investment is that they tend to base their 
decisions on political factors, not economic ones. To facilitate industrialization in the 
private sector, state enterprises have often made certain sacrifices private firms would not. 
They have suffered low returns because they supply basic inputs to the private sector at 
low costs.38 In the case of Brazil, public firms took the brunt of external crises such as the 
second oil crisis.39 By not concentrating narrowly on their own survival and aggrandize­
ment but also on the welfare of private local and foreign firms, state firms sowed the seeds 
of their own destruction in the severe economic hardship that Brazil faced in the 1980s. 
The split of focus of the state firm between its own welfare and the welfare of other 
economic agents (local and foreign firms) may be analogous to the compromised ability of 
the communist state to maximize development because of its split in focus between the 
productive sectors and the popular sectors, which will be discussed later. A certain 
division of labor and narrow focus on goal achievement between the state and the 
productive sectors is necessary for rapid development.
ECONOMIC POLICY
Having described this paper’s position on the magnitude of similarities and 
differences of institutions (particularly of the state) in Korea and Brazil, it will establish 
this thesis's position on the relative weights of similarities and differences of economic 
policy in these countries. There are two major schools o f thought on this issue. First, the 
neoliberal school emphasizes the differences in the trade-linked developmental policies in 
these countries (or regions). The alternative view, which will be promoted here, contends 
that, while there were differences in these countries' (or regions') trade-linked 
developmental strategy, the similarities were stronger than the differences. Gereffi is a 
good source to understand the subtle differences and major similarities of Latin American
38Baer. Brazilian Economy. 252.
39Ibid., 111. Even though public firms were called upon to make the sacrifice of adjustment, it was 
impossible to localize this sacrifice because of the extreme interconnectedness of economic agents in the 
Brazilian economy.
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(ie., Brazilian) and East Asian (ie., Korean) trade-linked developmental policy as it 
unfolded historically.40 "[T]he contrast often made between Latin America and East Asia 
representing inward- and outward-development models, respectively, is oversimplified. 
While this distinction is appropriate for some periods, a historical perspective shows that 
each of the regional pairs o f NICs has pursued both inward- and outward-oriented 
approaches. Rather than being mutually exclusive alternatives, the ISI and EOI 
development paths in fact are complementary and interactive."41
The model represented in figure 2 is a derivative of Gereffi's model except that it 
substitutes Korea for East Asia and makes some other minor alterations. Still, the original 
model's periodization of trade-linked development policy of Taiwan does not depart much 
from that of Korea, and the periodization of such policy in Mexico does not depart from 
those of Brazil at all. The five phases in his model consist of two "inward-oriented" and 
three "outward-oriented" periods of development. The commodity export phase typically 
entails the output of primary or semi-refined products for export primarily destined for the 
formal imperial or neo-imperial center countries. Primary ISI is the shift in an economy 
dominated by agrarian exports to one dominated by light manufactures (or consumer non­
durables) available primarily to the domestic market. Secondary ISI involves domestic 
production of "heavier" as well as more capital- and technology-intensive manufactures. 
The capital- and technology-intensive manufactures includes consumer durables, capital 
goods, and intermediate goods. Finally, there is primary EOI which tends toward 
emphasizing labor intensive "light" manufactures as its dynamic sectors, and secondary 
EOI, which leans toward stressing capital and technology intensive "heavy" manufactures. 
Consequently, secondary EOI requires a higher level of competence from personnel and a 
more rigorously developed local industrial base than primary EOI. While primary EOI 
concentrates efforts on promoting exports of traditional (or light) industries, secondary ISI
^See Gary Gereffi, "Rethinking Development Theory: Insights from East Asia and Latin America." 
Sociological Fnmm 4. no. 4 (1989), 505-33: Gary Gereffi, "Paths of Industrialization: An Overview," in 
Manufacturing Miracles: Paths of Industrialization in I atm America and East Asia, eds. Gary Gereffi and 
Donald L. Wyman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Gary Gereffi, "International Economics 
and Domestic Policies." Current Sociology 38, no. 2-3 (1990): 505-33.
41 Ibid.. 237.
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strives to engender exports of modem (or heavy) industries.
According to figure 2, Brazilian and Korean developmental policies are similar, 
first of all, because they started out the same. Brazil and South Korea went through a 
similar number o f years as well as overlapping periods in which both economies were 
dominated by commodity exports. In Brazil, this period lasted from 1880 to 1930, while 
in South Korea it lasted from 1910 to 1945. Also, both states followed up the (or brought 
on the early) demise of an economy dominated by the export of commodities with the 
policies of primary ISI. In fact, nearly all the states of late developing nations have 
created various price distortions which facilitate modernization except in the colonial or 
commodity export phase as Amsden describes.42
Despite the similarities in developmental policy regimes, there are differences in 
duration and timing of phases of trade orientation and in the fact that these orientations 
did diverge for a certain period. In regard to the former, Gereffi writes: "Primary ISI 
began earlier, lasted longer, and was perhaps more populist in Latin America than in East 
Asia."43 As can be seen, Korea's period of primary import substitution lasted only about a 
decade according to this model. Brazil's period of primary import substitution lasted 
about twice as long. In addition, while Brazil was undergoing secondary ISI during its 
1950s' democracy, Korea was undergoing primary ISI during its 1950s' democracy.
More interesting than the subtle differences in the duration of the same strategy 
(primary ISI) that these countries both pursued is the fact that, in 1960s, Korea's 
developmental path diverged from Brazil's. "The subsequent divergence stems from the 
way in which each country responded to the basic problems associated with the 
continuation of primary ISI."44 The problems, experienced by both countries, included 
rapidly rising inflation, a problem servicing foreign debt, and balance o f payments deficits. 
Balance of payments deficits and the resultant foreign debt were brought on by high levels 
of dependence on intermediate and capital goods as well as low levels o f manufactured 
exports. Korea considered the low level of manufactured exports to be the key problem
42 Amsden. Giant 12.
43Gereffi. "Domestic Policies," 237.
“ rbid.
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and initiated reforms to boost them in the early 1960s and created incentives to modernize 
industry. In the 1950s, Brazil considered the dependence on imports more critical.
Though Brazil attempted to reduce imports o f intermediate and capital goods through a 
round of secondary ISI, this was not its primary objective. The ISI strategy was primarily 
engaged in developing the consumer durables industry (through the attraction of foreign 
firms) and only secondarily oriented toward developing the intermediate and capital goods 
areas. When Brazil experienced more problems with inflation, foreign debt payment, and 
balance of payments deficits in the 1960s, the solution was to turn away from ISI and 
adhere to strict orthodoxy from 1964-67. Only in the 1970s, did secondary ISI policies 
return in force. Though exports were increasingly emphasized in Brazil over this period, 
they never received the push that policy gave them in Korea.
Even though these countries may have diverged in their policy orientation, they 
became alike in the long run. Secondary ISI in Brazil also lasted a lot longer than it did in 
Korea according to this model (over 30 years in Brazil compared to 6 in Korea). While 
Gereffi's original model only shows this convergence in the final period that began in 1983 
and lasted to present, this model has been altered to account for the fact the tendencies 
toward convergence may have begun in the prior period (in both cases this period started 
in the 1970s and lasted to the early 1980s). Though both Brazil and Korea showed almost 
complementary trade-linked developmental strategies in this earlier period of convergence, 
the same ingredients of their respective strategies were evident in either case. Thus, while 
Brazil financed its 1970s' deepening strategy with a primary reliance on foreign debt and a 
secondary reliance on diversified export expansion, Korea financed its 1970s deepening 
strategy with a combination of foreign debt and a high level of light industrial exports.
After both countries' economies had reeled from the second oil crisis in the late 
1970s, they changed their developmental strategies in a way that showed greater 
similarities between the two countries. Both Korea and Brazil in the 1980s underwent 
liberalization and expanded manufactured exports. In both cases, this strategy attempted 
to remedy the balance of payments and debt crisis brought on by the oil crisis and high 
levels of capital goods imports. The imbalanced external accounts (and consequent 
reliance on foreign debt) was also partially the result of the stagnation of export growth in
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Korea and the insufficient export growth in Brazil. Korea was somewhat less troubled by 
repayment of foreign debt for two reasons: (1) Korea's higher level o f export earnings 
made foreign debt easier to repay, and (2) Korea received better terms on its foreign debt. 
Inflation was also a problem for both countries at this time as well. Bradford provides a 
good summary of the convergence of trade-linked developmental policies and dates its 
origins well before Gereffi does. "The Brazilian development story, which is not dissimilar 
from that of Korea, also relied heavily on the involvement in achieving an export boom 
that began in 1967 and entailed a major expansion in the export o f manufactured goods in 
the 1970s. . . . The dichotomy between export promotion and import substitution is 
overdrawn in the descriptions of the experiences of both Brazil and Korea in both the 
1970s and in the 1980s."45
While this stylized model may well help expose the underlying similarities o f Korea 
and Brazil's developmental trajectories, this model is flawed in that it stereotypifies the 
developmental trajectories of these countries. In Brazil, a number of important points 
follow from this. To begin with, primary ISI may have begun much earlier in Brazil than 
is indicated in this abstraction.46 An important distinction between primary ISI and 
secondary ISI in Brazil is that Brazilian primary ISI was "unconscious" whereas secondary 
ISI was "conscious." Moreover, while the model implies that these periods of ISI were 
continuous, they were, in fact, often interrupted for significant periods.47
On the Korean side, there were a number of important omissions as well. While 
Korean primary ISI did begin in the early 1950s, this is not to say that (South) Korea 
(recently separated from the North) had experienced a significant amount of industrializa­
tion via Japanese FDI during the colonial period. "The Japanese left behind physical
45Colin I. Bradford. Jr., "East Asian Models: Myths and Lessons." in Development Strategies 
Reconsidered, eds. John P. Lewis and Valeriana Kallab (New Brunswick: Transaction Books. 1986), 120.
46See Flavio Rabelo Versiani, "Industrial Investment in an 'Export' Economy: The Brazilian 
Experience Before 1914." Journal of Development Economics, no. 7 (1980): 307-329.
47Brazilian primary ISI was interrupted between 1948-53. For this, see Fishlow, "Origins." 339-343. 
Brazilian secondary ISI was interrupted between 1964-67 and possibly between 1976-73. For the initial 
interruption in secondary ISI, see Albert O. Hirshman. "The Turn to Authoritarianism and a Search for Its 
Economic Determinants,” in The New Authoritarianism in I atm America, ed. David Collier (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1979). 76. For the second (partial) interruption is secondary ISI see Sena. 
"Mistaken Premises." 142.
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facilities [in South Korea] constituting one of the largest 'turnkey* projects in history."48
While aid-financed primary ISI was certainly a conscious process (though perhaps not a
completely rational one in economic terms) of aid acquisition and aid allocation, no
mention is made of this. Primary EOI was not neatly chopped off at the time secondary
ISI was begun (the rate of export growth did not drop until after 1975).
The omissions this model makes for Korea and Brazil separately have implications
for them, comparatively. For instance, if Korean primary ISI were more conscious,
continuous, and concentrated, would not this imply that the duration of primary ISI might
have been shorter than Brazilian primary ISI and Korean growth rate of light industrial
output more rapid? Moreover, if Korean secondary ISI were also more concentrated, less
equivocal, and less subject to interruption than Brazilian secondary ISI, would this not
have implications for the duration of this strategy and the rapidity of industrial
modernization? Neither of these considerations were incorporated in this model. Another
comparative event that is obscured by this model is the different implications that
"convergence" held for Korea and Brazil. After a short, albeit painful, period of recession
and rationalization in the early 1980s, Korea experienced a rather pleasant period of
development. Meanwhile, Brazil experienced a severe debt crisis resulting in a loss of
national autonomy over economic policy and a prolonged recession with hyperinflation.
While export revenues went toward servicing the foreign debt, Korean exports continued
to promote national development. Stallings warns about failing to recognize the critical
differences between East Asian and Brazilian cases.
Despite the differences in performance, the situation in respect to foreign capital 
appears similar: Brazil, Mexico, and Korea all have to have followed Taiwan in 
running current account surpluses, thus ending their need for foreign capital. The 
apparent similarity, however, is quite deceptive. Korea has indeed embarked on the 
Taiwanese balance of payments path, but Brazil's and Mexico's lesser reliance on 
foreign capital is not by choice. Both countries have been forced to run large mer­
chandise surpluses in order to continue at least partial debt service, and the decline 
in capital inflow has been an important cause of their enormous economic and 
political problems. . . .  [The 1980s] have been basically positive for Taiwan and 
Korean (which have grown rapidly and begun to escape prior economic depen­
dency relations), while the period has been extremely negative for Brazil and
« a
Jones and Sakong, Government. 30.
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Mexico (which are mired in recession and have witnessed greater foreign intrusion 
into their domestic affairs than at any time since the 1920s).49
To summarize, the similarities and dissimilarities between Brazil and the East Asian
model and Korea and the Latin American model must be analyzed. This comparison will
focus on how each country has responded to opportunities as well as crises in the global
economy in post-1960s' development. Dombusch and Park emphasize the underlying
similarities of Brazilian and Korean economic policy and link such similarities to similar
economic success in economic development (discussed in the next section). Though
Brazil shares many of the features of the "Latin American" model, it may be more similar
to the "East Asian" model than is commonly believed.
Korea's policies clearly do not represent a laissez-faire approach: intervention . . . 
is pervasive. Intervention [via import substitution] has also been used in Latin 
America but with mixed results.. . . except [in] Brazil. Perhaps because of its 
larger domestic market, Brazil successfully used protection to build up a highly 
efficient industrial structure. Brazil also avoided external bottlenecks that arise 
from explicit taxes on exports. . .  . The Korean strategy is much the same, with 
pervasive protection of an infant industry kind going hand in hand with a favorable 
treatment of the export sector ..  ,"50
While Brazil may appear to share more features of "East Asian" model than other 
Latin American countries, Korea tends to exhibit many of the traits commonly associated 
with the "Latin American" model. Like Latin America, Korea accumulated a large foreign 
debt.51 It has the same problem that Latin America does with unstable growth rates, 
growing rapidly in some years and only modestly in others.52 Korean growth ran 
concomitant with levels of inflation almost as high as those of Latin America: "Through­
out the entire post Korean War period, Korea has experienced rates of inflation that would
49Barbara Stallings, "The Role of Foreign Capital in Economic Development," in Manufacturing 
Miracles: Paths of Industrialization in Latin America and East Asia, eds. Gary Gereffi and Donald L. Wyman 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1990). 83-84.
R udiger Dombusch and Yung Chul Park, "Korean Growth Policy," Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity, no. 2 (1987): 403.404.405.
51Stephan Haggard and Tun-jen Cheng, "State and Foreign Capital in the East Asian NICs." The 
Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism, ed. Fredric C. Deyo (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1987). 94.
52Byung-Nak Song, The Rise of the Korean Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 62.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
51
be considered high by all but Latin American standards."53 Korea led East Asian countries 
in high levels of protection o f infant industry. In fact, a recent World Bank study found 
that Korean (as well as Taiwanese and Japanese) levels of price distortion were well above 
Brazilian (as well Mexican, Venezuelan, Indian, and Pakistani an) levels.54 While most 
accounts describe Korean income distribution as very equitable, there is at least one 
account that states "Korea's rate of aggregate economic concentration and wage inequali­
ties are among the highest in the world" and, assuming this is correct, are thus in a league 
similar to Latin America's.55 In both cases, most policies were directed toward redistri­
buting wealth to the industrial sectors. In both, this often meant that wealth was directed 
away from labor or the consumer class.56
Korea's economic policy was not only similar to Brazil's in times of plenty but also 
in times of famine. There seems to be the broad misconception that Korea performed 
comparatively better during the 1980s vis a vis Brazil because the Korean state imposed
53Mason et al.. Economic and Social Modernization. 110.
^World Bank. East Asian Miracle. 301. This finding not only runs counter to the World Bank's 
claims of limited price distortion, it is a bit too revisionist for the claims offered here. It is a strange definition 
of price distortion, however, which may explain the finding. Suffice it to say that Korean prices are hardly in 
perfect accordance with the free market.
55Amsden. Giant. 16.
56Neither Brazil nor Korea has felt it necessary to engage in programs that create equitable distribu­
tion. though perhaps Brazil's social welfare system is perhaps a bit more developed than Korea’s. It could also 
be said that Brazilian state has. at times, felt it necessary, either because doing so supports its political goals or 
because doing so supports its policies of import substitution, to raise the minimum wage. But the Korean state 
has continually stood in opposition to wage hikes which was the flip side to the military state's strong alliance 
with business. President Park said, "Before these goals [ie., promotion of the public welfare, freedom from 
exploitation and fair distribution of income] can be achieved, we must see to it that.. .  our poor economic 
power is greatly strengthened and that the .. .  power of productivity is fully utilized." For this see Park Chung 
Hee, Our Nations Path: Ideology for Social Reconstruction (Seoul: Dong-A. 1962). 224. The Brazilian state in 
some ways favors the welfare state model of economic redistribution more than the Korean one. This could be 
used to explain the slower development progress of Brazil in contrast to Korea. However. Brazil's ISI economy 
depended on the domestic consumption for growth. In any case, the differences in Korean and Brazilian 
models are of the nuance variety and not of the polar variety. Brazil (at least during the first half of the B-A 
period) and Korea have followed a policy which hedged against wage hikes and social welfare and instead 
emphasized the redistribution of wealth to priority sectors of industrial production. The nuances are, however, 
important to the contention that Korea has done a more efficient job, through its extensive microeconomic 
interventions, of wealth redistribution to priority industries. Such efficient intervention in B-A Korea has 
resulted in a superior level of economic development in this country in comparison to B-A Brazil. Brazil and 
Korea have done a more efficient job at redistributing wealth to priority industries than most communist states 
which have a more mixed agenda.
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austerity measures while Brazil did not. However, Amsden implies that Korea's economic 
policies in times of crisis were not so different from those of Latin America's, at least not 
in terms of its efforts to avoid austerity and liberalization, and, instead, to formulate and 
implement a developmental plan. Though she suggests that Korea's superior performance, 
may have been based on its the fact that Korea's pro-growth policy may have had a 
different emphasis than Latin America's.
If the Korean economy has outperformed the late learners of Latin 
America, the reason cannot be said to lie in short-term austerity measures to 
manage external shock, because the policy response of the Korean government to 
external shock was not to batten down the hatches. During the twenty-five years 
after the 1961 coup, the growth of the Korean economy, though spectacular, was 
regularly interrupted by internal and external shocks. . .  . [T]he 1970s were diffi­
cult years in which to industrialize. Nevertheless, external shocks did not derail 
the Korean economy from its fast-growth track. The government borrowed its 
way out o f balance o f payments difficulties and sustained fa st growth.. .  .
..  . The tact most often taken by the economy after economic downturns 
was a resurgence of exports and rapidly resumed expansion. . . .  [It has also re­
sorted] to fairly unorthodox measures . . . [such as] driving down interest rates, 
allowing the exchange rate to appreciate after devaluation and not allowing all but 
a trivial number of leading enterprises to go bankrupt. The Korean government 
may discipline private firms more than other governments. But it also provides 
them with staunch support. . . .  In all three stabilization exercises [carried out 
between 1979 and 1984], the Korean government can be described as having 
accommodated the private sector rather than having been austere, austerity 
typically being the mood of the of the stabilization exercises recommended by the 
Bretton Woods institutions. . . .
.. . [Within these institutions] liberalization in Korea in the 1980s is 
rationalized as the medicine for the economic diseases supposedly caused by the 
government intervention in the 1970s. Yet the premise o f economic disaster is 
nowhere substantiated. . .  . [Most economic indicators. . .  imply that just before 
the second energy crisis, the economy was performing rather well, a Big Push 
into heavy industry notwithstanding. . . .  To the extent that other growth policies 
favoring heavy state subsidization o f new industries have been successful, they 
have enabled the government to act vigorously within the context o f short-term 
macroeconomic policies to maintain the growth momentum in the face o f external 
shocks.57
Many will see strong similarities in the Brazilian and Korean cases. Brazil's 
stabilization at the time of the first oil crisis was rather mild. Instead, Brazil, like Korea,
57Amsden. Giant. 93-94. 105.
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opted to undergo a deepening program at this time. Like Korea, it borrowed heavily to 
pursue its program as well as to escape balance of payments difficulties. The differences 
between Korea and Brazil were minor ones, but they were the "straws that broke the 
camel's back." First, the Brazilian state did not provide as helpful an environment to its 
firms in the early 1980s by supportive exchange rate, interest rate, and bail-out policies. 
After 1982, Brazil came under the influence of IMF austerity and liberalization policies.
The differential export orientations of Korea and Brazil also contributed to their 
differential performance in the 1980s. While the Korean state made its Big Push into 
heavy industry in the 1970s, it continued to push really hard on its firms to increase 
exports, particularly after an economic crisis. While Brazil made some progress in this 
area in the 1970s, the state's efforts at export promotion were weak by comparison. The 
Brazilian state simply did not have the strength to force firms to leave the safer home 
market for the unknown foreign market under its own volition. Only after the debt crisis 
brought Brazilian policymakers to their knees and under the control of the IMF did the 
Brazilian state implement policies that expanded exports dramatically. By this time, the 
Brazilian state was not able to turn exports into a source of national development and 
experience positive growth. Export expansion and recession went hand in hand as export 
receipts went toward paying off Brazil's tremendous foreign debt. State policy in Korea 
facilitated adjustment of its firms by increasing exports while it encouraged industrial 
modernization in the 1970s. Meanwhile, state policy in Brazil forestalled adjustment by 
increasing foreign debt to compensate for balance of payments deficits which resulted 
from the first oil crisis and the deepening program. Forestalling adjustment haunted 
Brazilian development after the second oil crisis.
One may ask if the comparative research has shed any light on whether the critical 
differences in the institutions or the differences in economic policy had a greater impact on 
the different levels of economic development in Korea and Brazil. While such issues are 
interrelated, institutional differences are at the root of such developmental differences.
"The key to the superior industrial performance of the East Asian NICs does not lie in the 
general superiority of export-oriented industrialization strategies over import substitution 
or the market oriented strategies over state intervention as some writers have suggested.
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It is rather the ability o f the state to direct the accumulation process in the direction which 
is required by capitalist development in particular points in time which is crucial."5*
At first, one is tempted to say that Jenkins puts this a bit too strongly. Brazil's bias 
against exports was related to its ISI strategy that it employed in the 1970s, and this bias 
was part of the reason it experienced extreme vulnerability to balance o f payments pres­
sures and to foreign debt. Moreover, Korea's greater industrial export orientation helped 
Korea capture rents from world trade to a greater extent than Brazil. However, Jenkins is 
essentially correct in that the real reason for the problems that arose in the 1980s because 
of insufficient export performance in the 1970s (and before) was not the fault of the 
strategy, itself. Instead, it was the fault of a state which was not strong enough to switch 
its strategy to one that was more export oriented. The fact is Korea's conscious primary 
ISI in the 1950s served this country quite well as did Brazil's conscious secondary ISI of 
this time. In the 1950s, primary ISI helped light industry in (South) Korea to recover from 
its destruction in the Korean War and allowed it to surpass the level of expansion such 
industry had achieved under the Japanese. Likewise, in the 1950s, secondary ISI 
catalyzed the heavy, machinery, and chemical industries to expand at a rate that has not 
been possible either before or since. Korea was able to switch to a more export-oriented 
strategy when the advantages from trade and the constraints from balance of payments or 
foreign debt made it advantageous to do so. The Brazilian state had neither the will nor 
the capacity to independently engage in the extreme intervention or coercion necessary to 
make such radical gains in the expansion of manufactured exports. Despite these subtle 
differences in economic policy, major similarities existed in its pro-industrial orientation, 
emphasis of exports, and the growing convergence of trade-linked developmental 
strategies. These similarities were largely responsible for similar outcomes of rapid 
economic development.59 The broad similarities and subtle differences in the economic 
development of Korea and Brazil are the topic of the next section.
5*Jenkins, "Comparison,” 224.
The exception is that Brazil's early 1980s convergence with Korea in terms of greater export 
orientation ran concomitant with Brazil's economic crisis, while secondary EOI in Korea led to Korea's rapid 
economic recovery. However, as alluded to above, there are other policy differences that explain this 
phenomenon.
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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The statistics are not in question. The real debate lies in their causes. Previously, 
this thesis has conducted a literature review intended to give some evidence supporting the 
interpretation that Brazilian and Korean institutions, developmental alliances, and 
economic policies were not as different as they were alike. Further, this paper contends 
that such similarities were the causes of higher than average rates of industrialization in 
these countries vis a vis other late developing countries. However, Korea did industrialize 
faster and with fewer problems than Brazil, particularly in the 1980s. The argument is that 
Korea's model of development conformed more closely to a nationalist ideal model of 
development than did Brazil's. Thus, Korea found a faster track to industrial growth and 
modernization than did Brazil. A cursory view of Brazilian and Korean comparative 
industrialization and development is given through statistics and market failure analysis.
Growth Rates
Tables 1 and 2 will give a picture of economic development and the process of 
industrialization in Brazil and Korea during the B-A regimes through GNP, agricultural, 
and industrial growth. By analyzing the rapidity of industrial growth vis a vis agricultural 
growth. The underlying premise to this assumption is that modem societies go through 
fundamental changes.60 There is the agrarian phase where agriculture dominates the 
economy and its growth rates are high. Eventually, the growth of agriculture will plateau 
and industry will become the dynamic sector as evidenced by industrial growth rates 
relatively higher than agriculture. A characteristic of the NICs is that this transformation 
occurs very rapidly. Since this thesis has called both Korea and Brazil NICs and has 
contended that Brazil and Korea are similar in economic development, the transition of
60This view derives from the argument that economic development is broken into several stages at 
least dates back to Walt W. Rostow. The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1960). The stages approach has more recently been used to contend 
that the U.S. is now entering a post-industrial stage. See Daniel Bell, The Coming of the Post-Industrial 
Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting (New York: Basic Books, 1973). However, it is probably correct that 
while an economy can move through different stages in terms of dynamism being transferred to more modem 
sectors and industrial subsectors, the more traditional sectors and subsectors are important as a continuing 
platform for growth and should not be surgically removed without damage to the economy. On this, see 
Stephen S. Cohen and John Zysman, Manufacturing Matters: The Mvth of the Post-Industrial F.conomv (New 
York: Basic Books. 1987).
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Table 1. Korea's annual average growth of industry, agriculture,
and GNP under democracy and bureaucratic-authoritarian ism (%)
Democracy Agriculture Industry Total GNP
1954-57 3.3 16.9 5.5
1958-61 4.0 7.4 4.1
1954-61 3.7 12.2 4.8
B-A Agriculture Industry Total GNP
1962-66 5.5 14.8 8.3
1967-71 2.0 20.9 11.4
1972-76 5.8 20.1 11.2
1977-81 -1.0 10.5 5.8
1982-86 4.3 12.4 9.8
1962-86 3.3 15.7 9.3
Democracy Agriculture Industry Total GNP
1987-91 5.8 10.4 9.9
Sources: The statistics for the above table are compiled or computed from 
the following secondary sources. For the statistics on subperiods between 
1954 and 1961, see David C. Cole and Princeton N. Lyman, Korean Develop­
ment: The Interplay of Politics and Economics (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1971), Table A- 3. For the statistics on subperiods between 1962 and 
1976, see Jones and Sakong, Government. Table 8. For the statistics on the 
subperiods between 1977 and 1991, see II Sakong, Korea in the World 
Economy (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1993), 
Tables A.3 and 2.3.
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Table 2. Brazil's annual average growth of industry, agriculture,
and GNP under democracy and bureaucratic-authoritarianism (%)
Democracy Agriculture Industry Total GDP
1950-53 2.9 7.9 5.7
1954-58 4.9 9.5 7.2
1959-63 4.9 8.0 6.5
1950-63 4.3 8.5 6.5
B-A Agriculture Industry Total GDP
1964-66 4.0 4.1 3.6
1967-73 4.6 12.7 11.3
1974-81 4.9 5.4 5.4
1982-84 1.0 -0.1 0.7
1964-84 4.4 6.6 6.3
Democracy Agriculture Industry Total GDP
1985-87 5.1 7.3 6.7
Sources: The statistics for the above table are compiled or computed from the 
following secondary sources. For statistics on the subperiods between 1950 and 
1966, see Tyler, Industrialization in Brazil Table II-4. The statistical informa­
tion on the subperiods between 1967 and 1981 comes from Luiz Carlos Bresser 
Pereira, Development and Crisis in Brazil. 1930-1983 (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1984), Table 8.1. Statistics on the subperiods between 1982 and 1987 is found in 
Wemer Baer, "Brazil's Rocky Economic Road to Democracy," in The Political 
Economy of Brazil, eds., Lawrence S. Graham and Robert H. Wilson. (Austin: 
University o f Texas Press, 1990), Table 4.2. The statistics for the subtotal esti­
mate of the 1964-87 are figured from Tyler, Industrialization in Brazil. Table U-4 
and from Baer, "Rocky Economic Road," Table 4.2. Tyler provides the statistics 
between 1964 and 1967 and Baer provide statistics between 1968 and 1987.
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Brazil and Korea should be documented by high growth rates of GNP and industry and 
low or declining growth rates of agriculture. Overall, Brazilian and Korean GNP and 
industrial growth were quite high and, though this is not presented, such growth rates 
were much higher than the norm for late developing countries. However, one can also see 
that Korea's growth rates of industry and GNP were higher, particularly in the 1960s and 
most of the 1970s.
To give the reader a useful orientation of the political economy of Korean (table I) 
and Brazilian (table 2) growth of agriculture, industry and GNP, these tables are broken 
down into major regime periods. A few comments can be made about similarities of 
Korean and Brazilian economic growth in their respective 1950s democracies. First, 
Korea's industrial growth was extremely high in this period, particularly before the 1957 
annual stabilizations. Brazil's industrial growth was high also, albeit not as high as 
Korea's. Stabilizations tended to be intermittent in the 1950s in Brazil and may have 
contributed to these lower industrial growth rates in this decade. Stabilization not only 
hurt industrialization in and of themselves, they also shook business confidence about the 
commitment of the state to produce a business friendly market environment. In addition, 
Korea received copious amounts of industrial aid during this time which made rapid 
industrial growth possible. Brazil received a substantial but lesser magnitude of aid and 
public loans, which were not of the magnitude of Korea's but the highest in Latin America. 
A precondition of the similarity of high growth rates of industrialization in both these 
countries may have been the large amounts of aid both received. However, because Korea 
received more aid than Brazil, its industries grew faster. The presence of industrial aid is 
essential to understanding Korea's high rate of industrial growth and important to 
understanding Brazil's.
Second, despite Korea's higher industrial growth in comparison to Brazil, Brazil's 
GNP growth was higher than Korea's. This can be explained by the fact that Korea's 
economy was more traditional and thus more heavily dominated by agriculture than 
Brazil's (as is seen in the next sub-section). In both Korea and Brazil, agriculture 
experienced relatively low growth rates during the democratic period, but because the 
nature of Korea's economy was none traditional than Brazil's, low growth rates of
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agriculture were a much greater drag on GNP in Korea than they were in Brazil. Finally, 
agrarian growth was slightly higher in Brazil than it was in Korea. This may imply that 
Brazil, being more of a resource rich country than Korea, was more able to spread out its 
agricultural growth over a longer span in the post-war period than Korea and conse­
quently, implies that state alliances to the agrarian elite were stronger in Brazil than they 
were in Korea. On the one hand, Korea's resource poor status meant that this country 
could basically dismantle the agrarian elite through land reform and then forget about the 
agrarian sector, turning its attentions to promoting and securing the support of the 
industrial elite. On the other hand, Brazil's resource rich status meant this country 
engaged in the dichotomous policy of promoting agriculture and industry simultaneously. 
The more myopic support of industry by President Rhee in Korea would have had to have 
contributed to the higher industrial rates of growth in Korea than Brazil. Meanwhile, the 
dichotomy of sectoral promotion by Brazil presidents of the 1950s was conducive to a 
continuation of state support for agriculture but was not favorable to the kind of lopsided, 
"no-holds-barred" promotion of industry that Korea practiced. The result for Brazil was a 
lower industrial growth rate than Korea's.
Annual average growth of industry, agriculture, and GNP during B-A in Korea 
and Brazil show some interesting comparative trends. First, though these tables do not 
clearly indicate this, Brazil and Korea both experienced economic crisis in the early 
1960s. Both countries responded with economic orthodoxy, but in Korea there was 
something more. Korea's economic crisis ended shortly after the military took over 
because it quickly formulated and implemented nationalist development plans which 
promoted industrial exports and industrial modernization. Brazil's economic crisis 
dragged out for three years as Brazil implemented anti-nationalist stabilization plans, and 
growth did not recover until nationalism crept back into Brazil's policies from 1967-73. 
Though these crises were similar, Brazil's was both more severe and lengthy than Korea's.
While these countries had experienced similar crises at similar times, they also 
experienced similar growth periods. Brazilian and Korean GNP and industrial growth 
were similar in that they were higher than the average in late developing countries. A 
secondary level o f similarity emerges in that Brazil had one period (1967-73) when indus­
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trial and GNP growth were as remarkably high as Korea's during these respective B-A 
regimes. This was a period when the B-A nature of the Brazilian state became extreme 
and thus came closer to the Korean model. Moreover, the Brazilian 1967-1973 period (or 
"miracle years") was a period when the dynamic industries (consumer durables), having 
built up substantial capacity, expanded production to the limits of their capacity and 
expanded diversified exports. It was for Brazil an "easy" period of capital accumulation, 
but substantial industrial modernization also took place. In Korea, the dynamic industry 
(consumer nondurables) also experienced an "easy" period of capital accumulation as it 
filled excess productive capacity by increasing exports dramatically and industrial modern­
ization progressed rapidly in this country as well. However, considering the whole B-A 
period, growth rates can be contrasted by the fact that Korea's industrial and GNP growth 
was extremely high while Brazil's growth of these indicators was only moderately high.
Though growth declined in both countries during the "painful" industrial 
modernizing phases, which both countries began in the early 1970s, industrial growth 
remained brisk, nonetheless, in both countries, particularly Korea. Common motivations 
for the deepening phase were concerns about balance of payments sparked by the 1973 oil 
crisis, a wish to continue growth in spite of said crisis, and a recognition in both states that 
a broadening of the industrial structure would promote enhanced development.
In 1979, the oil crisis struck and both economies experienced difficulties. Again, 
while Brazil responded with strict IMF-imposed austerity and a belated export push,
Korea responded with a mixture of nationalism (reorganization of industries and export 
push) and conservatism (stabilization and liberalization). Again, Brazil's difficulty was 
more severe and prolonged than Korea's. However, the policy response was not the only 
factor that made the Korean crisis less burdensome than the Brazilian. Korea's legacy of 
exportled growth made the balance of payments problem and its substantial foreign debt 
easier to rectify than Brazil's legacy of domestic market-led growth (with some export 
expansion) could. In addition, Korea secured its foreign debt on better terms than did 
Brazil, which also made it easier to service. While Brazil experienced severe hardship in 
the 1980s, history suggests that a national development plan will creep back into Brazilian 
policy and the economy will eventually recover as is confirmed by Brazil's 1990's success.
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Change in the Sectoral Structure
Growth rates of industry, agriculture, and GNP are not the only ways to indicate 
industrialization. If the sectoral shares o f the economy can be mapped at periodic inter­
vals, one can determine which sector is becoming more dominant and which sector is 
becoming less dominant (see tables 3 and 4). One would expect an agrarian society to 
have a low share o f industry to GNP and a high share of agriculture to GNP. Conversely, 
one would expect an industrial society to have a lower weight of industry vis a vis agri­
culture. As an agrarian, late developing country progresses, one would expect industrial 
shares of GNP to increase and shares o f agriculture to decrease. The weight of services is 
of secondary importance since services can grow off the incomes of agriculture or indus­
try. Basically, the definition of a newly industrializing country would include a changing 
set of sectoral relationships whereby the share of industry in the GDP increases relative to 
the share of agriculture in the GDP. Thus, if Brazil and Korea can be considered rapidly 
industrializing late developers, one would expect these characteristics to be exhibited.
Such trends are indeed evident in the cases of Korea and Brazil.
The growth of manufacturing and the decline o f agriculture was more dramatic in 
Korea. In Korea, agriculture dropped over eight percentage points from over 48% of 
GNP to just under 40% of GNP. The percentage point drop in agriculture was only half 
as dramatic in Brazil, which fell from 26.7% of GNP to 22.5%, as was the rise of industry 
from 23.5% to around 25%. Conversely, there was a much more rapid increase in the 
structural importance of industry in the case of Korea than there was in the case of Brazil 
during the democratic period. In Brazil, the weight of industry increased a mere 1.7 
percentage points, from 23.5% of GNP in 1950 to 25.2% in 1960. However, in Korea the 
shares of industry increased almost 10 percentage points to rise from 8.8% o f GNP in 
1950 to 18.6% in 1960. Korea in 1953 had a much more backward sectoral structure than 
Brazil in 1950. Since Korea started from so far behind Brazil, it still had not achieved as 
great a percentage of industry in sectoral structure as Brazil had. Nevertheless, the gap 
between the structural weight of industry in Brazil and the structural weight of industry in 
Korea closed considerably during their respective democratic periods.
The growth o f industry in Korea probably reflects positive influence o f the aid
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Table 3. Sectoral structure in Korea under
democracy and bureaucratic-authoritarianism (%)
Democracy Agriculture Industry Services Total GNP
1953 48.2 8.8 43.0 100.0
1957 44.1 13.2 42.7 100.0
1960 39.9 18.6 41.5 100.0
B-A Agriculture Industry Services Total GNP
1965 41.0 24.1 34.9 100.0
1970 31.1 28.4 40.5 100.0
1975 27.8 33.1 39.1 100.0
1980 14.6 41.4 44.0 100.0
1987 10.8 43.2 46.0 100.0
Sources: For the vears 1953 and 1957. see Cole and Lvman. Korean 
ment. Table A-2. For all other years, see Song, Rise, Table 7.4.
Develop-
Table 4. Sectoral structure in Brazil under 
democracy and bureaucratic-authoritarianism (%)
Democracy Agriculture Industry Services Total GNP
1950 26.7 23.5 49.8 100.0
1955 25.1 24.4 50.5 100.0
1960 22.5 25.2 52.3 100.0
B-A Agriculture Industry Services Total GNP
1965 22.3 24.4 53.3 100.0
1970 11.5 35.9 52.6 100.0
1975 11.3 37.4 51.3 100.0
1980 10.0 38.1 51.9 100.0
1985 9.8 34.4 56.7 100.0
Sources: The statistics for selected years between 1960 and 1965 are from 
William G. Tyler, Industrialization in Brazil Table II-3. The statistics for 
selected years between 1970-85 are from Baer, Brazilian Economy. Table 6.11.
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which was channeled to it and the supportive environment the Rhee regime provided to 
industry through primary ISI. The decline of agriculture in Korea probably reflects food 
aid which undercut domestic production and a series o f bad harvests. Land redistribution 
in Korea also probably contributed by upsetting traditional organizations of extraction and 
traditional linkages between the agrarian elite and the state. The political incentives are 
nearly always to build alliances with the groups which can amass economic concentration. 
Since the landlords were disenfranchised and there was small political incentive to favor 
the peasants where wealth was not concentrated, the state turned its attentions to industry.
The more resilient relative weights of industry and agriculture in Brazil probably 
reflected the more persistent influence of the agrarian elite as well as the less supportive 
aid environment in Brazil. Indeed, Brazil could not afford to give all its support to the 
industrial sector since agrarian exports helped balance the international payments and 
helped finance industrial imports. Thus, even under ISI policies intended to promote 
industrial hegemony, agrarian interests could not afford to be entirely slighted because of 
agriculture's contribution to this process. It may have been in agriculture's interest to 
maintain or increase its share in GNP, and thus it probably lobbied against policies that 
would dramatically promote rising shares of industry vis a vis agriculture. A caveat to this 
is that many of the agrarian elite were also industrialists as well. One would expect them 
to support pro-industrial and pro-agrarian policy in Brazil. The competition and 
coordination of interests of these sectors worked to promote a more stable distribution of 
industry and agriculture in the economy.
As noted earlier, an economic crisis preceded the transition from democracy to 
military rule in both countries. It was noted that this crisis was more prolonged and 
pronounced in Brazil than it was in Korea. This is suggested by tables 3 and 4. Between 
1957 and 1960 (when Rhee stepped down), industry gained from 13 .2% of GNP to 18.6% 
of GNP. But in Brazil between 1960 and 1965 (a year after the military coup), the 
industrial recession had caused Brazil to de-industrialize as industry lost sectorial weight, 
falling from 25.2% of GNP to 24.4% of GNP. Services picked up the difference.
By 1965, both countries held around 24% of GNP in industry. Between 1965 and 
1975 (Brazil's "miracle" years), Brazil gained shares of industry in GNP more rapidly than
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Korea. This resulted from the rapid decline in the value of Brazilian agriculture in 
comparison to industry. This, in turn, was related to the drastic diversification of exports 
resulting in the reduction of economic importance of Brazil's main cash crop, coffee. 
Between 1965 and 1974, coffee fell from 42% of the value o f total exports to 12.6% of 
total exports; and the value of manufactured exports to total exports, in the same period, 
increased from 7.2% to 27.7%.61 Korea, starting out as a very agricultural country after 
the second world war, had about twice the weight o f agriculture in the economy in 1965. 
Though Korea lost more percentage points in agriculture than did Brazil, it would take 
Korea more time to modernize its sectorial structure since it had only begun its industrial 
drive at the end of the Second World War and Brazil had begun its industrial drive (with a 
lot of stops in between) around the First World War. By 1980, the sectoral shares seem 
rather similar in sectorial weights. In both countries, industry and the state had a much 
stronger alliance than agriculture and the state did. This is implied by the rapidly 
increasing shares of industry and the rapidly falling shares of agriculture.
However, in the wake of the second oil crisis, a strange thing happened. Brazil 
again diverged from its pattern of increasing the share of industry in the economy and 
decreasing the share of agriculture in the economy. De-industrialization accompanied the 
1980s debt crisis in Brazil as it had done in its 1960s debt crisis. While there may have 
been a convergence in economic policy in Brazil and Korea in the wake of the second oil 
crisis, as Gereffi suggests, a divergence in rates of industrialization occurred. The service 
sectors in both countries expanded in both countries in the wake o f the second oil crisis.
Finally, the difference is that the service sector is also an area o f interest. Services 
did not grow structurally in Korea as they did in Brazil. This may indicate that industrial 
reconstruction in Korea through aid-primed ISI was occurring so rapidly that the service 
sector could not keep up. Moreover, Rhee, with more interest in political goals than in 
economic growth, was not as interested in eliminating bottlenecks as was the case in 
Brazil. Still, it is surprising that the service sector did not at least hold its own structurally 
since infrastructural damage in the aftermath of the Korean War was so great and the 
rebuilding of the damaged infrastructure was bound to have caused some real growth of
61 Baer, Brazilian Economy. 84.
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that sector. The probable explanation is that industrialization was progressing so rapidly 
in Korea that it overwhelmed agriculture and services. Moreover, services continued to 
be a smaller share of the GNP in Korea than they were in Brazil, even through these 
countries authoritarian years.62 Part of this is the fact that Korea's welfare system was less 
developed than Brazil's, but such figures could possibly also reflect the larger role of 
public industry in the economy in Brazil in comparison to Korea. The main point, 
however, is that both Korea and Brazil made rapid gains in industrialization with a 
comcomittant reduction in the traditional sector. Korea's structural transformation was 
more rapid than Brazil's.
Change in the Structure of Manufacturing
To get a sense about the modernization within industry, the structure o f the output 
of the manufacturing sectors will be described. A simple way to describe the state of 
modernization of any given country is to group these manufacturing sectors under light or 
heavy industry. Light industrial sectors are those that tend to dominate in the initial stages 
of industrialization. Light industries are often referred to as "traditional" because they use 
standard technologies, have low start-up costs, and are labor intensive. Heavy industries 
are sometimes called "modem" because they use advanced technologies, have high 
start-up costs, and are capital intensive. Thus, Korea and Brazil would be expected to 
have light industry dominate at the early industrial stages, while heavy industry would be 
expected to grow structurally vis-a-vis light. Furthermore, the share of heavy industry 
would be expected to eventually overtake the share of light as the dominant industry, 
given the proper amount of time. Eventually, if the development process continues 
uninterrupted, it will eventually reach fruition and the semiperipheral nations (such as 
Brazil and Korea) will develop industrial structures similar to the developed nations.
62Many authors claim that Rhee's primary interest was not in the economy but was concerned 
primarily with political interests. While this may have very well been true, part of his political interest was to 
secure alliances in society which would support his continued rule. Industry represented an important support 
group in this regard. Another point is that comparative neglect of the service sector is a trait which was carried 
over into the Park regime. See Song, Rise. 59. For Brazil's attempts to and successes at eliminating bottlenecks 
in the democratic period, see Baer, Brazilian Economy. 62-70. As Baer notes, such policies created 
bottlenecks in its wake. See ibid. 70-73.
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As tables 5 and 6 indicate, the change in manufacturing structure was dramatically 
different in Korea and Brazil. In the early 1950s, the Korean industrial structure was 
made up roughly of 80% light industry and 20% heavy industry in 1953.63 Brazil was a bit 
more advanced at this juncture, having 73% of manufacturing in light industries and 27% 
in heavy industries. The 1950s concluded with Brazilian heavy industry gaining 15.6 
percentage points so that heavy industry accounted for 42.5% of the manufacturing 
structure, while Korean heavy industry had gained a mere 2.7 percentage points so that 
heavy industry made up only 22.7% of total industry. What explains Brazil's surge in 
industrial modernization in the 1950s at a time when Korea's industrial modernization 
progressed slowly forward at best?
The answers are fairly straightforward. In the 1950s, copious amounts of US aid 
were flowing into Korea. The aid virtually subsidized the import substitution carried out 
in Korea at this time. Most of the aid dole was earmarked for light industries, not vertical 
integration. Primary ISI was geared to building up light manufacturing firms, not heavy 
ones. Finally, political concerns not economic ones dominated the Rhee regime. The 
Rhee regime politically benefitted from erecting trade barriers and distributing aid to light 
industrial firms. If Park's "Big Push" into heavy industry is any indication, state coercion 
of industry to undertake the daunting task of entering new industry was hardly a way to 
gain political popularity. This is why Park "hardened" the state in the early 1970s. Rhee 
lacked the incentive to modernize industry, not to mention the resources.
With some exceptions, Brazil's political economy was markedly different from 
Korea's. Though smaller than the Korean aid dole, Brazil's portion of international aid
63Because the data for Korea in 1953 is not strictly comparable to other years in this table, the 
numbers represented in parentheses are taken to be crudely more accurate and. consequently, will be the ones 
used. The original figures are not comparable because the paper and leather industries (elsewhere considered 
light industries) are included under the chemical industry (which is considered a heavy industry). The way this 
category is figured makes the proportion of light to heavy industry smaller than would otherwise be the case. 
The following method is used to tabulate a crudely more comparable figure (represented in parentheses). 
Taking the chemical industry of 1955 from the distorted figure for 1953. there is a difference of 4.1 percentage 
points. Subtracting this from heavy industries, a product of 20% results, and adding this to light industries, a 
product of 80% emerges. However, if the doctored figure for 1953 is more comparable, this means that only a 
small decrease in the structural importance of light industry is evident between 1953 add 1960. The project 
then is to explain this minuscule decrease in light industry from 1953 to 1955 and the small decrease in light 
industry from 1955 to 1960. since these movements are quite small when compared to the large decreases of 
light industry from 1960 onward.
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Table 5. Sectoral structure of manufacturing in Korea 
under democracy and bureaucratic-authoritarianism (%)
Democracy Bureaucratic-authoritarianism
1953 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1986
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Light
industry 75.9 (80.0) 79.6 77.3 70.9 66.5 58.0 50.0 42.2
Food, 
beverages, 
& tobacco 26.9 26.4 36.5 26.1 29.3 23.1 20.2 15.3
Leather
& textiles 34.9 (39.0) 35.4 25.2 28.3 20.8 20.9 17.7 15.1
Wood prod. 4.5 6.7 3.4 3.2 3.3 2.1 1.5 1.2
Printing/ 
publishing & 
paper prod. 3.3 5.9 5.8 7.6 5.1 4.4 3.7 4.1
Nonmetallic
minerals 4.1 3.1 4.9 4.4 4.8 4.7 5.0 4.3
Other 2.2 2.1 1.5 1.3 3.2 2.8 1.9 2.2
Heavy
industry 24.1 (20.0) 20.4 22.7 29.1 33.5 42.0 50.0 57.8
Chem. 14.6(10.5) 10.5 9.7 13.9 18.1 19.8 23.1 20.7
Basic
metals 2.2 2.4 2.7 3.9 1.0 2.9 6.4 7.5
Transport 
equipment 
& machinery 7.3 7.5 10.3 11.3 14.4 19.3 20.5 29.6
Sources: The statistics for the above table are computed from the following primary or 
secondary sources. For 1953, see Kwang Suk Kim and Michael Roemer, Growth and 
Structural Transformation. Studies in the Modernization of the Republic of Korea: 1945- 
1975 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press for Council on East Asian Studies, 
1980), Table 21. The "chemicals" category for 1953 is inordinately large because it 
contains paper and leather products. This means the category "printing/publishing & 
paper" will not include paper and the "leather, textile & apparel" category will not contain 
leather for this year. This distorts the general categories of "light" and "heavy" manufac­
tures for this year. For 1955, see United Nations, Patterns of Industrial Growth. 1938- 
1958 (New York: UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1960), 488. For 
1960-86, see Song, Rise. Table 7.3.
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Table 6. Sectoral structure of manufacturing in Brazil under 













































































Sources: For statistics on selected years between 1949-1964, consult Wemer Baer and 
Isaac Kerstenetzky, "The Brazilian Economy," in Brazil in the Sixties, ed., Riordan Roett 
(Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1972), Table 12-b. For statistics on the year 
1969 see Werner Baer and Annibal V. Villela, "Industrial Growth and Industrialization: 
Revisions in the Stages of Brazil's Economic Development," Journal o f Developing Areas 
7, no. 2 (1973): Table 13. For statistics on the years 1975 and 1980, see Baer, Brazilian 
Economy. Table 15.5. Estimates for 1984 are calculated from EBGE [.Fundacao Institute 
Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica], Estatisticas Historicas do Brasil: series econo­
micas. demograficas e sociais de 1550 a 1988. 2.ed, rev. e atual. v. 3 de Series 
estatisticas retrospectivas (Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, 1990.), Table 7.17.
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was large as well. But external finance was not earmarked for light industry as was the 
case in Korea. Brazil channelled its aid to heavy industries and infrastructure projects. 
Brazil's policy of secondary ISI was of more importance in explaining the dramatic 
explosion of the heavy industry sector. Brazil had, heretofore, experienced unconscious 
primary ISI. It had been tied to the world economy by exporting primary products 
(chiefly coffee) and importing consumer durables. When Brazil threw up large tariffs and 
gave generous incentives for the entrance of foreign firms, the response was tremendous 
by such firms' not wishing to lose Brazil's lucrative market for consumer durables. While 
there was some resentment from local capital about being displaced from heavy industries 
or from less technologically advanced firms' not receiving the subsidies given to foreign 
capital, the objections were muted by a general era of economic expansion. So it was that 
the difficult task of domestic firms' having to leam advanced technologies and having to 
enter risky industries was avoided in the Brazilian case. Consequently, the political 
resistance to Brazilian secondary ISI was not as great as the political resistance to Korean 
secondary ISI. While Korean secondary ISI required a hardening of the state, Brazilian 
secondary ISI was conducted under a semi-accommodative democratic one. In summary, 
the reason for the difference in the industrial structure was that Brazil was instigating 
secondary ISI by encouraging a large inflow of foreign capital in the modem industries, 
while Korea, during the 1950s, encouraged the reconstruction and the creation of light 
industries during this period of primary ISI. Suffice it to say that the political economies 
of Brazil and Korea were radically different during their respective periods of democratic 
industrialization, and this led to radically disparate rates of vertical integration of industry.
The economic crisis in Brazil and Korea around the time of the military coups in 
the early 1960s was not reflected by a regression to a less modem industrial structure in 
either case (though, as we have seen, a regression was evident in the Brazilian sectoral 
structure in the early 1960s). Brazil began the 1960s with a share of heavy manufacturing 
(at 42.6%) almost twice as high as Korea's (at 22.7%). While the Korean democracy was 
notable for the lack of industrial modernization and the Brazilian democracy was excep­
tional for the rapid modernization of industry, just the opposite trends were evident in 
these countries B-A phases. This trend was not so pronounced at the end of the 1960s:
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Brazil had gained around 10 percentage points in heavy industry's industrial share (at 
52.2%) to Korea's 11 point gain (at 33.5%). Both countries had experienced a capital 
accumulation phase at roughly this time, and both had diversified their industrial structure 
on the coattails of it.
The differences in Brazilian and Korean rates of industrial modernization became 
pronounced in the 1970s during their deepening phases when both states attempted to 
manipulate investment toward heavy industry. By the end of this period, Korea had 
gained 16.5 percentage points in heavy industry's share of total industry (at 50%), while 
Brazilian deepening had only resulted in an increase of 4.2 points (at 56.4%). Granted, 
since the share of Brazilian heavy industry had reached a high level, it was bound to 
plateau at some point, and Korean share o f heavy industry, still being relatively small at 
the beginning of the 1970s, had more room for growth. However, these statistics lead one 
to believe that Korea was doing something very right in terms of promoting industrial 
modernization, while they lead one to conclude that Brazil's policies of industrial 
modernization were not nearly as effective. The increase in shares of heavy industry in 
both countries meant that, by the mid-1980s, these countries' industrial structures had 
converged to a point to where both were pushing 60% of heavy industry in total industry.
What explains the dramatically differential rates of industrial modernization in 
Brazil and Korea in the 1970s? This thesis argues that three features loom large in this 
explanation. First, there was the different types of firms in the dynamic sectors. Foreign 
firms could have been used to modernize industry. The legacy of foreign firms in Brazil's 
most modern industries left Brazil in a quandary. Foreign firms were the natural choice 
with their large size and access to high technology; however, such firms were reluctant to 
enter such firms in Brazil, and the Brazilian state lacked the capacity to force these firms 
to make such a move, in any case. In addition, modernization into modem industry by 
foreign firms was viewed as compromising national security. Though local firms might 
have been used as a vehicle of modernization, this "first-best" choice was not viable 
because most local firms were small and low-tech. Consequently, they lacked the 
necessary characteristics for industrial modernization. Since local firms were not fit for 
the job of modenization and foreign firms were unwilling to take on the job, the only
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option was to differentiate Brazil's public firms to accomplish goal. Since public firms 
tend to sacrifice their own profitability for the good of other members of the triple 
alliance, they probably were not as efficient or growth-oriented as private firms would 
have been. For these reasons, industrialization progressed slower in Brazil than in Korea.
Considering the productive social forces, Korea had all the advantages. It had no 
legacy of foreign domination of the dynamic industries. Indeed, local private firms 
inhabited the dynamic industries. Some o f these were large and had already embarked on 
the tentative steps of industrial modernization. The Korean state had an easier time 
inducing these large local firms to enter new industries and accomplish national 
development objectives than Brazil could hope to have with its foreign firms. Korea 
developed public firms that could carry out gap-filling functions. Such functions were 
geared toward providing markets for local firm expansion or providing crucial inputs for 
this purpose. Further, public firms tended to enter the riskiest areas of production to make 
private local firm expansion more attractive. The state intensively screened foreign firms 
so that technology transfer to and ownership of industries by local private firms could be 
maximized. In this way Brazil and Korea were very different.
Second, much difference in development can be explained by the different types of 
state intervention. Korea intensified authoritarianism to make its intervention more 
decisive, while Brazil liberalized its authoritarian regime during the respective deepening 
period of the 1970s. For Brazil, a weaker state meant that subsidies "proliferated instead 
of priorities" and that coercive strength was lacking to stabilize inflation or to motivate the 
private sector to cooperate with its developmental plan.64 For Korea, a stronger state 
meant that policymaking was insulated and policy implementation could effectively be 
carried out by command as well as incentive. In addition, Brazil preferred macroeconomic 
to microeconomic, while Korea displayed the reverse emphasis. Because macroeconomic 
intervention is less sector specific than microeconomic intervention, Korea was able to 
ensure that its sectors confirmed to its developmental plan to a greater extent than Brazil. 
The result, particularly in the 1980s, was that Brazil's economy surged out of control, 
tempered neither by a coherent plan nor market considerations, while the Korean state
^ ish low . "Tale." 98. 110-111.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
72
allocated investments efficiently toward developmental aims.
Finally, the major Brazilian and Korean forms of microeconomic intervention 
differed substantially. Brazil and Korea both used credit subsidies, but Korea used these 
more heavily than Brazil. The Korean state used reciprocal subsidies by which perfor­
mance results were demanded from firms, while Brazil used unidirectional subsidies more 
frequently. The Brazilian state's major microeconomic device to enhance industrial 
modernization was through state firm expansion. However, state firms were encumbered 
by their by their preference for welfare- instead of profit-maximization. Deepening via 
coherent policy implemented through reciprocal microeconomic subsidies (through the 
credit system) and directed toward a strong local capital sector seems preferable to direct 
state production in terms of achieving a more ideal model of accumulation. Korea was 
better placed ideologically and institutionally to take advantage of this model than Brazil.




INDUSTRIALIZATION BEFORE 1950 
Japanese Colonialism
Japanese colonialism in Korea formally dates from 1910. At the time of colonial 
takeover, there were two characteristics of Korean society which bear mentioning. The 
Korean economy at this time was dominated by agriculture, four-fifths of its population 
depending on the earth for their livelihood.' The period of Japanese colonialism had 
implications for both the public and private sectors. The authoritarian nature of the Korean 
state may have arisen from the Draconian police organization and intelligence agencies set 
up by the colonial Japanese state. These organizations were intensively utilized by the 
Rhee and Park administrations. The colonial policing organizations established the 
precedent for the state's being the central force in Korean society and the source of power 
by which it ruled. During the colonial administration, the one single goal that the 
bureaucracy and the police force were concerned with was extracting a surplus from the 
rice paddies.2 "The bureaucracy, while highly centralized, reached down into every village 
in the form of a police force and an agricultural extension service."3
While the broad outlines of the mission of colonial bureaucracy remained 
unchanged (ie., maximizing Korea's output to Japan) eventually some industrialization was 
encouraged via Japanese FD I. The effects of this mission were bom out in the private 
sector to which this thesis now turns. Nowhere were the modernizing effects of Japanese 
colonialism felt more than in the urban areas.4 While agricultural growth was hardly
'Edwards. "Industrialization in South Korea." 101.
2For a description of Japanese land reforms see Amsden, Giant. 52-54.
3Ibid.. 34.
4This thesis does not contest that Japanese colonialism had an impoverishing influence along with its 
modernizing influence. However, much of the impoverishing effects of such colonialism were primarily felt in 
the country by the peasants. This is outside the realm of this thesis which focuses on industrialization. 
Moreover, the impoverishing effects of colonialism in the urban areas were a ban on Korean entrepreneurship.
This ban was overturned after the Second World War when the formerly Japanese-owned industries found 
their way into the hands of Korean entrepreneurs. While the dearth of Korean management experience had an
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sluggish, industrial output grew much faster than that of agriculture. This was particularly 
true in the 1930s as Korea became an important base to bolster the Japanese war effort 
against China.5 The nature of this industry had a geographical component: the heavier 
industry was located in the north while the lighter industry (mainly grain processing, 
textiles, and some machinery) could be found in the south.6 The end of World War II left 
Japanese industrial and other properties in the hands of the Korean government, and many 
of these properties were sold at substantial discount to well-connected members o f the 
private sector. This not only gave the state a major political resource but "gave rise to 
the first crop of capitalists in post-war South Korea."7
The private sector may have also benefitted from the example of export orientation 
in the colonial economy as the private sector turned (under the direction of the state) to 
intensive exporting behavior during the 1960's. By the late 1930s, over 50% of Korean 
output was exported.8 Admittedly, it is arguable as to whether or not openness to trade 
was an advantage to a colony. It could be more convincingly argued that Korea did not 
begin national industrial development until the state was strong enough to start throwing 
up barriers to trade and heaping up subsidies to foster the growth of its industries.9 
American Occupation
Like the Japanese legacy, the US profoundly affected Korea's political economy. 
One of these influences was on the forthcoming Korean state. When the American 
Military Government (AMG) set up camp in Korea in the wake of the defeat of the
impoverishing effect the physical plants that the Japanese left behind after World War II turned out to be an 
asset to Korean industrialization.
Vor statistics see Edwards. "Industrialization in South Korea." 103 and Haggard and Cheng, "State 
and Foreign Capital." 88.
henceforth, wherever possible. South Korea will be referred to as Korea and North Korea, where 
mentioned will retain its full nomenclature.
7Tun-jen Cheng "Political Regimes and Development Strategies: South Korea and Taiwan," in 
Manufacturing Miracles: Paths of Industrialization in I-atm America and East Asia, eds. Gary Gereffi and 
Donald L. Wyman (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1990), 147.
o
Edwards. "Industrialization in South Korea." 103
9Amsden. Giant 12.
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Japanese after World War II, it crushed the power bases of the left and catapulted the 
forces of the right into political power. The politics o f the Korean People's Republic were 
divided along communist and conservative factions. While the urban left was allowed to 
perish in a bloody uprising in the fall of 1946, the rural guerrilla movement endured until 
the Korean War.
The AMG also strengthened control by enhancing the power of the conservative 
alliance which coalesced under the Korean Democratic Party (KDP), Korea's "most 
conservative political faction."10 This alliance included the landlords, the bureaucrats, and 
the police.11 All three groups needed protection from a society that was hostile to these 
Japanese collaborationists and thus were proponents o f authoritarian government. A 
strong state was evident in the Rhee and Park regimes, both in terms of societal control 
and in terms of economic intervention. Also, the KDP was strongly anticommunist. This 
doctrine had profound implications on Korea's future development since it secured US 
support as an aid donor during the Rhee regime, and it was used to rationalize heavy 
government intervention into the economy during the Park regime.
Second, the US also helped increase the state's power by weakening the power of 
the land-lords via land reform. Through land reform, the US "groped" toward creating a 
middle class in Korea to pacify the peasants and to compare favorably with communist 
North Korea. While the landed elite did not lose power completely, their role was 
transformed as they became statesmen, educators, and entrepreneurs.12 It was through the 
evolving Yangban class (or landed elite) that "both industrialization and authoritarian rule 
[were] facilitated."13
Finally, there were a number of other ways that the US affected industrialization at 
this time. The treaty after the surrender of the Japanese at the end of World War II left the 
Korean properties of the zaibatsu (Japanese conglomerates) in the hands of the Korean
10Ibid.. 36.
1 turnings, "Northeast Asian Political Economy," 66. For a similar evaluation of the power constel­
lation that assumed power in the wake of the withdrawal of the AMG see Cheng. "Political Regimes," 148.
12Amsden, Giant 37 and Cumings, "Abortive Abertura" 12.
13Cumings, "Abortive Abertura." 12.
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government which would later sell such properties, under pressure from the US, to the 
private sector at heavily discounted rates. The US also supplied aid to Korea. Finally, the 
US tried to indoctrinate the political elite in the economic philosophy of economic liberal­
ism (which in turn was buttressed by the aid lever). These economic influences were felt 
long after the formal withdrawal of the AMG and are covered in greater detail.
INDUSTRIALIZATION DURING 
THE DEMOCRATIC PERIOD (1948-1960)
The State
Despite the constitutionally democratic government the US delivered to Korea, a 
"constitution in itself obviously did not ensure democracy."14 Syngman Rhee was elected 
in August of 1948. A period of repression followed.15 The state was strengthened in other 
ways as well. One way Rhee strengthened the executive was to wrest power from the 
congress. Though the KDP initially backed Rhee, it grew increasingly irritated with his 
style of autocratic rule based on police intervention into society. A power struggle 
emerged. Rhee, in 1952, gained the upper hand in this struggle and forced through a 
series of constitutional amendments which strengthened executive control.16
Rhee also worked to strengthen the executive vis a vis society. In 1951, Rhee 
centralized his control over society by repressing dissent and "subsuming" what remained 
of the left by creating the quasi-corporatist Liberal Party.17 Rhee turned to the police, the 
bureaucracy, and machine politics to manage future elections.
The Korean War changed the developmental alliance by contributing to the of loss 
the landlords from its ranks.18 When North Korea drove into the South, they carried out 
extensive land reform. Even though the Land Reform Bill was passed in 1949-50, it was
14Cheng, "Political Regimes." 149.
15Edwards. "Industrialization in South Korea." 105.
16Haggard, Pathways. 55.
17Cheng, "Political Regimes." 148.
18For the history of land reform in Korea, see Cumings. "Abortive Abertura." 12; Edwards. 
"Industrialization in South Korea." 105; and Haggard, Pathways. 55.
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not implemented until 1953. According to this bill, landlords were given industrial bonds 
in exchange for their land. The effect of this reform was minimal since the bulk o f land 
was sold in anticipation of this reform. Be that as it may, land was redistributed. By 
eliminating an important source of societal power (the landed elite), land reform made the 
Rhee regime all the more exclusionary and eliminated a group that in Latin America 
proved a source of resistance to industrialization. Unlike the gradualist transformation of 
alliances between state and society in Latin America, Korean land reform abruptly and 
fundamentally shifted state concerns from the agrarian to the industrial elite.19
Aid Maximization Policies 
The State-US Alliance
Though the aid maximization strategy and the ISI strategy were highly comple­
mentary, this paper will try to desegregate them. In so doing, it will first speak of the aid 
maximization strategy before discussing the ISI program. Since the lion's share of the aid 
came from the US, the US-Korean relationship as well as the magnitude of this aid should 
be described. "It is no exaggeration to say that American aid sustained the Korean . . . 
[economy] in the fifties, supplanting domestic capital formation and allowing increased 
imports. . . . Dependence on aid was high."20 Both Rhee and Park as well as some Korean 
scholars have complained that US aid did little to promote long-run growth. The copious 
amounts of aid bestowed upon Korea, in all likelihood, did more good than harm.
Korea did everything it could to maximize aid flows. The aid maximization 
strategy can be considered both rational and irrational, depending on the way one looks at
I9Ibid.
20Haggard and Cheng. "State and Capital” 87. Haggard Pathways. 55 calls Korea's access to 
American aid "key” to this county's import substitution. For statistical support for this contention see Amsden. 
Giant. 39; Haggard and Cheng. "State and Capital" 87; and Cumings. "Abortive Abertura.” 5. For an evalua­
tion of Rhee's concerns see Amsden. Giant 45; for a quotation of Park's estimation see Jones and Sakong, 
Government 43. Cumings. "Northeast Asian Political Economy." 62.63.68. Cumings suggests that the US 
policy was aimed at Korea realizing its static comparative advantage as a peripheral nation, while Japan would 
be allowed to reenter the international economy as the semiperipheral state and the US of course was slated as 
a center country. Also see Amsden, Giant. 45-48. Amsden bases her criticism of the technical bungling of US 
aid projects on a report of a subcommittee that visited Korea. For this report see United States House of 
Representatives, Relief and Rehabilitation in Korea. 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives 
2574 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office. 1954). Also see Krueger. Developmental Role.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
78
it. According to economic logic, the economic policy was a shambles. However, it can 
also be considered rational in its attempt to maximize the Rhee regime’s control over aid 
allocation and to maximize aid flows. "[Rhee and his associates] rejected the idea of 
overall planning and were not interested in trying to define the longer-run objectives or an 
integrated set of policies. This probably reflected a belief on their part that they could 
retain more flexibility and achieve better results in negotiations with aid donors by 
proceeding on an ad hoc basis. . . .  To have agreed [to an economic plan] would have 
exposed the government to serious political risks."21
During this period, the rejection of planning led to a relative unimportance of 
technocratic advice in terms of impacting Korean development. Nevertheless, islands of 
technocratic expertise were conceived.22 In 1955, the Ministry of Reconstruction (MOR) 
was created to coordinate country-wide planning. While the MOR would eventually be 
disbanded, a branch of the MOR created in 1958, the Economic Development Council 
(EDC), would be significant in times to come. The Bureau of the Budget in the Ministry 
of Finance and the Research Department in the Bank of Korea were other centers of 
developmentalist thinking in this regime.
This thesis will now turn to the conflictual alliance that emerged between the 
Korean state and the American state at this time. Many conflicts arose between the US 
government's desire to use aid leverage to influence the political economy of Korea and 
the desire of the Syngman Rhee to retain independence from the US. "By and large, the 
Rhee administration staunchly opposed the US policy package. The rancor between the 
two countries exceeded what could reasonably be expected."23 Two areas, one general and 
one specific, entailed an acute amount of dissidence between these parties.
The more general policies advocated by the United States suggested a develop­
mental direction seemed to move, not forward, but backward in time. These policy
21David Cole and Young Woo Nam, "The Pattern and Significance of Planning in Korea," in 
Practical Approaches to Development Planning- Korea's Second Five-Year Plan, ed. Irma Aldeman 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969). 32.
“ Haggard. Pathways. 58.
23Amsden. Giant. 43.
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recommendations seemed to suggest Korea return to its traditional light industry produc­
tion and primary product export position in the division of labor. These suggestions were 
buttressed by aid but were frequently not ultimatums. "U.S. aid ideas adjusted to 
economic realities. Except in the 'tolerable' level of inflation, U.S. advice was not rigid 
and certainly not liberal."24
To the Americans, the most important policies concerning specific issues were 
control o f inflation and a realistic exchange rate.25 The US wanted a stabilization package. 
"Corruption apart, Rhee's position was a stabilization package comprising devaluation, a 
balanced budget, tight money and high interest rates would make growth all but 
impossible."26 Indeed, hyper-inflation never materialized. The US was not only successful 
in pressuring Korea to impose an annual stabilization in 1957, but it was also successful in 
engineering periodic devaluations: the first was a massive devaluation of 300% in the 
wake of the Korean War, another devaluation occurred in 1955, and two more maxi­
devaluations followed in 1961.27 Scholars are divided about whether the devaluations had 
a positive or negative affect on the economy; but, in this case, the stronger argument lies 
with those claiming devaluation hurt the economy.2*
In an attempt to make the Koreans more obliging to the requests of the US, the 
Americans engineered two initiatives which were to facilitate US influence over Korean 
economic planning. The first was the creation o f the Combined Economic Board. The 
second was the government to government pact of 1948. This pact expected a number of 
economic reforms to ensure sound fiscal and monetary policies, privatization of Japanese 





2*Haggard Pathways. 57.70,74 emphasizes the importance of overvaluation and instability of the 
exchange rate in creating major economic problems during the Rhee regime and cites the devaluation during 
the Park regime as integral to the success of export promotion. Amsden Giant 41.65 cites, however, 
conservative macroeconomic policies (including devaluation) and aid cuts as responsible for the 1959 
depression and calls the 1961 devaluation "disastrous." Devaluation may have stimulated export expan­
sion over the long-term; but in the short-term, lowering exchange rates stimulated nothing but recession.
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imposition of annual stabilization programs. In 1949 and 1950, reductions in aid were 
imposed in an effort to ensure compliance.29 As the 1950s drew to a close, US influence 
over Korea, which had been purchased through aid, waned a little with diminishing aid 
flows. Nevertheless, US pull in Korea remained profound.30
The State-Business Alliance
The Rhee administration's alliance with business arose from both the distribution of the aid 
dole and the sale of Japanese properties. First, this paper will analyze the distribution of 
US aid and how this subsequently built an interest group with which the state formed an 
alliance. While inconsistent macroeconomic policies may have been more important in 
maximizing aid flow, microeconomic policies were of greater importance in the allocation 
of them. These allocative policies included state distribution of aid goods, Japanese 
properties, import licenses, foreign exchange, and Central Bank credit.31 While irrational 
economically, such microeconomic policies "that appeared a complex and confusing 
patchwork in economic terms can be explained by Rhee's use of the instruments of 
economic policy . . .  to sustain political support."32 Thus, the business/state relationship in 
the 1950s was one of interdependence. While the businesses may have been dependent on 
aid for a good deal of their profits, the Rhee regime was dependent on the private sector 
for campaign contributions and electoral victories.33
The distribution of state operated enterprises (SOEs), Japanese properties, and the 
banks would become highly beneficial to the private sector. Before the privatization, Jones 
and Sakong in their chapter, "Heritage Denied," suggest that these properties were quite 
inefficient: "[the] Japanese left behind physical facilities constituting one of the largest 
'turnkey1 projects in history. . . . [However, these resources failed to promote substantial




33Cheng, "Political Regimes," 151-152.
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growth because] all the infamous characteristics of public enterprise were exacerbated by 
the chaos and ignorance of the foreign collaborators . . . [and were later] as poorly run 
under the [Korean] government as under the Americans."34 Though privatization began in 
1954, major reforms in this area did not get underway until 1957. "The divestment of 
SOEs gave rise to the first crop of capitalists in postwar South Korea . .. [resulting] in a 
close association between the state and businesses."35
Rhee's government managed some major accomplishments. First, it reconstructed 
a strong light industrial sector with excess capacity which would figure heavily in the drive 
to increase exports in the 1960s. Second, it helped create the Korean diversified business 
group (chaebol) which benefited from this period of illicit wealth accumulation.36 Finally, 
it demonstrated a precedent to the strong state-business relationship that would reemerge.
ISI Policies
Primary ISI industries was necessary because o f external constraints consisting of 
"political partition, a major loss of markets [mainly Japanese], and persistent balance of 
payment problems."37 Decolonization permitted the beginning of the "easy" phase of ISI. 
However, as "the economy became more stabilized (foreign aid arrived, prices dropped, 
and the balance of payments difficulties eased), ISI became an objective in itself."38 This 
objective was closely related to maximizing aid flow and, consequently, "featured low 
interest rates, an overvalued exchange rate, a budget deficit financed by borrowing from 
the central bank when taxes and aid generated revenues were insufficient, and Central 
Bank financing of commercial bank credit to the private sector."39 Korea's adoption of
^Jones and Sakong. G overnm en t 30, 33. 35.
35Cheng, "Political Regimes." 147.
36Amsden. Giant. 39.40.
37Haggard, Pathways. 51.
38Cheng. "Political Regimes," 145.
39 Amsden. Giant 39.
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primary ISI in the wake of the colonial era was hardly unique among LDCs and eroded 
some of the developmental impediments ubiquitous post-colonial periods elsewhere.40
The beneficiaries of ISI were local capitalists, since Korea was not an attractive 
site for foreign investment at this time and Japanese colonial investment was ultimately 
turned over to local capitalists. However, at the outset of ISI, domestic industries were 
too weak to be able to shape the strategy of the state which meant that pro-industrial 
policies were initiated at the behest of the state.41 The Rhee regime desired to maintain 
power by co-opting (and creating) a supportive social group in the local capitalist class.
Despite neoliberal argument that Korean ISI policies during the 1950s produced 
limit-ed development, this assertion seems to be unfounded. True, GDP growth did only 
average 4.8% annually from the period 1954 to 1961, but this was due to a sluggish 
performance of agricultural and service sectors.42 On average, the industrial sector during 
this period grew at 12.2% annually. Moreover, it is unfair to judge the Rhee regime's ISI 
policy as totally at fault since the US-imposed annual stabilization plans (beginning in 
1957) accounted for much of the stagnation at the end of the 1950s. The stabilization 
plans not only slowed inflation but also stalled investment and growth. Finally, ISI 
provided the industrial platform from which EOI growth would spring. This platform was 
a strong light manufacturing sector with over-capacity, buttressed by subsidized credit, the 
aid dole, and protection from imports.43
Though economic growth had been rapid through the 1950s, this growth become 
untenable. In 1960 and 1961, some indicators of economic growth looked gloomy. The 
low growth rate during the early 1960s is attributable to the downward spiral of aid, the 
orthodox macroeconomic policies the state converted to under pressure from the US, and 
the exhaustion of "easy" ISI. Economic decline as well as political factors contributed to
^ i d . .  12. 14.
41Cheng. "Political Regimes." 144-145.
42Haggard. Pathways. 59.
43 Amsden. Giant 41.
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Rhee's downfall. Rhee stepped down amidst the intense riots of April 19, 1960. The 
political economy of import substitution and aid maximization had come to an end.
Chang Myon presided over the short-lived Second Republic (1960-61). While 
short, this regime had a lasting impact on Korean economic development. In the political 
realm, the state sought to reform the bureaucratic structure. The Committee on 
Government Organizational Reform, which was set up under Myon, "recommended the 
establishment of an independent ministry of economic planning and an economic research 
institute both along the lines implemented by Park."44 In addition, the five year economic 
plan proposed by the Economic Development Council was approved by the Park cabinet 
shortly after the junta took control. Most importantly, though, the Chang Myon and the 
coming Park regime shared a commitment to economic growth. The contrast in political 
styles can also be drawn between the Rhee and Park regimes. "[The 1961 coup] brought a 
decade of political incompetence to a close . . . [and] would open a new chapter on both 
growth and state power."45
INDUSTRIALIZATION DURING PARK’S 
FIRST PERIOD OF MILITARY RULE (1961-1972)
Origins and Policies of Primary EOI 
The State
In the aftermath of the coup of May, 1961, Park rectified the loss of societal order 
by severe repression.46 Park went on to institutionalize his executive dominance by a 
"circuitous" consolidation whereby he won a narrow victory when the elections were held 
in 1963 in the context of "fragmented and politically tainted opposition . . . [and] charges 
of election fraud."47
"^Jones and Sakong, Government. 46.
45Amsden. Giant. 38.
^laggard. Pathways. 62.
47Ibid.. 63. Because the state's presence is so pervasive, Koo calls Korea a "hypermilitarized" society. 
See Hagen Koo, "The Interplay of State, Social Class, and World System in East Asian Development: The 
Cases of South Korea and Taiwan." in The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism, ed. Fredric C. 
Deyo (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 173.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
84
This thesis contends that far from free market principles of neoliberals, “Korea is 
evidence for the proposition that, if and when late industrialization arrives, the driving 
force behind it is a strong interventionist state.”48 Amsden shows that, even though 
favorable macroeconomic conditions (low exchange and wage rates) in most cases did not 
hurt export expansion, there are sound reasons for disbelieving that they were a greater 
causal factor than state intervention in favor o f EOI was.49
State strength is cased in terms of executive dominance. There were some 
continuities in executive dominance from the Rhee regime. First, the legislature under 
Park was weak and, in any case, controlled by this executive's own party, the Democratic 
Republican Party (DRP). Second, the transition to "democracy" did not disband instru­
ments of societal control developed earlier. The Korean Central Intelligence Agency 
(KCIA) was particularly important in this regard. It "combined external and internal 
intelligence-gathering functions, maintained close links with the ruling party and estab­
lished a pervasive presence throughout society. hS0 The doctrine of anticommunism was 
the rationale for intervention in all spheres of society, including the economic. In the latter 
case this was, of course, an oxymoron.51
48Amsden. Giant. 55.
49A full explanation of such concepts is beyond the scope of this paper. For a full illustration of this 
argument consult Ibid.. 56-63.
S0Haggard. Pathways. 63.
51 In fact the staunch anticommunist stance has been a mask for communist-like interventions into the 
economy. Cumings, "Abortive Abertura." 89. 13 gets at this irony when he writes. "The South Korean state 
has a far stronger role in the economy than any Latin American state save Cuba." Likewise. Amsden. Giant 
37 writes. "Notwithstanding the military junta's pervasive intervention in the economy, an act that might 
otherwise be associated with socialistic tendencies, anticommunism has been the dominant political ideology 
guiding Korean industrialization." White and Wade, Development States. 5.6 seem to imply that Korea is 
some mix of capitalism and communism calling it a "guided market" economy and contend that in some ways 
"South Korea [is]. . .  fundamentally different from the economies of most socialist countries. On the other 
hand, [it i s ] . . .  also different from most Western economies." Chang, "Industrial Policy." 151 explains a 
reason for the strong similarity between the Korean state and communist states in terms of state economic 
intervention when he writes that Park "was also strongly influenced by Communism. His brother was an 
influential Communist leader, and he himself was sentenced to death (but earned amnesty by publicly 
denouncing Communism) as one of the leaders of a Communist mutiny within the Korean army in 1949."
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The third reform consisted o f changes made in the decision making structure.52 
Probably the most important among these was the reorganization of the Economic 
Planning Board (EPB) in June, 1961. The executive of the EPB was elevated to the 
position of Deputy Prime Minister, and its policies were unconstrained by the legislature. 
Finally, the state elevated the EPB to a powerful position by giving this organization 
discretion over a number of functions (including planning and information gathering) 
which had formerly been the purview of disparate organizations. The consolidation 
resulted in the reduction of "the abilities of other ministries to initiate projects 
independently."53 The EPB was not only responsible for long term planning, but it also 
had a hand in the coercion process by which firms were made to abide by these policies.
Institutional changes, though, were only half of the story. The state, now 
dominated by the executive branch, also exhibited a regional, if not indigenous, bent 
toward export-led industrialization. While Haggard, tends to place great emphasis on the 
influence of the US in charting subsequent Korean economic policy, other scholars such as 
Chang and Amsden reject this idea and instead emphasize the role of President Park 
himself and his senior staff.54 "Under Japanese rule, Korea had been a highly export 
oriented country. . . . [However,] in the 1960s exports were viewed by the military regime 
as a . . . [means to achieve] self-sufficiency . . . and the antithesis of self-sufficiency was 
implicitly defined as continued reliance on US largess."55 Ironically, Korea did not adopt a 
policy of increased exports because it saw the wisdom of the neoliberal policies that the 
US was pushing on Korea. Indeed, it was US economic interference Korea was trying to 
escape with exports. This is why the Korean model seems to resemble the model of 
Japanese corporatism more than it reflects any western neoliberal model.
[The type of state exhibited by Korea].. . should at least be partly understood as
an outcome of the conscious actions taken by the military regime of General Park
Chung Hee, which fundamentally shaped the political economy of the country for
52Haggard. Pathways. 64-65.
53Ibid.. 65.
^Ibid., 68-71; Chang, "Industrial Policy ," 150-151; and Amsden. Giant 48-52 and 71-72.
5 5 Amsden. Giant 71 -72.
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decades to come. . . .  The political ideas of the top political decision makers of the 
military regime were fundamentally shaped under the shadow of Japanese corpora­
tism. In terms of their economics the early top decision makers were no fans of 
the free market, although they had to pay constant lip service to the 'free market 
economy1, given the critical importance of U.S. support for the political survival 
of the regime. In addition, whatever little economic knowledge the early Korean 
economic bureaucracy had was not neoclassical economics but the economic 
theories of Fredric List, Joseph Schumpeter, and Karl Marx, which dominated 
Japanese academia and policymaking circles in the first half of the twentieth 
century. The major themes o f the Korean economic policy making, for example, 
the concern for 'social waste' from 'excessive competition', the emphasis on scale 
economies (and large firms), the obsession with capital accumulation (reflected in 
the anticonsumption bias), and the desire to develop heavy and chemical industries, 
make more sense when we understand the intellectual background of the economic 
bureaucracy. Given such a background, it is more than natural that the political- 
economic agenda of the Park regime was summarized as 'guided capitalism'
(Gyodo Jabon-Jui), where the state plays a guardian role.56
The true innovation of Korean policy was that it left so little to the market. 
"Macroeconomic policy measures were seen as ineffective for the rapid upgrading of 
industrial structure owing to their uncertain impact on specific sectors and were conse­
quently given a status secondary to industrial policy. . . . [Tjherefore,. . . 'priority' sectors 
.. . [were] given custom designed financial, technical and administrative support."57 In 
explaining why the state has distorted macroeconomic prices less than other developing 
countries, Amsden writes, "The [state's] insistence on performance standards . . . induced 
a level of productivity, and a willingness to invest on the part of the private sector, that 
made greater price 'distortions' unnecessary, and the ample price 'distortions' that did exist 
more effective. . . . [G]rowth has been faster in Korea not because markets have been 
allowed to operate more freely but because the subsidization process has been qualitatively 
superior: reciprocal in Korea, unidirectional in most other cases."58 If state intervention is 
stifling to entrepreneurship as the neoliberals claim, it is "not clear to us what could more 
'stifling', if so many firms have so little freedom to decide what and how much to produce
^Chang, "Industrial Policy." 151.
57Ibid. 139.
58Amsden. Giant. 145.
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at what price."59 Korea is not an example o f how conservative reforms can create devel- 
opmentally positive results, but the antithesis o f it. Despite the fact that Korea was 
acutely dependent on the US, "in the mealy matter of economic growth , Korea charted 
an independent course."60 This meant that the state placed growth before stability, which 
was precisely the opposite direction of causality recommended by neoliberal doctrine.
This section has described some initiatives the state took by itself that led to EOI policies. 
However, the state did not take such initiatives without being cognizant of the needs of its 
industries. This topic is explored below.
The State-Business Alliance
A new alliance structure that arose between the state and the private sector was 
critical to the EOI transition. The state concentrated its energies on the cotton textile 
firms and the progressive millionaires (chaebol) received redoubled scrutiny and policy 
ministrations. The policy areas that the state implemented to appease and transform these 
interest groups were trade policy (formulated primarily with the cotton textile firms in 
mind) and investment policy (formulated primarily with the chaebol in mind). Trade 
policy directed primarily toward the light local firms would be more pertinent for explain­
ing industrialization during the first phase o f Park regime. Investment policy aimed 
primarily at the local conglomerates was more pertinent for explaining industrialization 
during the second phase of Park regime.61
This thesis will first look at the development of the statt-chaebol alliance. With 
the turn to EOI, the military faced a serious dilemma. The military had promised both 
growth and the elimination of corruption. Initially, the government made good on its 
clean-up campaign by quickly passing the Special Law for Dealing with Illicit Wealth 
Accumulation, purging members of the bureaucracy known to be inefficient or corrupt and 
attacking conspicuous consumption. The government threatened confiscation of shares of 
the chaebots industries and prison sentences for its CEO's. Leading businessmen were
S9Chang, "Industrial Policy," 138.
60 Amsden, Giant. 49.
61 Ibid.. 64.
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paraded around the streets wearing sandwich-board signs proclaiming slogans like "I was 
a parasite on the people."62 Soon, it dawned on this regime that the chaebol were neces­
sary vehicles of growth. Faced with this situation, the military could either forgive these 
businessmen who were accused of accumulating wealth illicitly and risk political 
retribution, or it could punish these businessmen and risk economic collapse and the 
subsequent political fallout. In the end, some businessmen opted to declare bankruptcy 
and pay their fines. Others offered the concept o f a business-govemment relationship "in 
which the government would extend financial assistance to industry in line with the 
priorities of the first plan while excusing the accused from criminal prosecution."63 The 
leading CEO's "[i]nstead of becoming victims of martial emasculation... were 'allowed to 
enter center stage' like the Meiji millionaires before them, albeit in a kneeling position."64 
The state avoided political fallout by basing its legitimacy on growth instead of a 
corruption free political economy. Moreover, by threatening property confiscation of 
shares and sentences, the state set a profound example for all the private sector in which 
the private sector was obliged to serve the society by executing the will of the government 
in an effort to pay interest on a debt that could never quite be repaid.65 "Out of the 
remonstrations with the millionaires came the crux of Korea's investment policies. . . [and 
within days of the coup,] an alliance had been formed between business and government 
that laid the basis for subsequent industrialization."66
Another ingredient of this model, and this is more pertinent for the first phase of 
industrialization under Park, was the state's alliance with light industry, particularly the 
cotton textile producers. After the Korean War, textiles received the "lion’s share" of 
international aid which helped to quickly rebuild the industry after the devastation of war.
In addition, Korea's textile industry had achieved total import substitution by 1957. The
62Cumings, "Northeast Asian Political Economy." 69.
63Haggard, Pathways. 72.
64Amsden. Giant. 72.
6SChang, "Industrial Policy." 151-152.
66Amsden. Giant 72.
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combination of supports meant that it had been "reconstructed" to the point of excess 
capacity. It was this excess capacity that the state intended to remedy through increasing 
this sector's export activity.
To emphasize the fact that the state had much more power vis a vis industry, this 
thesis will contrast the power relationships between these two groups during the Park 
regime and the Rhee regime. Park's B-A state based its legitimacy on economic growth. 
Consequently, the state needed the private sector to perform. What may have given the 
state's will impetus was that much of the interdependence between business and the state 
which characterized the Rhee regime was gone. Part of the difference had to do with the 
way elections were financed. Rhee financed his electoral campaigns by kickbacks 
provided by businesses to which he allocated favors. "The ability to extract rent from 
individual businesses, while at the same time the regime was unable to direct the use of 
resources by the business sector, denoted the structural dependency of political power on 
the capitalist class."67 Elections under Park were financed by "an unavoidable political tax 
levied by a powerful incumbent, rather than a discretionary contribution that imposes 
obligations on the recipient."68 In the aftermath of the clean up campaign, the largest local 
capitalists were dependent on the state for their very existence. Jones and Sakong's 
analysis of "Korea, Inc" puts the state-business relationship in its proper context. Despite 
the fact that there is a great deal of harmony of interest between local capital and the state, 
the power quotient is firmly on the state's side: "The government's wishes are tantamount 
to commands, and business does not dare take them lightly."69
The government influenced the behavior of its firms through three methods of 
subsidy and coercion: credit pricing and allocation, reservation of the domestic market for 
domestic producers, and other export subsidies. During the Rhee regime, the US 
encouraged desired behavior in Korea by increasing aid flows or pressuring to change 
undesired behavior by threatening to decrease or actually decreasing (or even terminating) 
aid flows. The Korean military government internalized this dependent relationship. It
67Cheng, "Political Regimes." 151-152.
Jones and Sakong, Government. 68.
69Ibid.. 67.
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did this by assuming control over the banking system. Instead of the US using aid to exact 
desired behavior, the state used the banking system to condition desired behavior by 
allocating scarce credit to the members of a highly leveraged private sector that would 
carry out its wishes. The nationalization of the banks was the "one exception to the new 
government’s decision to eschew confiscation. . . [and] proved a critical move in the long 
run, allowing the government to determine where, when, and how much to invest in which 
industries."70 Through state control over the banks, it not only controlled the domestic 
loans but the foreign loans which were channeled through these banks. This meant, with 
the exception of the curb market, the government controlled access to all credit. Not 
only did the state use the credit lever to increase levels of export, it also used its influence 
in loan allocation to keep investment in priority sectors at very high levels, increasing the 
rate of industrial modernization. Partly conceding to foreign pressures to keep interest 
rates high, the state raised the domestic interest rates but kept international loans well 
below the market.71 With high domestic interest rates and the 1962 amendments to the 
Foreign Capital Inducement Law, which offered government guarantees to foreign loans, 
the stage was set for rapid accumulation and efficient utilization of foreign debt. Foreign 
debt was used to promote rapid modernization and rapid export expansion. "A regime of 
multiple interest rates arose, therefore, quite similar in principle to the multiple exchange 
rate regime that export subsidies created. The cost of borrowing at home far exceeded the 
cost of borrowing abroad. This afforded the government the opportunity to discriminate 
in favor of particular industries and firms. . . . [T]he real cost o f borrowing abroad was 
negative (in most of the 1960s and 1970s)."72
The holy grail of economic success for the neoliberals is the ability of private 
sector to make its decisions unfettered by the interference of government on the market. 
But, during the Park regime, the private sector had lost almost all control over such
70Amsden. Giant. 72. 73.
71 Ibid.. 74.
^Ibid.
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decisions; instead, such power rested in the hands of the state.73 Contrary to neoliberal 
predictions, the heavy state intervention, both macroeconomic and microeconomic, 
succeeded marvelously in Korea. "Macro-level reforms changed the broad structure of 
incentives, but at a second, micro-economic level a significant battery of state supports 
and institutional reforms reduced the risks and transactions costs of shifting into the export 
business. Exchange rate and trade [macroeconomic] policies established a permissive 
framework for the realization of comparative advantage, and more targeted 
[microeconomic] policies pushed firms to exploit it."74
Local firms also received protection from international competition over the 
domestic market which constituted another important subsidy. For textile firms, this 
meant that the inherently risky business of exporting heavily was compensated for by the 
reservation of the domestic market for them. The cotton textile industry still depended 
heavily on the domestic market despite increases in exports.75 Larger firms were likewise 
rewarded for expanding into inherently risky "new" investments in this fashion. Local 
firms have been protected from foreign firms in two ways. First, though foreign firms 
were allowed to enter Korea, their wares, as stipulated by the state, were to be bound 
primarily for the external, not the internal, markets. Foreign firms were only allowed to 
operate in Korea if they could provide a "new" technology to which local firms could not 
gain access in other ways.76 "Foreign direct investors have been welcomed to enter the 
light manufacturing export sector, whereas they have been discouraged from investing in 
import substituting sectors such as pharmaceuticals and heavy industry."77 Second, 
Krueger, who has been at pains to promote Korea’s status as a market economy, admits 
that a most "remarkable aspect of the . . . period since 1953 has been the remarkable
^Chang. "Industrial Policy." 138.
74Haggard, Pathways. 67.
7SFor statistics on the large share of wealth textile firms accrued from the domestic market vis a vis 
exports see Amsden. Giant. 67.
76Mardon, "Control of Foreign Capital." 116-117.
^Ibid.. 76.
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stability of the tariff structure."78 This leads Amsden to conclude that tariffs "together 
with quantitative import restrictions and government export incentives . . .  provided 
Korean business with abundant government support."79
Export incentives were the third way the Korean state encouraged exports. Neo­
liberal economists claim that a low unified exchange rate was the most important reform 
prompting Korea's turn to EOI. Market failure theorists claim that subsidies were more 
important. By estimating the export effective exchange rate (EEER), one can weigh the 
effects of exchange rate devaluation vis a  vis subsidies. There is a strong argument that 
subsidies were more important in deciding the transition to EOI. It did not "prove 
possible to increase exports merely by devaluing the won against foreign currencies. The 
major effect of devaluation was worsening the business climate by the increase in the price 
of imported inputs, which fueled inflation."80 After reviewing the data on the real effec­
tive exchange rate and movements in export growth in Korea, Amsden finds that "exports 
and the real effective exchange rate . .. show little relationship to one another."81
The 50% devaluation of the won in 1961 hurt the cotton textile industry particular­
ly hard because it imported 99% of its cotton stock. The devaluation meant textile firms 
paid a higher price for cotton, resulting in imported inflation. "The crisis precipitated by 
devaluation provoked the military government to intervene with an expansionary econom­
ic package, which exacerbated inflation even further."82 Noting the lack of response of 
cotton textile firms after the 1961 devaluation, Amsden uses the Frank, Kim and Westphal 
study to draw conclusions about the causes of the explosion of exports in Korea:
The volume of exports from Korea barely budged in 1960-62, but bounded in
1963, 1964, and thereafter. . . . What seems to have turned the tide was a sharp
rise in subsidies to exporters. . . . The value of manufactured exports was higher




Amsden. Giant. 66. The above statistics cited are cited in this source but originate from the 
Economic Planning Board. Economic Survey (Seoul: EPB. 1962). 49.
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in 1963-64 than in all previous years combined since the Japanese defeat in 1945, 
notwithstanding the increasing overvaluation of the won in 1963-1964 amidst high 
inflation. The export effective exchange rate rose from 151.5 won per dollar in 
1962 to 189.4 in 1963, at the same time as exports rose. The government again 
devalued the won by 50% in May 1964 (after the United States made the release 
of food aid contingent on devaluation). Exports increased further, but so did sub­
sidies, as indicated by the gap between the official and the effective exchange rates. 
The gap between them would have been even wider if subsidies to capital had 
been included.*3
In addition to subsidies, Amsden finds that "a strong element of coercion underlay 
Korea’s phenomenal export performance."84 Coercion was necessary because neither 
market forces nor incentives alone were sufficient to stimulate exports. In the early 1960s, 
neither excess capacity nor low wages nor a devalued won was enough incentive to turn 
textile companies to export. In addition, export incentives were quite generous in the 
1950s.*5 Such positive incentives were not sufficient to increase exports because textile 
firms were very leery about the risky nature of intensive exporting. Consequently, the 
state had to use large doses of subsidy and coercion to pressure these firms into 
implementing the state’s ambitious export designs. The basis for the claim that a large 
component in explaining the dramatic increase in the exports by way of state coercion on 
firms is provided by reference to a survey conducted in 1976 by Rhee and others.*6 In this 
survey, the response to the question "What has been the effect of export targets fixed for 
your firm?" is telling. Over half (53%) marked negative effects. The share marking 
neutral or positive effects were mixed—10% and 37%, respectively. The strong negative 
reaction to government intrusion implies that state pressure was formidable since export 




The literature which does emphasize this point includes Charles R. Frank, Kwang Suk Kim, and 
Larry E. WestphaL Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: South Korea (New York: National 
Bureau of Economic Research. 1975): Jones and Sakong. Government. 92; and Amsden. Giant. 65.
See Rhee. Ross-Larson. and PurselL Competitive Edge.
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implies that the reaction of Korean firms to state demands to increase their exports was 
more a "reaction to pressure rather than subsidies, let alone the 'right' relative prices."87
The State-US Alliance
While this thesis has tended to emphasize state and its alliance to firms as the 
origin of the EOI, Stephen Haggard and others contend that this transition resulted 
primarily from US pressures and advice.88 Part of the reason that the US was able to have 
so much influence on Korea was not only that it was beginning to take a hard line with its 
aid policy but that Korea had gotten itself into an awkward economic situation.89 Also, 
the dwindling of aid naturally caused the Korean government to search for alternate 
sources of financing industrialization, including foreign debt and exports. Below, Haggard 
contends that the shift to EOI was a result of the intricate interactions between US and 
UN officials, on the one hand, and Korean officials, on the other.
[T]he United States used the aid weapon to force policy changes both 
through the short run manipulation of aid to achieve limited goals and through an 
announced intention to reduce aid commitments over the longer run. . . .  [After 
Park's failed attempt to escape aid dependence and American pressure by seeking 
foreign credits,] in April 1963, the government negotiated a major stabilization 
program with the United States, including ceilings on the growth of the money 
supply, the budget deficit, commercial bank credit expansion, and foreign exchange 
reserves. The next target was the exchange rate drawing on a study commissioned 
by AID [Agency for International Development], the United States pressed 
devaluation despite strenuous objections from Korean business and government 
officials.
The period from 1962 through early 1964 was punctuated by periods o f 
acute tension between the United States and Korea . . .  but the government's
87Amsden, Giant 69. Coercion was also used extensively in motivating firms to modernize into 
"new" industries as will be shown in the next chapter.
88Haggard. Pathways. 68-70.
on
On the one hand, there are two clear examples of the new tendency of the US to use the threat of aid
reductions or actual such reductions: in 1963 the US reduced PL480 aid from what it had been the following 
year and the director of US AID in 196S had independently suspended aid disbursements until Korea brought 
wages and spending into line. The Kennedy administration felt that past aid policy in Korea had been 
ineffective because of a subcommittee report. See United States House of Representatives. Relief. On the 
other hand. Korea's economic difficulties included a food shortage, resulting not only from the high food price 
but a bad harvest, it also included an attempt on the part of Park to try to borrow Korea's way out of its 
economic troubles. For details see Haggard. Pathways. 69.
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acceptance of the need for reform allowed a gradual reconciliation with the United 
States. Acceptance of the need to stabilize also marked the culmination of a 
gradual turn within the junta away from populist ideas and towards greater con­
servatism and reliance on technocratic advice.. . . The final move toward an 
outward-looking strategy evolved during the two years following Park's 
assumption of the presidency in January 1964. These had their origins in a 
group of American advisers working closely with mid-level planners in the 
Economic Planning Board and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. A Joint 
US-Korean Economic Cooperation Committee, formed in July 1963, became the 
locus for the discussion of development strategy, including the promotion of 
exports the coordination of commercial and investment relations, and fiscal 
and financial reform.90
The Americans believed that the East Asian sphere would be more secure with a 
US center tied to a Japanese semiperiphery tied to a Taiwanese and Korean periphery.91 
The US foreign policy in Asia as in other regions of the world was one where "[sjecurity 
and economic considerations were inexorably mixed."92 Consequently, the US in the 
1960s "placed enormous pressure on Korea to accord diplomatic recognition to Japan.
This was viewed, at the time, by businessmen and students in Korea, as suicidal for infant 
industry and cultural integrity."93 Opponents to normalization also feared that if Japanese- 
Korean relations were normalized, the Park regime stood to further consolidate internal 
control from any resources which would be forthcoming from such a normalization. The 
normalization proved the most contentious of the policy battles involved with the EOI 
reforms.94 Amidst escalating protests, the normalization bill passed the legislature in a 
late-night maneuver known in Korea as "the snatch." It is so called because the opposition 
in the Assembly had resigned at the time it became law. This normalization treaty 
resulted in a flow o f Japanese capital which paved the way to the EOI transition: it
^ b id .. 68.69. 70.
The problem with neoimperialism was that it was too porous to prevent Japan from moving into the 
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included a $300 million grant, $200 million in government to government aid, and $100 
million in commercial credits.
US pressure directed toward Korea to increase exports may have had its desired 
result, but the broader objective of such pressure to get Korea to adopt a neoliberal eco­
nomic model was hardly accomplished. Also, instead of a Western-based model that 
emphasized stabilization before growth and low levels of intervention by the state, Korea 
adopted an economic model very similar to Japan's. This model promoted new heights of 
state interventionism and autonomy. This is not surprising since state interventionism and 
autonomy are important ingredients of the Japanese developmental model. To understand 
the switch to EOI more completely, the tight alliance that was formed between the Park 
regime and local private capital must be explored. Though the US had an influence in 
defining Korean economic policy, this influence played second fiddle to the those of 
Japanese corporatism and state private sector alliances. During the first period of military 
rule, this alliance accommodated (primarily) a state-led drive to intensive exporting by 
private local firms and (secondarily) a state-led drive to channel investment toward the 
more modem areas. During the second period , these emphases reversed themselves..
INDUSTRIALIZATION DURING
PARK'S SECOND PERIOD OF MILITARY RULE (1973-79)
The Origins and Policies of Secondary ISI 
The State
Much has already been said about the institutional reforms which made the state 
stronger in the wake of the coup. Some additional institutional reforms preceded the 
state's drive into heavy and chemical industries, including intense societal repression.
"On October 17, 1972, martial law was declared, the constitution suspended, the National 
Assembly dissolved, the universities closed, and all political parties banned. The Yushin 
or revitalizing constitution gave Park the power to dissolve the National Assembly and to 
appoint one-third of its members. Election of the president was made indirect. Executive 
autonomy reached its peak."95
9SHaggard. Pathways. 131.
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This repression also included "[an increased] KCLA penetration of society, a clump 
of 'emergency decrees,' and increasing use of vile tortures against dissidents."96 It seems 
that the reforms of this period were also modeled on the Japanese precedent in that the 
word Yushin is pronounced I  shin in Japanese, and the latter is used in reference to the 
post-1868 Meiji reforms. Cumings draws an explicit connection between industrialization 
and the hardening of the state in the early 1970s.97
The reforms enhancing executive autonomy only accentuated a second complex 
reform which would more directly shape the state-led drive into industrial modernization: 
this was the HCI Plan, itself. The HCI Plan was announced in President Park’s New 
Year’s Address of January 12, 1973. Even before this, though, major undertakings such 
as the Pohang Iron and Steel Yard (built between 1970-74), the Hyundai Shipyard (built 
between 1972-73), and a number of petrochemical facilities (built between 1968-74) were 
well underway. It was not until May, 1973, that the Heavy and Chemical Industries 
Promotion Council was established. The council was charged not only with custom 
designing the incentive system for HCI but also with clearing obstacles to industrial 
modernization and hand picking the firms to participate in the HCI projects. To give 
this council the necessary credibility and power it would need to fundamentally transform 
Korea’s industrial structure, the Prime Minister received the chairmanship of this council 
and related ministers became its members.
However, President Park’s desire to make the HCI council more powerful and to 
exert greater control over the council resulted in some institutional reforms. "The 
formulation and implementation of the heavy-industry plan epitomized the 'strong' state. 
Planning was highly centralized in the Blue House and the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry (MCI), bypassing the more orthodox Economic Planning Board (EPB)."98 
Specifically, this reform established a senior economic secretary to the president as the 
director o f the Plan. A special task force acted as secretariat of the council. "The senior
^Cumings. "Northeast Asian Political Economy," 77.
^Cumings, "Abortive Abertura” 6-7.
9*Stephan Haggard and Chung-in Moon. "Institutions and Economic Policy: Theory and a Korean 
Case Study." World Politics 42.2 119901:217.
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economic secretary and the task force then made up the core organization that was 
empowered to implement the HCI Plan, under the supreme power of the president."99
In addition to the continuities and changes in the institutional power o f the state, 
some ideological continuities and shifts are evident. One o f the continuities was that the 
HCI Plan, like the primary EOI plan before it, laid bare the leadership orientation of the 
state in conjunction with its strong commitment to economic development. Whether 
speaking of the EOI or the secondary ISI reforms, one fact should be clear: the Korean 
government, not the market, steered its economy toward export-led growth and moderni­
zation of industry. In the same way Park government took bold steps toward increasing 
exports, it initiated a distinctly new set of policy reforms to speed industrial moderni­
zation. The Park government showed a marked tendency toward leadership to anticipate 
the market and what was best for the private sector, which is a step beyond following 
market signals and responding to pressures from the private sector.
The state gained confidence in its ability to formulate successful technocratic plans 
and its ability to rigorously implement them. This confidence sprang from the fact that 
government had not only formulated a successful plan for the promotion of exports but 
also had administered the hugely successful Steel Plant and the Hyundai Shipyard. "The 
government concluded that these successes did not occur by accident but were the natural 
outcomes of bold risk taking and careful utilization of changing domestic and international 
economic conditions."100
Such confidence was reinforced by the fact that sufficient information had been 
accrued on the developmental histories o f developing countries for the state to conclude 
the moment was ripe for industrial deepening in the early 1970s.101 The Japanese model 
was a particular aid. "[I]n order for South Korea to catapult into the ranks of advanced 
nations . . . development of HCI was the only available choice, and . . . there was little
"Lee. "Promotion Plan." 443.
l00Ibid.. 439.
101Chang, "Industrial Policy." 146.
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reason why South Korea could not repeat the Japanese success."102 However, the state 
became harder and developed the HCI plan with respect to its alliance with business, 
which is discussed below.
The State-Business Alliance
On the most general level, the HCI Plan entailed a new relationship between the 
three forms o f capital. The state imposed a distinct division of labor between public, local, 
and foreign industrial capital. The state elected the local private, not the public, sector to 
be the central locus of new industry. However, this assertion deserves certain qualifica­
tions. This definitely did not mean that the state had decided to let the decisions of firms 
be governed by the guiding hand of the market rather than the long-reaching arm of the 
state. If anything, the degree of coercion and incentive increased during the 1970s. It also 
did not mean that the government would refrain from engaging in public enterprise. The 
growth of public enterprises in Korea is widely recognized.103 Since the state selected a 
few key, large projects to make public productive investments, "it was a top-down rather 
than a bottom-up approach to industrial restructuring."104 Such public investments sought 
to provide a minimum market size and stimulate a chain of related investments by the local 
private sector. This approach stood in stark contrast to the one followed in Brazil.
Foreign firms were to become a significant minority during this epoch of industrial 
deepening. Such firms were exploited for their technological abilities. The state placed 
specific conditions on foreign firms which focused specifically on facilitating the rate at 
which technology could be transferred from foreign firms to local firms. Foreign industrial 
capital was discriminated against in favor of foreign loan capital which was channelled into 
large local conglomerates. Moreover, in terms of investment, foreigners were discrimin­
l02Lee. "Promotion Plan." 439.
I03Three articles in particular originate from edited volume by Deyo. Asian Industrialism. These 
include Cumings. "Northeast Asian Political Economy," 123-124, 128; Haggard and Cheng, "State and 
Foreign Capital." 123-124: Fredric C. Deyo. "Coalitions. Institutions, and Linkage Sequencing—Toward a 
Strategic Capacity Model of East Asian Development," in The Political Economy of the New Asian 
Industrialism, ed. Fredric C. Devo (Ithaca; Cornell University Press. 1987). 136-238.
I04Lee. "Promotion Plan." 436.
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ated against in favor of local capital. Only if technology in an industrial sector was 
exceedingly complex, prohibitively expensive, or simply unavailable on the market, did the 
state allow foreign firms to enter modem sectors. Even then, the standard condition for 
entrance was the joint venture. After the condition of the joint venture had been met, the 
state negotiated conditions with foreign firms concerning, among other things, the rate at 
which technology and ownership would be transferred to local firms. Such negotiations 
maximized the position of local capital vis a vis foreign capital in assuming the dominant 
position in the joint venture. An antecedent to such negotiations was the state's continu­
ing encouragement, once the contribution of foreign firm to the local firm's expansion was 
obsolete, for the local firm to squeeze the foreign firm out of the joint venture entirely.105
Since the alliance between the state and local capital is one of the most critical to 
understanding the nature of Korean development, it is described in more detail. In the 
section on the first period of the Park regime and EOI, this thesis discussed the primary 
alliance that the Park regime made with local light industrial exporters and the secondary 
alliance the state made with large local capital during the EOI period. The hierarchy of 
these alliances changed during the period of secondary ISI. Now, the state forged a 
primary alliance with large local capital and a secondary alliance with local light industrial 
exporters. Similarly, the main policy emphasis changed from trade policy, pursued during 
primary EOI, to investment policy, pursued during secondary ISI.
The detailed intervention into the investment decisions of the private sector as was 
associated with the HCI Plan implies a great deal of coercion. "Though they strongly 
influenced resource mobilization and patterns of resource allocation,. . . past plans were 
[indicative plans] not imperative plans . . .  An imperative plan, in contrast to an indicative 
plan where only broad objectives and strategies are provided, is quite detailed. The 
programs in the imperative plan are expected to be executed meticulously."106 Coercion 
was not only required because of the meticulous technocracy of the Korean state, but
I0SMardon. "Control of Foreign CapitaL" 120-122. 126-137.
l06Lee. "Promotion Plan." 441.
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coercion was necessary because the state sought to override the objections raised by the 
private sector over the wisdom and profitability of the HCI investment projects.107
Two interrelated methods of coercion will be mentioned here. "A typical method 
of coercing was to convey to the concerned businessman President Park’s wish to see the 
businessman’s participation in the HCI Plan’s projects."108 Another typical method that 
gave the first method its teeth was to threaten or actually withhold either subsidized credit 
from intransigent firms.109 In special cases of intransigence, the state had actually resorted 
to bankrupting firms by this method. This left the impression with the domestic private 
sector that no firm was safe and that even state suggestions, much less its commands, 
should be considered with the utmost seriousness. While the state used coercion during 
the EOI phase to prompt firms to increase exports, the intensity of coercion increased 
dramatically during the HCI phase to influence the direction of investments toward 
modernization.
To complement coercion, the plan offered generous incentives for participating in 
HCI projects. First, the state used various credit incentives to facilitate HCI investment. 
The state facilitated the redistribution of resources toward HCI sectors through the 
National Investment Fund (NIF). Even though the NIF did not lend exclusively to HCI 
participants, the growth of the fund and composition of NIF lending heavily favored the 
development of HCI sectors. Because the HCI Plan was too immense of a project to be 
solely financed by the money in the NIF, the state-owned banking sector made up much of 
the difference. Such loans to HCI projects rose dramatically in the 1970s. Moreover, 
bank credit to these sectors was heavily discounted. This was not only true in that the 
state held the macroeconomic price for loans (the interest rate) below the market rate but 
also in that the microeconomic controls meant that borrowing costs of the HCI sectors 
were 25% below the average borrowing costs of other sectors. Also, the terms for 
repayment for HCI sectors were longer than non-HCI sectors. Since the low interest rates 
created excess demand for bank credit, the state moved to an even more central position in
107Ibid.. 441.436.
108Ibid.. 441.
109For this see Jones and Sakong, Government. 101-110.
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its ability to control the direction of industrialization by allocating cheap, long-term credit 
to its preferred sectors and to the firms."0 Although these allocation measures signalled a 
change of policy regimes from one that supported primarily EOI to one that supported 
primarily secondary ISI, important continuities were evident as well: "Whereas subsidized 
credit for working capital was available to any exporter, long-term capital at subsidized 
interest rates was allocated to only targeted firms and industries."1"
Second, the state used tax incentives to encourage HCI investments. A measure 
that constituted a "major support" to the heavy and chemical sectors came in the form of 
the Tax Exemption and Reduction Law of 1975.112 Since this law allowed accelerated 
depreciation of equipment for the purpose of reduced taxation, investment tax credits, and 
tax holidays to firms engaging in HCI activities, such firms paid significantly less tax than 
non-HCI firms.
Third, trade policy, particularly the Limited Tariff Drawback system, also sup­
ported the HCI plan by placing import restrictions on the more modem import substituting 
industries. Heretofore, to help Korean light exports be more competitive, tariffs on capital 
goods and inputs used by export industries were either low or nonexistent. Now, how­
ever, high tariffs were levied on such goods, promoting a greater share of domestically 
produced inputs and capital goods."3 Other trade policy measures also supported HCI 
sectors including domestic content requirements, tax credits for firms investing in domes­
tically produced goods, and in most cases high entry barriers to encourage monopoly or 
oligopoly in HCI sectors. Even as policy shifted from one supporting primary ISI to one 
supporting secondary ISI, the state still emphasized exporting from both traditional and 
modem sectors. "Pressure to meet ambitious export targets gave the Big Push into heavy 
industry its frenetic character.""4
"°Lee. "Promotion Plan." 442.
111 Amsden. Giant. 73.
" 2Lee. "Promotion Plan." 447.
" 3Ibid.. 442.447.
114Amsden. Giant. 16. also see 73-74.
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Fourth, the incentive system to industry included various types of fiscal expendi­
tures in the HCI projects. These included investment by public enterprise in HCI projects, 
construction of HCI industrial parks, credit subsidies for HCI related investments, and 
R&D outlays.
Finally, the Korean state knew it must help to create a contingent of managerial 
and technological elite within the productive sectors.115 Though late industrializing 
countries in general have better educated populations than those of the first and second 
industrial revolutions, "fe]ven among late industrializing countries, Korea tends to excel 
in most indices o f education, standardizedfor population size.''116 Changing conditions in 
US foreign policy and the global economy contributed to the state's decision to pursue a 
deepening program as is explained below.
The State-US Alliance and the Global Economy
The US made changes in its foreign policy toward East Asia which may have 
prompted Korea to switch to a secondary ISI strategy. Such changes resulted in Korea's 
feeling more vulnerable to security threats. "President Park Chung Hee decided to adopt a 
policy of self-defense to ensure the national security of Korea. Such a policy required an 
economy centered on defense industries and supported by the development o f HCI [heavy 
and chemicals industries]."117
In addition to the changing security situation, Korea faced four international 
catalysts which resulted in the formulation and implementation of the HCI Plan. First, 
though Korea (and Taiwan) had cornered the world market for light industrial goods, this 
hegemony was threatened and rapidly eroded by a second tier of East Asian NICs.
Second, die US and other industrialized countries began placing import restrictions on 
Korean light manufactures in the late 1960s; this made the future for light manufactured
usFor statistics on this increase in technical and managerial students, manpower, and training 
facilities see ibid.. 218 and Lee. "Promotion Plan." 488.
116Amsden. Giant 217. For more on "industrializing through learning” one need only consult 
Chapter 1 of this work by Amsden which was given precisely this title.
117Lee. "Promotion Plan ." 437.
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exports look dim. Third, the oil crisis of 1972 influenced Korea and other NICs to pursue 
deepening because of the ready supply of recycled petrodollars on the international credit 
market and the means of using them to avoid adjustment through recession.118 Thus, 
import substitution in the heavy and intermediate goods areas seemed like an attractive 
option: "Korea would not be able to overcome its trade deficit and consequent foreign 
debt burden as long as it continued to rely on foreign capital goods and intermediate 
materials to produce light industry export products."119 Finally, Korea's "comparative 
advantages" underscored the rationale to pursue secondary ISI.120 These included a well 
trained and low wage labor, development of state o f the art facilities, the ready availability 
of foreign credit, critical market size (attained by Korea in the early 1970s) to support ISI, 
and a rough correlation of ambitions between the local private sector and the state. But 
the developmental aspirations between the state and the local business leaders were not 
identical. Since the local firms opposed the concept o f an intense drive into heavy and 
chemicals in principle, the "initiative to diversify, therefore, fell to the state."121
INDUSTRIALIZATION DURING THE LAST PERIOD 
OF MILITARY RULE (THE CHUN ADMINISTRATION, 1980-88)
Korea experienced some rather severe economic difficulty in the wake of the 
second oil crisis which made some observers question the wisdom of the HCI plan. Even 
so, the modernization of industry is also credited with helping Korea overcome its 
economic crisis. Consequently, the plan has been redeemed in the eyes of many 
observers.122 Aside from the oil crisis and the distortions the HCI plan may have
118Albert Fishlow. "Latin American Adjustment to the Oil Shocks of 1973 and 1979." in Latin 
American Political Economy: Financial Crisis and Political Change, eds. Jonathan Hartlyn and Samuel A. 
Morley (Boulder: Westview Press. 1986). 57.
u9Lee. "Promotion Plan." 438.
120lbid.
121 Amsden. Giant 88.
122A balanced view of the successes and failures of the HCI Plan can be found in Sakong. World 
Economy. 59-60 and Lee. "Promotion Plan." 455.456-57. These authors allude to the changing leadership 
commitment from "growth first" to "stability first." Amsden offers a less reserved endorsement of the HCI 
Plan. See Amsden. Giant 85.88.94. 107-108.
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introduced, political turmoil may have also worsened the economy as the country’s 20- 
year leader was assassinated: "Park’s assassination was followed by a period of serious 
turmoil and weak political leadership under Choi Kyu-hah.1,123 This interim leadership 
lasted just a year and a half. The period came to an end with the inauguration of Chun 
Doo-Hwan. President Chun promised to restore economic growth and promote the 
conditions for a return to democracy in 1988. Like the military presidents in Brazil,
Chun also limited himself to one term.124
Within Chun’s presidency, economic policy and economic performance centered 
around two themes. The post-1980s economic policy concerned itself with the excesses 
of the HCI Plan (overcapacity and excess competition between firms) and the decline of 
the sunset industries. This phase in economic policy dealt with the repercussions of the 
second oil crisis and sought to lessen the economic hardships resulting from this crisis.
The three economic policy initiatives corresponded roughly to these two economic 
concerns. The policy initiatives were stabilization, liberalization, and reorganization.
While stabilization and liberalization suggest the pressure and influence of US economic 
philosophy on the Korean state, the reorganization suggests the influence of Japanese 
corporatism on this state as well as the influence of the intimate business-state relationship 
(which is itself a piece of the Japanese model).
The Origins and Policies of Stabilization,
Liberalization, Reorganization, and Secondary EOI
Influence o f Japanese Corporatism and the State-Business Alliance
The policy reform resulting from Japanese corporatism and the state business 
alliance entailed the reorganization of the industrial structure. Such reorganization had 
two components corresponding to two distinct subperiods: reorganization of the sunrise 
industries (1980-84) and the sunset industries (1984-88). Both subperiods of 
reorganization sought to increase the oligopolistic tendencies in an economy that was
123Norman A. Graham. "The Role of the Military in the Political and Economic Development of the 
Republic of Korea." Journal of Asian and African Studies 26. 1-2(1991): 119.
124Ho\vever, the term to which Chun limited himself to was a long one. eight years, while Brazilian 
military presidents limited themselves to five-year terms.
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already heavily oligopolized. Since neoliberal philosophy is based on competition of firms 
in a free market, reorganization was diametrically opposed to liberalization because it 
entailed a profound amount of state intervention into the economy and contributed to an 
increasing oligopolization of industry. In these ways, though, economic policies affirmed 
the state's affinity for Japanese corporatism and its alliances to local heavy and light 
industrial firms. In this way, the state sought to reduce “wasteful competition” which was 
thought to be responsible for the excess capacity. The reorganization of the sunrise 
industries was intended to correct for the chaeboPs financial difficulties arising from 
capacity overhang and slack demand for products manufactured by HCI firms. The sunset 
industries were reorganized so that their declining comparative advantage could be 
prolonged for as long as possible.
The policy directives here were also aimed at consolidation of the market for fewer 
firms.125 In addition to affirming the state orientation toward Japanese corporatism and its 
alliance to large local capital, the policy could also be said to be directed toward correct­
ing the policy excesses of the 1970s. Whatever the impetus for this policy reform, the 
effect of strengthening the local private sector was the same: the state geared reforms 
toward strengthening conglomerates against the adverse economic conditions of the 
second oil crisis. Moreover, the reorganization agenda comprised reforms which would 
salvage the new industries from bankruptcy and make them more profitable as well as 
more competitive on the world market. Reorganization was a double-edged sword. 
Discipline made up one edge of this sword. Reward made up the other. The basis for 
deciding which chaebol would be rewarded and which would be disciplined depended 
upon economic performance of the new firms in question. Reorganization constituted the 
leading source of state microeconomic intervention in the 1980s.
The first phase of this reorganization extended from 1980-84. In the power 
generating equipment industry, four firms were consolidated into one firm which the state 
then nationalized. One of the three passenger car producers was forced to exit and 
produce only buses and trucks until demand tightened. In the naval diesel engine industry, 
one firm (Daewoo) and the two others (Hyundai and Ssangyong) were forced to divide
125The following derives from Chang, "Industrial Policy," 148-49.
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the market into segments so that each segment could be monopolized by one company or 
another. The eight heavy electrical industries were also reorganized. Three of them were 
consolidated into one (Hyosung) and allowed to produce only expensive and highly 
specialized products. Four other lesser companies were forced to only produce cheaper 
and less intricate products. The state asked the last (Hyundai) to produce for its sister 
companies. In the electronic switching system industry, the four existing firms (Samsung, 
Gold Star, OPC, and Daewoo) were required to specialize in different product lines so as 
to minimize competition. The state consolidated two firms in the copper smelting industry 
by forcing one firm to buy out the other. This in turn was supported by a moratorium on 
past bank loan repayment and participation in the company by the Korean Development 
Bank. The state sought to remedy overcapacity of these infant industries by reducing 
"unhealthy competition."
The next phase of this reorganization occurred between 1984 and 1988. Unlike 
the first phase of reorganization, this second phase concentrated on sunset industries 
including overseas construction, fertilizer, and shipping. In 1984, the firms in the shipping 
industry were reduced to less than one-third of their 1983 number. In that same year, 
three fertilizer firms were liquidated. Government intervention continued between 1986 
and 1988 as the Korean government reorganized 82 inefficient firms. The shipping and 
overseas construction industries constituted around one-fourth of such reorganizations.
Though such reorganization was geared toward creating monopoly and reducing 
market competition, certain facets of competition were not lost in such reorganizations.
As Chang illustrates, firms competed in such reorganizations to escape state discipline 
(i.e., restricting a firm’s market shares or rescinding a firm’s right to produce for the 
market at all) or gamer state favor (i.e., expanding a firm’s oligopoly power over the 
market or creating monopoly power for a firm).
What is notable in the conduct of such 'reorganization' programmes is that 
even the economically and politically powerful conglomerates, chaebols, as indi­
vidual conglomerates, were not immune to state discipline, although, as a group, 
they were certainly privileged in their access to various rents. To the Korean pol­
icymakers, it seems to matter less who runs a business than that it is run efficiently. 
If a particular chaebol runs a plant well, fine; otherwise, the ownership has to be 
transferred to another chaebol or even to the public sector. . . . The fact that 
chaebols as conglomerates are potentially able to move into any line of business
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(on the basis of their activities in related lines) makes it difficult for a particular 
chaebol to keep any particular industry in its fiefdom. Unless it remains reasonably 
efficient, other chaebols can easily persuade the state that they can do a better job 
and get state support in the next round of capacity expansion in that industry. 
Therefore, the chaebols had a powerful incentive to remain efficient, especially 
when the loss of state support can mean a sharp downturn in business . . ., given 
the state control of credit and the high leverage of Korean firms.126
While the guiding hand of the market and that of the state may have the same re­
sult in the long run, the state determination of whether firms are allowed to produce may 
be preferable to market determination in several respects. The "state method" is quicker 
and more efficient than the "market method." Also, knowing that a concrete entity, 
instead of the abstraction of market forces, determines which firms survive and fail add an 
additional catalyst for firms to achieve peak efficiency and performance in the economy.
A final point that should be made about the ownership reorganizations that 
occurred between 1980 and 1988 is that these were hardly a new means of strengthening 
favored business groups. Rhee had created the chaebol out of the sale of government 
properties, aid distribution schemes, and allocation of covet rents.127 This represented a 
basic reorganization of property at its time just as the current reorganization of properties 
embodied a basic shift. The difference is that, while the chaebols during the 1950s were 
being created to do great things in the future, the chaebols during the current reorganiza­
tions were being salvaged from the difficulties that such great accomplishments entailed 
and from the abrupt economic environmental changes brought on by the second oil crisis. 
Beside reorganization, the state formulated and implemented two more sets of reforms as 
this paper will show.
Influence o f Neoliberalism and the State-US Alliance
The policies of stabilization and liberalization resulted from pressures from the US 
and the partial conversion of the state to the doctrine of neoliberalism. The degree of 
liberalization remains in debate, but there is little argument over whether or not the state
126Ibid„ 149-150.
127The best source for discerning the contribution of sales of public properties to the creation of the 
chaebol is Jones and Sakong, G o v ern m en t 270-273. Also see Cheng, "Political Regimes," 146-148.
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became more inclined toward stabilization policies than it had in the past. In the post- 
1980 phase o f  economic development, the Korean state maintained its leadership qualities 
but adopted a stability-dominated, as opposed to a growth-dominated^ perspective in 
economic policy.128 This represented a major metamorphosis of the orientation o f the 
state toward a  "developed country" perspective on macroeconomic policy. This 
metamorphosis was precipitated by the economic crisis. This crisis was, in turn, associated 
with the oil crisis, on the one hand, and the macroeconomic distortions caused by the HCI 
plan, on the other. Having induced one component of the private sector to radically 
increase exports and having induced another component of the private sector to grow 
large through diversification, the state could concern itself with less grandiose tasks: it 
was at this time that the Korean state began the fine-tuning of its economic machine 
through conservative macroeconomic policies. This did not mean that economic growth 
was not important, still, or that state intervention had been totally abandoned.
But price stability was not the only area in which the Korean state directed policy 
reforms. Another such area was that of liberalization. Liberalization occurred in the areas 
of trade and banking. Neoliberal scholars assess liberalization as the medicine for the 
heavy state intervention created from secondary ISI.129 According to this view, the 
liberalization o f  incentives made Korean exports more competitive on the world market.
The state engaged in two major areas of liberalization: trade was the first such 
area. While some efforts in liberalizing trade are evident, such liberalization in Korea may 
be more an experiment in "lip-service" than a concerted effort to remove import barriers: 
"To assess the openness of Korean trade after liberalization is as hard as assessing the 
godliness in a reformed heretic."130 Second, the Korean state liberalized the banking 
system. This measure signaled a dismantling of a cornerstone of the 1970s modemiza-
p.
" Compare the changing nature of leadership commitment in Sakong, World Economy. 44-45, 56- 
60.68-71.
l29For this view see Lee, "Promotion Plan." 450, 454. While state intervention most certainly 
decreased, liberalization probably did not result directly in economic recovery, as some claim. Ironically, 
behind the scenes state intervention, even during this period of liberalization, probably did the most to speed 
the economic recovery. See Amsden. Giant. 93-94.
l30Ibid.. 134.
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tion program since subsidized interest rates had promoted the expansion of new industry. 
Neoliberals claim that liberalizing government control over the banking system translated 
into closer-to-market interest rates and caused the state to shift "its role away from mak­
ing investment decisions toward coordinating industrial policy and promoting small and 
medium-sized firms."131
However, the degree of Korean financial liberalization is questionable. Amsden 
not only discounts the idea that financial liberalization (to the extent that it has occurred) 
disadvantaged big business vis a vis small but also maintains that the degree of financial 
liberalization was not exceptionally large. Despite the measures to liberalize the state 
manipulation of the banks and prevent big business from gaining control over the banking 
system, it soon "became clear that the government had by no means altogether relinquish­
ed administrative control over the banking system. It had also become clear that big 
business groups had not been prevented from taking equity control [of the banking 
system]."132 This meant that the chaebol did not react with chagrin to financial liberali­
zation but with appreciation: "In exchange for whatever trade liberalization actually 
occurred, the big business groups won critical concessions from the government in the 
area of finance."133
Critics of secondary ISI in Korea contend that it was harmful to the Korean 
economy to have resources misallocated toward heavy industry and directed away from 
light industrial exports. This argument is often cased in terms of the harmful effects of 
state intervention (which brought about the HCI program); and this economic harm that 
comes from intervention is contrasted against the economic good that follows from 
adherence to the market mechanism (which brought about the success o f the EOI 
program). On a theoretical level, this assertion can be refuted on the grounds that it 
creates a false contrast: the most persuasive evidence that this research has uncovered 
suggests that primary EOI was no less a product of heavy government intervention than 
secondary ISI was. On an empirical level, the statistics show no cataclysmic drop in
13lLee. "Promotion Plan." 454.
132Amsden. Giant. 135-36.
133Ibid.
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export growth between the period of EOI and the period of secondary ISI. Exports grew 
at only marginally slower rates in the period o f secondary ISI than they did during primary 
EOI.134 This leads one to conclude that the disincentives toward exports during the HCI 
promotion years must have been rather mild.
Similarly, some claim that the heavy state intervention associated with the HCI 
Plan further burdened an economy racked by the oil crisis. However, Amsden claims that 
the development of HCI industries contributed to significant economic development prior 
to the second oil crisis:
[In the wake of the first oil crisis, the] government responded in January 
1974 with measures to maintain overall growth. A policy decision was taken to 
absorb fully the oil price increase, and that decision contributed in 1974 to a 62% 
rise in imports. . . .  The current account deficit jumped by a factor of 5 to 11%, a 
historic high, despite a growth of exports of 16%. To finance the deficit, the 
government both borrowed abroad and depleted foreign reserves which fell by 
3.5% in a year. Between 1973 and 1974, Korea's total foreign debt rose 42%. . . .
The country reaped the rewards o f both borrowing and running down its 
reserves in the form or positive growth—7.7% in 1974 and 6.9% in 1975—at a time 
when most non-oil producing countries were plunged into depression. By 1976 
fast growth had resumed and GNP grew by 14.4%. Although investments as a 
share o f GNP declined, exports grew by a staggering 49 .2%. . . . Output con­
tinued to soar after 1976-77. . . . The current account deficit, moreover, remained 
healthy until [the second oil crisis], . . . Thus, amidst the Big Push into heavy 
industry in 1977-79 and just before the second oil crisis in July 1979, the 
Korean economy was in good shape.. . .
. . .  In studies sponsored by the World Bank . . . liberalization in Korea in 
the 1980s is rationalized as a medicine for economic diseases supposedly caused by 
government intervention in the 1970s. Yet the premise o f economic disaster is 
nowhere substantiated. . . .  Most economic indicators, including the current 
account and the debt-GNP ratio, imply that just before the second energy crisis, 
the economy was performing rather well, a  Big Push into heavy industry not 
withstanding. 135
In summary, a large degree of credence can be given the fact that the Korean state 
had seriously engaged in conservative macroeconomic controls to dampen inflation. This 
reflects not only an acceptance o f the US advice for following the dictates of neoliberal­
ism, but it also reflects the reality that Korean industry had reached a state approaching
134For supporting statistics, see ibid, 56.
135Ibid.. 94. 99.
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that of the industrialized countries. The extent and effects of liberalization are less clear. 
Perhaps the amount of state intervention in the trade and banking industry had receded, 
though it is doubtful that it had disappeared. In the 1980s, perhaps the state's affinity for 
the chaebol did decline, but it is doubtful that state policy attempted to seriously undercut 
the domination of the Korean economy by the large conglomerates. To seriously reduce 
the degree to which the state intervened in the economy, to significantly undermine the 
state alliance with big business, or to significantly curtail the economic hegemony of the 
chaebol would fly in the face of model of development that had worked so well for Korea 
in the past.





As in Korea, Brazil’s industrialization hardly began with authoritarian rule. In 
Brazil, there has been one overpowering component of industrialization. This is a grow­
ing flirtation with import substitution which began unconsciously and only became fully 
conscious in the 1950s. It is true, however, that external crises (exogenous factors) 
tended to shape industrialization much more than government policy in both Korea and 
Brazil during the early periods. It is uncertain whether tariffs were effective in bringing 
about industrialization before the 1890s. Versiani has linked tariff policy and periodic 
exchange rate fluctuations to four short spurts o f heightened investment and industrializa­
tion in Brazil’s most dynamic sector (cotton textiles) of the 1870-1914 period; however, 
Fishlow denies the contribution of this tariff policy to industrialization before 1950.1 For 
Fishlow, monetary expansion precipitated a real devaluation in the 1890s which consti­
tuted the first phase of unconscious ISI. While recognizing this, Versiani also claims 
tariffs, which shot up in the late 1880s, also played a role in this unconscious ISI. It is 
also uncertain whether tariffs in the 1880s were the result of the accommodation for 
industry or the government’s need to secure revenue.
Another investment spurt occurred in the six years before World War I. This 
period of investment coincided with the appreciation of the currency. However, tariffs 
had been raised at the turn of the century which equilibriated domestic and import prices 
of textiles. The domestic textile industry, encouraged by an appreciated exchange rate and 
a booming market, invested in imported equipment. The pre-World War I period was the 
last case in which the efficacy of tariffs can even be argued before the 1950s.
World War I was another instance of ISI. The war interrupted the supply of 
imports, which cut two ways in terms of economic development. On the one hand, the 
supply of manufactured consumer goods was cut off, which stimulated more intensive use 
of the expanded means of production acquired before the war to satisfy a captive market.
'Versiani, "Industrial Investment," 308; and Fishlow. "Origins," 312-313.
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On the other hand, light industry dominated the industrial structure at this time. Textiles, 
clothing, food, and shoes contributed 57% to the industrial product in 1907 and 64% in 
1919 .2 The war cut off imports of machinery, which basically meant little expansion of the 
productive capacity of existing dynamic sectors or little expansion of dynamism into other 
sectors occurred.3 Some expansion did occur, but the main positive effect was redistribu­
ting wealth into the industrial sector that was used for investment to expand and change 
industrial capacity in the future.
The fortunes of light industry fluctuated with the contradictory monetary and 
exchange rate policies. Tight credit policies especially disadvantaged textiles. Coffee 
valorization policy entailed government purchase o f excess stocks of coffee. The success 
of this scheme, by increasing the income of the coffee sector, must have given some boost 
to domestic consumer goods industry. However, the valorization scheme made coffee 
seem artificially profitable which must have forestalled capital movement toward industry. 
Though traditional sectors flagged, newer sectors such as cement, iron, steel, and paper 
grew appreciably. As the World War I period represented an era of expansion of output 
with little development, the twenties, paradoxically, represented a period of decline of 
total output with an increase in industrial modernization.4
The 1930s represented a period of unprecedented expansion of output and 
industrial change. Exchange controls were introduced to prevent a total collapse of the 
balance of payments situation and became the source o f import substitution. Consumer 
goods virtually completed the ISI process while this process catapulted cement, iron, and 
steel industries into the lead of sectoral dynamism. While the diversification was healthy 
for the economy, the traditional sectors would suffer in the 1950s from not updating their 
outmoded technology. This led to the early decline o f the sector and with it a major 
source of labor-intensive employment.5
2Baer, Brazilian Economy. 26.
3Ibid.. 31.
4Ibid., 32-36 and Flavio Rabelo Versiani. "Before the Depression: Brazilian Industry in the 1920s.” 
in I .a tin America in the 1930's, ed. Rosemary Thorp (New York: St. Martin's Press. 1984).
5See Baer, Brazilian Economy. 36-40 and Fishlow. "Origins," 339.
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World War II was different from the other crises in that Brazil had, because of 
favorable coffee prices and favored access to the US market, a heightened capacity to 
import. However, war-time shortages made imports inaccessible. The domestic pro­
ducers were better able to adapt to meet domestic demand. According to Fishlow, after 
the war, a policy of non-ISI was introduced to act as a subsidy to industry.6 True, the 
currency was substantially overvalued, which made this instance different from former 
instances of IS I, but import licenses ensured that only goods deemed essential to indus­
trialization would be allowed into the country. This meant that while the domestic capital 
goods industries faced competition from imports, the durable and nondurable consumer 
goods industries profited from their protection from competing imports. Moreover, 
overvaluation acted as a subsidy for industry to buy cheap foreign equipment. There were 
a number of difficulties with the system of overvaluation of the 1940s. Most importantly, 
unconscious ISI was not as efficient at instigating industrialization as conscious ISI would 
have been.7 Overvaluation, the hallmark of unconscious ISI, had a number of negative 
consequences including export pessimism, capital intensive industries, and balance of 
payments disequilibrium.*
INDUSTRIALIZATION DURING 
THE DEMOCRATIC PERIOD (1950-1963)
Brazil progressed through three electoral periods in its democratic phase. Each 
had significant implications for Brazil's political economy of development. Getulio Vargas 
ruled Brazil form early 1951 to early 1954.9 Vargas' economic policies were "mixed" 
between reformism, developmental nationalism, and neoliberalism. However, they leaned 
more heavily toward developmental nationalism. Brazilian nationalism was split between 
those who endorsed simple economic development and populists who wanted economic
‘ibid.. 343.
7 A more conscious favoritism of industry over agriculture would not have been politically feasible for 
Brazil at this time.
*Fishlow. "Origins," 343-344.
9The first electoral period is based on Skidmore. Experiment chapters III and IV.
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development with social reform. An important influence on the former group was the 
technocratic component that worked in the Joint Brazil-US Economic Development 
Commission (1951-1953). This group looked at ways in which bottlenecks to economic 
growth could be removed. The work of the Joint Commission strongly influenced the 
"Lafer Plan," designed by Finance Minister Horatio Lafer. It helped economic develop­
ment by promoting certain industries and removing economic bottlenecks. It did this 
through import substitution, which was set up through a flexible multiple exchange rate 
system. The plan found finance through foreign private, public, and World Bank loans.
The Lafer Plan, along with the investments it stimulated, also resulted in balance of 
payments problems, foreign debt accumulation, and inflation. Though Lafer had tried to 
stabilize the economy, he had been thwarted by the intransigence of Ricardo Jafet, 
president of the Bank of Brazil, who had refused to raise interest rates. The new Finance 
Minister Oswaldo Aranha developed the "Aranha Plan" for reducing the public deficit, 
controlling credit, and regulating foreign exchange. Still, the stabilization plan still 
allowed the most "essential" imports for economic development into the country.
However, Vargas became disenchanted by both the orthodox technocrats (associ­
ated with the Aranha Plan) and the developmental technocrats (associated with the Lafer 
Plan) and drifted toward the populists. His appeals to labor and attacks on foreign firms 
allude to this drift. The anti-foreign rhetoric translated into policy in 1951 when public 
monopolies, Petrobras and Electrobras, were created in sensitive areas, oil and electricity, 
respectively. Vargas turned further left when he appointed Joao Goulart, seen as a radical 
leftist, as Labor Minister in 1953 and endorsed Goulart's recommendation that the 
minimum wage be raised 100% in 1954. The military, offended by Vargas' populist 
migration, moved to depose him. However, Vargas committed suicide rather than leave 
office. He left behind an inflammatory suicide note that made him extremely popular and 
served to ingrain the "Vargas tradition" even deeper into Brazilian politics.
Vice President Cafe Filho took over the presidency after Vargas' suicide. While 
Filho was much more orthodox than Vargas, he, for the most part, eschewed radical 
reorientation of his successor's policies. Filho backed a mild stabilization plan. However, 
one conservative reform by the Filho government, SUMOC 113, had extensive
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implications. SUMOC stands for the Superintendency of Money and Credit, a semi- 
autonomous branch of the Bank of Brazil with policymaking ability. SUMOC 113 served 
to attract foreign investors by granting foreign firms the most preferential exchange rate 
for importing inputs. The only "catches" were that the sectors that the foreign firms 
entered had to be considered important by the state, and the foreign firm had to establish a 
local partner in the project to be eligible for the exchange discount.
The second electoral period began in 1956 with the election of President 
Juscelino Kubitchek and Vice President Joao Goulart.10 Both were in the Vargas 
tradition. Kubitchek's developmental policies ran on two separate tracks. First, there was 
the Brasilia project. This entailed moving the capital of Brazil from Rio de Janeiro to the 
underdeveloped interior, Brasilia. This was not only a powerful political symbol but was 
also a "pork-barrel" gold mine. Brasilia was a huge construction and infrastructure project 
and contracts for construction were traded to congressmen for their support of portions of 
Kubitchek's developmental program to which they might have otherwise objected.
Despite the political benefits that the Brasilia project may have offered, some of 
Kubitchek's technocratic supporters "saw Brasilia as a white elephant which led to 
inflationary pressure and diverted resources from productive activities."11
The second track, the "Targets Program," received more unified technocratic 
support. This plan, too, had its origins in the work of the Joint Commission. The 
program consisted of thirty targets in five major areas (energy, transport, food, basic 
industry, and education. Of these, basic industry received the greatest support and the 
most emphasized specific industries were steel, petroleum, roads, and automobiles. The 
World Bank, conceived as a major source of finance for the plan failed to provide 
significant support. Despite this, because of preexisting commitments, the World Bank 
provided more loan capital to Brazil than to any other Latin American country between 
the time of the Bank's creation and 1961. The US Import-Export Bank (Ex-Im Bank) was 
more helpful. In spite of the loans Brazil received from public sources, technocrats felt
10The second electoral period is presented with the help of ibid.. chapter V; and Sikkink. 
"Developmentalism," chapters V. VI. VII. and VIII.
"ibid.. 253-254.
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they had been promised more public Iaons during the Joint Commission than they 
received. To partially make up for what it did not receive from public sources, Brazil 
borrowed heavily on the private market at higher interest rates and shorter terms of 
maturity. Finally, the National Bank of Economic Development (BNDE), which was 
partially a product of the Joint Commission, also facilitated the Targets Program by 
channeling foreign and domestic credit to basic industries and bottlenecked areas.
Outside the areas o f securing loan capital, two other policy tools were important in 
implementing the Targets Program. The Tariff law of 1957 was important in this regard. 
This was the first instance o f conscious ISI in Brazil and it induced much foreign invest­
ment in Brazil. The second device, the extensive use of SUMOC 113, discussed earlier, 
undergirded the tariff law and offered an additional incentive to foreign investment.
The Targets Program, beyond the substantial increase in economic development 
that it catalyzed, also resulted in balance of payments difficulties, debt servicing problems, 
public deficits, and inflation. Kubitchek attempted to remedy these problems with the 
1958 stabilization program, developed in consultation with the IMF. Ultimately, the 
stabilization plan contradicted the developmental plan. Kubitchek broke with the IMF in 
mid-1959. The strategy of national development had been reaffirmed, but it was not 
trouble-free. Additional financing from the US and the IMF was contingent on successful 
stabilization and Brazil's external bottlenecks and internal inflation were still worrisome.
The third electoral phase began in 1961 President Janio Quadros and Vice 
President Joao Goulart assumed the top governmental positions.12 Finance Minister 
Clemente Mariani carried out drastic stabilization measures that resulted in recession but 
rectified Brazil's external accounts and slowed inflation. Foreign creditors, again, began to 
lend heavily to Brazil. However, stabilization only lasted six months, and, two months 
after that, Quadros resigned. Thereafter, Goulart, became president. He was only 
allowed to do this after reaching an agreement with a military that was highly suspicious of 
him and initially blocked his ascension. The agreement was that Goulart could only 
assume the presidency if he relinquished much of his power. The Goulart government can 
be divided into four policy phases. He spent the year of 1962, maneuvering to regain his
l2For this period, see Skidmore. Experiment chapters VI, VII. and VIII.
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presidential powers. Part of this strategy was to create political and economic havoc to 
convince the military and the public that the Brazilian political-economic system would not 
function under the parliamentary system. In any event, this lack of leadership on the part 
of Goulart, whether contrived or real, resulted in the turbulent years o f the early 1960s 
being "devoid of any consistent line of economic policy."13 After he won back full 
presidential powers, Goulart spent half of the year in 1963 experimenting with moderately 
leftist policies, which were designed to work within the government by utilizing the 
"positive" left. Finance Minister Santiago Dantas and Planning Minister Celso Furtado 
designed a three-year plan, the "Dantas-Furtado Plan." This plan was the first economic 
plan that attempted to balance stabilization, pro-growth, and reform policies under one 
coherent developmental package. Nevertheless, the plan was promulgated at a time when 
economic and political stability were at a low ebb. Consequently, it failed. The other half 
of the year Goulart spent drifting toward the more extreme leftist views while initiating 
surprisingly little policy direction. In early 1964, Goulart abandoned trying to work inside 
the government, breaking off negotiations with the deadlocked congress, and began ruling 
by presidential decree on behalf of the "negative left." His decrees were too shocking and 
reformist for the military, which had already begun conspiring against him. In early April, 
the military ousted Goulart and established a military government.
On the whole development during the 1950s in Brazil was very rapid. Rapid 
growth was especially concentrated in the transport equipment industries. The electrical 
equipment industries, metallurgy, and chemicals also made impressive gains. "Of the 
efficacy of the incentives there can be no doubt. . . .  In no other intercensual period had 
such extensive structural change occurred [as in 1949-59]."14
Despite these accomplishments, however, there were also drawbacks to secondary 
ISI. First, this strategy gave Brazil serious balance of payments problems. This arose 
because ISI policy encouraged the import of capital goods while discouraging industrial 
exports and, to a lesser extent, agricultural exports, by giving primary exports an 
unfavorable exchange rate. The need to pay off foreign debt also hurt external accounts.
13Baer. Brazilian Fconomv. 76.
14Fishlow. "Origins," 345.
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Second, the ISI strategy made Brazil vulnerable to and dependent on foreign 
capital.15 To further industrialization while rationing foreign exchange (which had come to 
be in short supply with recurrent balance of payments problems) and to encourage tech­
nology transfer, foreign capital was actively pursued. ISI policies and other incentives 
made Brazil attractive to foreign capital because MNCs could duck under the protective 
tariffs and take advantage of Brazil’s large market. It is not a matter of argument that 
Brazil needed some MNCs for technology transfer, but the extensive recruitment of 
MNCs was inadvisable because of some of the drawbacks to this type of development.
Third, underabsorption o f labor constituted a daunting problem with ISI of the 
1950s. While inappropriate technology can be associated with a high level of MNC 
penetration, the state was also to blame in that subsidies on the import of capital goods 
also resulted in low labor absorption. There are three negative consequences of low labor 
absorption. First, the result in a large gap in income inequality. Second, such inequality 
fostered a labor elite for which the market was skewed toward consumer durables. Third, 
and most importantly, the underutilization of the labor force was, in fact, a major 
weakness of import substitution in that it encouraged a narrowness of the market which, in 
turn, is associated with Brazil's cyclical stagnation periods. Such market narrowness and 
cyclical crises were exacerbated by the fact that exports were discriminated against as a 
result of import substitution policies.
After the boom of the 1950's, which culminated in the peak GDP growth rate of 
10.3% in 1961, Brazil's economic picture turned suddenly bleak. "The immediate cause of 
the stagnation that set in after 1961 seems to have been the continuing political crisis that 
the country experienced after the resignation of Janio Quadros from the presidency in 
August, 1961 ,"16 "The lack of political control, the continued agitation for reforms and 
the lip service that Goulart paid to the latter, and the denunciation of foreign capital 
resulted in increasingly severe economic problems."17 The downturn of the Brazilian
^Repatriation of profits, price gouging through monopolies, and employing inappropriate capital- 
intensive production are the most common complaints about MNCs.
I6Baer. Brazilian Economy. 77.
17Ibid.
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economy in the early 1960s spawned a backlash of pessimism about the viability o f the ISI 
model from the left and the right.1®
Brazilian presidents had been pulled in three directions: toward orthodox, 
developmentalist, and reformist policies. Now it was the military’s chance to restore order 
to politics and the economy. While the military did restore order, it is interesting to note 
that the order was not static. At first, the military endorsed neoliberal policies. It, then, 
went through a period of promoting policies of national development. During abertura, it 
even became concerned about reform. Finally, it returned to neoliberalism in the wake of 
the debt crisis. The details of this progression are provided below.
INDUSTRIALIZATION DURING THE FIRST 
PERIOD OF MILITARY RULE (1964-1974)
The Castello Branco Administration
Following the 1964 coup which ushered in the Castello Branco regime, the 
Brazilian state was consumed with the ideology of economic orthodoxy. Since World 
War II, the Brazilian state implemented policies of economic orthodoxy. However, each 
of these had been prematurely aborted because Brazilian presidents were loathe to accept 
the political backlash associated with such policies.19
The situation had changed in the early wake of the 1964 coup, and "Castello 
Branco gave virtual carte blanche to Roberto Campos and Octavio Bulhoes, the economic 
ministers of the new government. . . .  [In so doing, this period] marked a renewed and 
considerably more propitious opportunity for the Brazilian adherents of economic 
orthodoxy to sell their wares."20 The popular conception of this period was that Brazilian 
policy making was carried out by a cadre of rational technocrats who came down on the 
side of orthodoxy and were responsible for the economic recovery; however, Fishlow 
proposes that these technocrats were not so insulated, and, thus, not so rational in a
For a discussion on the differences in the orthodox and structuralist scholars about the reasons for 
the failure of ISI see ibid.. 77-78.
19See Ruth Berins Collier. "Regime Evolution." 85 for a good summary.
20Fishlow. "Reflections." 70-71.
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pragmatic sense, but more ideological and theoretical.
[Economic policies in Brazil] after 1964 . . .  have an important political overlay.
. . .  It is no secret that Campos' policies, if not the details of their execution, 
received the enthusiastic support of AID and the international lending agencies.
The enthusiasm was more than passive. Brazil, during the 1964-67 period, ranked 
only behind India, Pakistan, and South Vietnam in net official aid receipts. AID 
program loans ranked as a prime contributor... . [T]hese loans necessarily 
involved close association between American and Brazilian policymakers. Further­
more, because advances from the International Monetary Fund were involved, the 
program loans negotiated went beyond American participation. The foreign 
influence was fully on the side of orthodoxy.. . .  [B]y closing down the internal 
political process and giving virtual carte blanche to Campos and Bulhoes, the 
military government had also opted for magnifying the external influence upon 
domestic economic policy. . . .  [T]he outsiders advice largely proved to be wrong. 
Program agreements did not stimulate development.21
The orthodoxy school considered the roots of inflation to be generous wage 
increases, government profligacy with the resulting monetary expansion, and loose credit 
policy. This evaluation, nevertheless, had its defects. Since these factors are easily 
rationalized with one another, Fishlow writes: "It is, therefore, not the conceptual incon­
sistency of the three models that is disturbing but rather their empirical inadequacy."22 
First, this theory is inadequate because it claims that wage hikes and easy credit were 
responsible for inflation despite the fact that such factors had shown declines in the 1959- 
64 period and inflation accelerated nonetheless. Second, this theory is inadequate because 
its formulation of the monetary function is faulty. This is true not only because it focused 
on the public deficit to the exclusion of other important determinations of monetary 
expansion but also because it proposed that changes in the money supply would lead to 
rapid price changes. Indeed, this belief was faulty because monopolies and oligopolies 
tended to compete with labor for shares of wealth which made the Brazilian economy 
resistant to monetary brakes on inflation. "This combination meant that declining money 
demand did not set in motion the strong pressures upon price which would be anticipated 
in a competitive setting."23 The empirical errors in the orthodox model led to errors in
21 Ibid.. 82. 83. 84. 
^Ibid.. 74.
3 Ibid.. 76.
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execution of the policies. Though Fishlow does admit that the stabilization package did
eventually work, he questions whether the payoff in terms of lower inflation was worth the
developmental cost in terms of plummeting industrial output:
A substantial reduction in the rate of increase of the money supply or of govern­
ment expenditures would lead to intolerable output and employment consequences 
as the adjustment process occurred. Yet, urged on by AID and the international 
lending agencies, the government in the end payed too little attention to the 
inherent resistance o f the Brazilian price level to aggregate economic policies.
In 1966, Campos held firm and pursued restrictive policies in all dimensions. . . . 
[The fact that inflation did eventually fall late in Castello's regime demonstrates 
that orthodoxy] can apparently ultimately prevail, but only at the expense of 
serious reductions in economic activity. As capacity utilization declines (if it 
goes low enough), price mark-ups and thereby inflation can evidently be 
restrained, economies of scale notwithstanding. The trade-off defined by 
the price-output equation in 1966-67 is highly unfavorable, however.24
The e Silva/Medici Administrations
Though the Castello Branco government had, in its last months of rule, begun a 
pro-growth policy, the incoming Arthur Costa e Silva government made good on its 
pledge to radically reorient the state strategy from orthodoxy to developmentalism.
After a stroke left this president incapacitated early in his term, a military tribunal selected 
General Emilio Medici to replace him. Medici carried on his predecessor's policies. On a 
continuum with democracy on one pole and bureaucratic-authoritarianism on the other, 
the Medici was as close to the B-A model as Brazil would get.25 Nevertheless, this 
truncated regime, despite its authoritarian leanings, was not completely insulated from 
political pressure. "The new government, albeit a successor military government,. . . 
demonstrated the same skepticism toward orthodox policies that had been observable 
under civil regimes. The limited political process of electoral presidential succession had 
served to catalyze economic discontent and dissatisfaction and to motivate changed 
economic policies. Different therapy this time produced different results, however."26
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regime also increased wages, the public deficit, and the credit supply to the private sector.
These policies accomplished two goals simultaneously: they achieved miracle growth
rates of industry and GNP, and they restrained inflation. Ironically, because of the looser
monetary policy, wage earners and oligopolized firms were no longer at each others
throats in a fight for shares of wealth. Inflation decelerated. In recognition of the
Brazilian economy as inherently inflationary, this military regime concluded that
"inflationary expectations could be countered by growth better than restraint."27 Such a
recognition represented a basic ideological reorientation of the new administration in
comparison to the old.28 Inflation came down to 20% where it remained throughout the
economic miracle. Further, the change in ideology and policy of the military regime was a
direct consequence of the diminishing sway the foreign groups held over the state
and a reciprocal explosion in the ability of domestic groups to lobby the state.
[T]he very transition from economic orthodoxy to heterodoxy was a direct con­
sequence of the limited political process of presidential selection in 1967. Three 
aspects were important. First, choice of a successor.. . posed the question within 
the military of the desirability of continued economic restraint. Second, the elec­
tion, albeit indirect and predetermined .. . inevitably invited internal pressure 
groups to offer their views on economic policies. . . [The] enforced political 
recess of the Revolution was not therefore the magic formula for guaranteeing 
the success o f stabilization. Rather the limited opening afforded by the political 
process in 1976 is a highly significant part of the tale. . . . [The policy change 
resulted from] a diminution of external pressures and greater mobilization of 
internal opinion.29
While the more heterodox policy portfolio was a response to the pressures of domestic 
social forces and high growth certainly boosted the military regime's popularity with most 
domestic social forces, the erosion of the military's resolve to implement the policies o f 
orthodoxy may have perversely undermined the ideological cohesiveness of the regime.30
A real difference existed between the orthodox Castello Branco regime and the 




^Serra. "Mistaken Premises." 142.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
125
that all these regimes included the following aspects in their policies. The first was stabil­
ization of the economy by reducing the government deficit. This was accomplished by a 
combination of reducing government consumption and increasing its revenues. An impor­
tant part of increasing revenues was an increased tax collection which some claim could 
not have been accomplished without a B-A regime.31 While government consumption was 
cut back, "[government investment expenditures were never cut back during the vigorous 
stabilization years after 1964, as existing infrastructure projects were continued."32 The 
rise of state enterprise was also a counterpart of high government investment.
Another o f the institutional changes in the 1960s and early 1970s was the rapid 
development of the capital markets.33 These included indexing, a capital market law, and 
forced savings. Indexing, which was a mechanism that allowed Brazil to live with 
inflation, had been in effect in Brazil in the 1950s, but it was not until after 1964 that its 
use became widespread. While the indexing system allowed Brazil to live with high 
inflation, this system was flawed in that the government was not able to keep politics out 
of the implementation of this strategy. Indexing, consequently, came to be used for 
political ends which were often not conducive to maximizing development.34 A capital 
market law in 1965 also strengthened the system of financial markets because it "provided 
an institutional setting for strengthening and increasing the use of the stock market and 
encouraged the establishment of investment banks to underwrite new issues."35 A number 
of forced savings institutions were set up by post-1964 governments to encourage a higher 
savings rate.36 The creation and expansion of the National Housing Bank (BHN) became 
a major initiative in this area. Though ostensibly committed to residential construction, it
31 Skidmore. "Economic Policy Making." 22.
32Baer. Brazilian Economy. 79.
33Ibid. 90. 92-93: Fishlow. "Reflections." 79. 82. 98.
34See Baer. Brazilian Economy. 92-93.
35Fishlow. "Reflections." 79.
^ b id .. provides statistics on increased savings.
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"is also important as a source of savings and a determinant for investment."37
Early military governments also adopted a rather consistent stance on foreign 
trade. This orientation contrasted sharply with the former, democratic governments.
"The rapid growth and diversification of exports was deemed essential to the health and 
long-term recovery o f the Brazilian economy."38 This was accomplished primarily by 
frequent minidevaluations of the exchange rate and the introduction of state subsidies to 
export. This last reform included rebates on loan interest rates and tax reductions. In 
addition, the abolition of state export taxes and the reduction of the amount of "red tape" 
through which exporters had previously been required to wade also contributed to better 
export performance. The rise in exports, especially manufactured exports, had a number 
of positive outcomes for Brazil.39
Despite the fact that Brazil had made major accomplishments in export expansion 
during the first period of military rulership, the prospects for future export expansion were 
hardly so bright. The Achilles' heel of export expansion in Brazil was the tendency for the 
state to allow the exchange rate to become too overvalued. This tendency, however, did 
not matter "inasmuch as export incentives (tax incentives and subsidized credits) more 
than compensated for the overvaluation."40 By the mid-1970s, export competitiveness 
was threatened because overvaluation had reached an extent that it had overwhelmed the 
export incentives.
Finally, foreign capital became increasingly important over the course of the 1960s
37Ibid.. 98.
38Ibid.. 80.
39For an enumeration of these positive aspects see Fishlow, "Reflections.” 102. For statistics on the 
diversification and expansion of Brazilian exports see Baer. Brazilian Economy. 84. While the Korean story of 
expansion is quite well known, the Brazilian saga of such expansion is less well known A good summary of 
Brazilian state's attempts to encourage MNCs to export is seen in Gary Gereffi and Peter Evans. 
"Transnational Corporations. Dependent Development and State Policy in the Semiperiphery: A Comparison 
of Brazil and Mexico." in Latin America's Economic Development: Institutionalist and Structuralist 
Perspectives, eds. James L. Dietz and James H. Street (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 1987). 168-70. 
176-180: and Eva Paus. "The Political Economy of Manufactured Export Growth: Argentina and Brazil in the 
1970s." The Journal of Developing Areas 23,2 (1989): 173-200. State firms, at least in mining, have also 
contributed to export orientation of Brazil. For this, see Hewlett. "State," 154-55.
^ a e r .  Brazilian Economy. 93.
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and early 1970s.41 While the increase in FDI was large, the expansion of foreign loans was 
exponential. While FDI may have facilitated economic growth and some technology 
transfer, there is considerable reason to believe that the more intense exploitation of local 
capital resources under state micro-interventions may have maximized national develop­
ment. There is also reason to believe that the state should have monitored more closely 
the expansion and the terms by which foreign debt was acquired in that a severe debt crisis 
in 1979 would constrain Brazilian development for years afterward.
There is no denying the many strengths o f the model described above. However, 
there were also weaknesses. The cyclical interpretation of Brazilian growth is one of 
those weaknesses. Cyclical interruptions in growth are by no means an exclusively 
Brazilian phenomenon. All capitalist economies experience such cycles, but the highly 
import substitutive nature of the Brazilian economy has made the deleterious effects of 
such cycles amplified in the Brazilian context. An impartial review of Brazilian history 
reveals a pronounced cyclical pattern of growth and decline.
There are three factors associated with Brazil's vulnerability to interruptions in 
growth as well as its predisposition to cyclical spurts of growth in this time frame. First, 
much more concentrated investments are required of late developing countries to enter the 
import substitutive areas of heavy, chemical, and high technology than those of prior 
industrializations. After such investments diminish, there is normally a period of contrac­
tion. Second, the "bunched process" of secondary ISI, whereby many new sectors are 
activated simultaneously through extensive government incentives and support, led to an 
extreme degree o f economic integration. This means when one sector o f the economy 
experiences trouble, general economic crisis results.
Third, in Brazil's import substitutive economy, the responsiveness of resource 
allocation to new price signals is not only more muted, but government policy is likely to 
be less accurate. The successful resolution of both these factors tends to make cyclical 
interruptions less lengthy and less pronounced. This is because "[accompanying inflation 
and balance of payments problems mask the problem [of cyclical interruption] until too 
late, and aggregate policies are more likely to emerge than those directed toward
41For statistics see ibid.. 84.
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rectifying sectoral imbalances and rigidities."42 Because of these three factors "[i]n Brazil, 
this [cyclical] model seems to have been played out to its fullest."43
With orthodox macroeconomic policy, the recession generally follows and stability 
is not achieved. The classic policy response to the recession is to promote resumed 
growth through developmentalist macroeconomic policies. At this point, the "worst of all 
worlds was experienced—continually slowing growth, progressively higher inflation, and 
an insoluble balance of payments deficit."44 A consistent policy portfolio with slightly 
expansionary monetary policy in combination with plentiful microlevel interventions to 
ease and definitively shape the form o f adjustment of firms and sectors to the new 
economic conditions is a sound policy response. Even though Brazil only implemented 
half of this equation, its economy recovered remarkably: "an expansive and consistent 
monetary policy, properly implemented, could yield increases in real product without 
proportional consequences upon prices. Ultimately, such a course was pursued in 1967 
and contributed to the initiation of a recovery [that continued until 1973],1,45
Having discussed the vulnerability associated with the Brazilian economic model 
(economic downturns), it is appropriate at this time to discuss the fact that, in 1973-74, 
the Brazilian economy was showing signs that such a downturn was eminent. First, 
continued economic expansion was threatened because Brazil lacked adequate savings to 
finance future capacity-augmenting investments. Such investment funds can come either 
from reducing consumption and channeling savings into investment, from increasing 
export earnings, or from increasing foreign savings (through FDI or debt). Brazil already 
had a large contingent of foreign firms and debt. Likewise, Brazil made some progress in 
reducing consumption and increasing savings through forced savings programs. Some 
efforts were made and some progress was made at increasing diversified exports.
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force drastic expansion of industrial exports as Korea had done years before. The Geisel 
administration had set a target of a 10% growth rate which implied a 4 percentage point 
increase in the rate of savings. However, this increase in the rate of savings would have 
"conflicted with the incentives to consumption of consumer durables that had been a 
prominent feature of the miracle years."46 Thus, a high rate of savings rate in the context 
of a secondary ISI economy represented two horns o f a dilemma contained in Brazil’s 
development strategy. Furthermore, considering the capital drain of the higher import bill 
and the rate o f inflation, an increased savings rate would be hard to obtain in the future.
Another weakness of the economic model was its tendency to rely on a political 
calculus rather than a technocratic calculus. Instead of utilizing excess capacity in the 
domestic capital goods sector, the Brazilian state buckled to pressures in the consumer 
durable goods sector (composed mostly of foreign firms) and gave incentives for the 
importation of capital goods.47 The state bias in favor of the consumer durables industry 
was complemented by an income distribution which was also conducive to an economy 
with consumer durables as its leading sector. Baer contends that "increased investment in 
a society with concentrated incomes produces a production capacity profile that is unlikely 
to be adequate for a more egalitarian society."48 Furthermore, since Brazil's ISI economy 
was driven by domestic consumption, the state contributes to such consumption patterns 
by providing cheap credit for consumers to purchase such products. MNCs are credited 
with much of the complementary issues of income concentration, using inappropriate 
technology, and skewing consumption patterns through advertising which distorted 
production profiles. Stunting the domestic capital goods sector by intensive imports o f 
such goods was an error, especially when domestic capacity existed.49
The nature of industrialization, itself, was the last sign that the economic miracle
46Fishlow. "Tale." 87.
47Apparently. Brazil has had a long history with political pressures from MNCs for importation of 
capital goods rather than domestic purchase. For this phenomenon in the Kubitchek years, see Baer. "Political 
Determinants." 57. For the continuation of such pressure into the military regime, see Serra. "Mistaken 
Premises." 131. 133-34.
48Baer. Brazilian Economy. 90.
49Serra. "Mistaken Premises." 131.
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was coming to a close. The industrialization that occurred was more of a capital 
accumulation variety than a modernizing one. "A notable feature o f Brazil's growth in the 
1950s and the 1960s was the relatively low capital coefficient."50 Complementing the 
weakness o f a low capital coefficient was the balance of payments problems which stymied 
importation to increase the capital coefficient. The administration had to deal with the 
probability that an external resource imbalance and mounting inflationary pressures would 
develop. This imbalance was created by ISI deepening and the oil crisis. The bleak 
potential increases in exports worsened the outlook for the external account. The 
exchange rate had become overvalued and, consequently, discouraged exports.
The oil crisis tended to exacerbate problems of the inadequate savings, low 
productive capacity, and balance of payments problems. This was because Brazilian 
wealth would tend to be transferred to oil producing countries and not into savings. This 
was also because non-oil imports would be squeezed (worsening the balance of payments 
situation and the ability to expand imports that would increase productive ability). In 
addition, Brazil's exports would meet tougher markets abroad (worsening the balance of 
payments situation and reducing the foreign exchange that could go toward increasing 
Brazil's productive ability).
The above was true for a number of reasons. Brazil imported 80% of its oil. Oil 
imports more than doubled as a share of total imports between 1973-75. Oil import 
prices, themselves, quadrupled; oil-intensive manufactured imports also increased in price. 
Huge increases in the import bill, the trade, and current account deficits occurred between 
1973 and 1974.51 Imported inflation which happened as a result of the oil crisis increased 
Brazil's rate of inflation. The automobile "was at the center of Brazilian industrialization 
strategy," and commerce was based on the truck, not the train.52 Both these facts made 
cheap fuel imports the foundation upon which further Brazilian development was based. 
The perverse effects of import substitution in the 1970s (which suggested a rising, not 
declining import coefficient) partly reflected the rising petroleum import bill, but it also
^ a e r .  Brazilian Economy. 81.
5lFor statistics see Baer. Brazilian Economy. 96.
52Fishlow. "Tale." 87.
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reflected the rising capital goods import bill.53 If government policies had directed firms 
toward purchasing capital goods domestically instead of abroad or if policy had 
emphasized exports sufficiently, the deterioration of the balance of payments situation and 
the accumulation of debt would not have been so severe. To further explore these and 
other issues, the next period of military rule must be examined.
INDUSTRIALIZATION DURING THE SECOND 
PERIOD OF MILITARY RULE (1974-1984)
The Geisel Administration
As the Brazilian economic miracle came to a close, a new govemment—the Geisel 
administration (1974-1979)—assumed power. As described above, the "new administration 
inherited from the outgoing Medici government a miracle that was already showing dis­
turbing signs of mortality."54 These signs of mortality consisted of an inadequate savings 
rate and balance of payments problems in the context of a need to expand productive 
capacity. Unfortunately, the mortality of this model was sealed by the oil crisis which 
occurred scarcely four months before the presidential change. In sum, this crisis had a 
number of profound implications for the Brazilian economy.
The oil crisis also made the political tasks of the Geisel government more difficult. 
A stabilization and consequent decisive rationalization of Brazilian income would have 
been politically unpopular for most sectors. Since "the incoming administration of 
President Ernesto Geisel set goals that it considered politically imperative," the state 
avoided such rationalization.55 Instead of a rationalization, the Geisel regime embarked on 
a politically popular pro-growth deepening strategy. The adoption of this strategy was 
related to "political considerations and responses of domestic groups. . . . Policies were
53Hewlett suggests that MNCs may have contributed to the balance of payments deficit: "It seems 
difficult to account for the dramatic price escalation [of imports] by merely citing the U.S. domestic rate of 
inflation that hovered around the 11 percent mark. Is it possible that.. .  multinationals compensated for some 
of their global problems by transfer pricing and artificially increasing the cost of their imports into Brazil?”
See Hewlett "State." 187.
54Fishlow. “Tale.” 86.
55Baer. Brazilian Economy. 97.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
132
forged not in a technocratic vacuum. . . . Indeed, the conscious objective o f the Geisel 
government was to channel popular reaction, through its program of relaxation of 
repression, distensao."56 Also, the military state's pride in its past accomplishments and its 
confidence in Brazil and its potential played a role in the decision to pursue deepening. 
Such confidence is related to the grandenza convention.57
On the economic side, the need to increase productive capacity at this juncture 
contributed to this decision. Additionally, there was a fact that made imports easier to 
acquire despite import constraints and deteriorating terms of trade. First, Brazil's decision 
to pursue the deepening strategy through export expansion and foreign debt was resolved 
by a glutted international credit market which also resolved Brazil's balance of payments 
problems. Second, Brazil endorsed a policy o f overvaluation which not only made 
"essential" imports cheaper but also made foreign debt easier to repay.
Considering these economic and political influences, the state opted for a new 
development strategy. "Although some might have thought that the economic logic of the 
oil price revolution called for a substantial net transfer of resources to the oil-exporting 
countries,. . . [the Geisel government] hoped to pay Brazil's higher oil bills by growing 
. . . .  Growth via debt was justified on the grounds that future savings o f foreign exchange 
resulting from the investment programs . . . would ultimately bring about a situation in 
which Brazil could produce trade surpluses large enough to service and repay its 
international debt."58 On the positive side, the ISI policies had beneficial developmental 
consequences, such as high growth, even as the world was locked in recession and 
significant industrial modernization.59 Many academics of the time praised Brazil's 
accomplishments.60 However, such sentiments were the seeds of inertial inflation, huge
^TFishlow. "Tale.” 89.
57For more on this, see ibid.. 83.86 and de Castro, Renegade Development. The latter contends that 
Brazil lost its grandenza convention at the end of the 1970s.
58Baer, Brazilian Economy. 97. 100-101
59 Fishlow. "Tale."’ 88.
“ What is amazing is that at least one scholar actually predicted the debt crisis even as Brazil and 
other developing countries were still reaping the rewards of debt-led deepening. See Richard Cooper. 
"Comment." in International Economic Policy: Theory and Evidence, eds. Rudiger Dombusch and Jacob A.
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deficits in external accounts which precipitated the debt crisis, and an IMF stabilization 
plan which ushered in recession.
The policies of the Geisel government from mid-1976 on have been characterized 
as "stop and go."61 This is because they have vacillated between stabilization policies 
(which are intended to slow inflation but also compromise growth) and developmentalist 
policies (which are intended to promote growth but are commonly accompanied by infla­
tion). This conceptualization of developmental choices created a false dilemma in the 
minds of Brazilian policymakers who saw their choices as stability with recession or 
instability with growth. Ironically, Brazil may have been using the wrong tools to con­
trol inflation. Microeconomic and macroeconomic tools may be necessary to deal with 
inflation which arises in the context of large conglomerations of economic power. The 
most effective tools Brazil had in its command, however, were macroeconomic tools; and 
these were the less powerful of the two. With effective microeconomic tools arrayed in 
favor of growth and providing a break on inflation, Brazil might have been able to control 
inflation and grow simultaneously.
The high rate of inflation constituted a major obstacle to healthy economic 
development in Brazil. Its rate ran concomitant with the Geisel strategy, the post-oil crisis 
international environment, and the "fight for shares" domestic inflation that existed in 
Brazil. While Baer seems much more orthodox than Fishlow in his prescriptions for 
policies to control inflation, both Baer and Fishlow cite structural reasons, as opposed to 
orthodox explanations, for the causes of Brazilian inflation.62 Baer concludes "that the 
structuralist explanations of Brazil's inflationary resurgence come closer to the roots o f the 
problem than those of the orthodox school. The latter deal more with the symptoms than
Frenkel (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1979). 325.
61 To some extent the "stop and go" policies were also reflected in the successor government's 
policies, though the "gos" were rather more sluggish and the "stops” carried greater recessionary 
consequences.
62Baer.Rra?ilian Fconomv. 80 writes that the reason that the stabilization policies were ineffective at 
restoring the basis for growth before 1968 was "the time lag involved before the effects of the . . .  reforms 
. . .  could be felt." Fishlow. "Reflections," 106. alternatively, believes that the change in policies between the 
Castello Branco and subsequent regimes in Brazil was that the former relied too heavily on stabilization 
policies while the latter demonstrated that "an expansive and consistent monetary policy properly implemented 
could yield increases in real product without proportional consequences in prices."
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the basic causes of the inflationary process."63
Structuralists believe that Brazilian inflation is caused by a labor elite and oligopo­
listic firms which were allowed to raise their own rents at will. The "fight for shares” 
between different economic sectors is called inertial inflation. If such an analysis is 
correct, one can readily see where microeconomic discipline of actors could result in 
lower inflation. The difference o f discipline explains why Brazil and Korea had different 
inflationary experiences even though they both had highly concentrated market structures.
While the dominant thrust of Geisel's economic policy was deepening, the policy 
went through three phases. In 1974, the Geisel administration embarked on an orthodox 
monetary and fiscal policy designed to cool the overheated economy and lessen the excess 
demand inherited from the previous regime. The plan envisioned "a modest corrective 
that did not compromise . . . the attainment of high growth in the new international 
environment, while maintaining external and internal equilibrium."64
This failure of the orthodox policy was assured by both economic and political 
conditions. Economically, the corrective inflation endorsed by this policy regime was apt 
to be severe considering deregulation of the extensively administered price controls that 
had been necessary to constrain the excess liquidity inflation during the miracle years.
Aside from deregulation, increases in the oil price had resulted in generally higher 
import prices in most goods. This imported inflation, even when partially ameliorated by 
government subsidy, was not only passed along by Brazilian firms; but, in some cases, it 
was anticipated. Thus, the austerity program achieved few successes in the short term.
The political scene was not conducive to a lengthy duration of austerity. ARENA, 
the government party, had just suffered a major defeat at the polls which had left the 
puzzled military seeking popular approval. "Moments of political uncertainty, and they 
abounded in early 1975, were not the ones to impose unpopular and conventional austerity 
policies. Rather, there was great temptation to demonstrate a singular Brazilian capacity 
to overcome what other countries, and other regimes, could not manage. Brazil was to be
63Baer. Brazilian Economy. 158. For this full argument and supporting statistics, see chapter 5.
^Fishlow. “Tale." 89.
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an 'isle of tranquility1 in the midst o f international economic turbulence."65 Ironically, while 
the deepening may have helped to pacify domestic dissent, it undermined the internal 
cohesiveness of the military regime, which had come to power to implement orthodoxy.66
To understand the growth components, which were particularly pronounced in the 
second phase of this regime’s economic policy but which are also apparent in the third 
such phase, it is helpful to know something about the Second National Development Plan 
(PND Q, 1975-1979).67 The three goals of this plan were to promote the rapid expansion 
of capital goods, intermediate industrial goods (such as basic metals, fertilizer, and petro­
chemicals), and economic infrastructure (nuclear and hydroelectric power, alcohol 
production, communications, and transportation). "Many of these investments were 
undertaken by state enterprises (in such fields as energy, steel, and economic infra­
structure), while others (especially capital goods) were carried out by the private 
sector with massive support from the development bank (BNDES)."68
Presently, the macroeconomic aspects of this phase will be discussed. Monetary 
and fiscal restraint eased and treasury deficits increased. To support its political agenda 
and to encourage growth within the ISI economy, the regime granted a 10% wage bonus; 
and a different wage formula meant that wages would now keep pace with inflation. 
"Complementing this rationale [for high growth rates] was the fact that easing wage 
repression would be easier within the context of an expanding economy."69 The state’s 
policy now supported "a more aggressive medium term development strategy designed to 
accomplish the dual objective of sustaining high rates of growth while promoting adjust­
ment to the oil shock."70 The state could pursue this potentially inflationary wage policy 
because the indexing system could be used to control the worst of inflation, and it could
6SIbid.. 90.
^Serra. "Mistaken Premises." 142.
67Baer. Economic Development. 97. 100.
68Ibid.. 100. BNDES stands of the National Bank of Economic Development.
69Ibid.. 97.
70Fishlow. "Tale," 88.
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pursue this pro-growth policy because the existence of cheap international credit from 
recycled petrodollars were widely available on the world market.71 However, the indexing 
of wages and prices, ironically, may have triggered a chain reaction of inflation because 
the Brazilian state was not strong enough to make sectors absorb price shocks. These 
price shocks included some natural disasters, the quintupling of the oil price in 1973-74 
and its doubling in 1979, the steep devaluations in 1979 and 1983, and the drastic rise in 
the interest rate in the 1980s. "Of course, these price shocks would not be inflationary as 
such if the sectors that are directly involved are willing to absorb them. If, however,. . . 
the sectors are able to pass the price shocks onto their customers . . . and if those 
customers, in turn, are in a position to pass on such higher prices, then the shocks will 
have started a chai of price increases that will affect the general price level."72
Foreign debt quadrupled between 1967 and 1973 and quadrupled again between 
1973 and 1979. The difference between the borrowing during the miracle years and the 
borrowing after the first debt crisis was that earlier borrowing was split between internal 
resources that financed investment and external resources that financed increases in 
external reserves. Debt, after 1973, increased because of the huge increase in the trade 
deficit and much larger interest and service payments. The trade deficit resulted from the 
oil crisis and the deepening strategy. Much of the debt was acquired by the public sector 
which figured heavily in the deepening strategy and took advantage of extreme petrodollar 
liquidity in international financial markets. "[R]ecycling of petrodollars had begun in 
earnest, and Brazil was not only an eligible recipient but an attractive target."73
There are a number of reasons why the Brazilian state facilitated such a huge 
expansion of international debt. First, such debt dampened inflationary pressures which 
were inherent in the aftermath of the oil crisis. Second, the state used international debt to 
support high rates of fixed investment by providing firms, especially capital goods firms, 
with a plentiful supply of relatively cheap imports of intermediate inputs and capital goods.
7lFor statistics on the growth of foreign debt and inflation .see ibid.. 91 and 90. respectively, and 
Baer. Brazilian Economy. 101-102. 106 and 142-145. respectively.
^Ibid.. 140-141.
^Fishlow. "Tale." 91.
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Third, the problem of resolving the dilemma between inadequate domestic savings for 
expanding industrial capacity had now been solved by the rapid increase of foreign debt 
and the consequent rapid increase of foreign savings.74
Heterodoxy more than orthodoxy influenced the shape of the development 
coalition and the developmental direction. "Those who believe that post-1964 Brazil had 
been converted to the magic of the market or to outward-oriented growth were quite 
mistaken."75 Only the Castello Branco administration had rather strong faith in the free 
market. But successive administrations lost faith in orthodoxy and began implementing 
heterodox growth policies with largely positive results.
However, Brazil's heterodox approach was far from perfect. While state elites 
argue that debt-led growth was preferable since the eventual stagnation that came in 1981 
was much shorter in duration than a preemptive stagnation would have been, the first flaw 
in the heterodox plan was that debt-led growth may have been too rapid in the context of 
the oil crisis. An alternative policy of slower growth may have been preferable for Brazil 
at this time.
Suppose, for instance, that the yearly real growth rate in the 1973-81 period had 
been 4 percent instead of 5.6 percent. Then, beginning with a base year GDP of 
183 billion in 1973, the GDP would have been US$ 250 instead o f US$ 285 billion 
in 1981 (all calculated in current dollars). A total repayment of the debt with the 
actual GDP attained in 1981 (US$ 61 billion) would have left a sum of US$ 224 
billion; the per capita income would have risen, under these circumstances, from 
US$ 1,827 in 1973 to only US$ 1,836. Suppose that, with the more modest GDP 
growth, the ratio of foreign debt to GDP in 1981 remained the same as that in 
1973, 6.8 percent instead of the actual 21.5 percent. Under these circumstances 
the total foreign debt would have grown to only US$ 17 billion; subtracting that 
from the US$ 250 billion of GDP attained by the lower growth rate, the country 
would have been left with US$ 233 billion and a per capita income of US$ 1,910.76
The second flaw in the heterodox approach was that it placed undue faith in the
short-term ability of the new round of secondary ISI to equilibrate the trade deficits.
There was little available capacity to exploit at this time, which meant that ISI would
74For statistics which support this contention, see Baer, Brazilian Economy. 105.
75Fishlow. "Tale." 92.
76Baer. Brazilian Economy. 106-107.
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necessarily be import intensive.77 Also, the state paid too little attention to export 
promotion. Despite the fact that the gates to world trade were closing at this time, Brazil 
could have done more to exploit its favorable terms of trade. Limiting imports would 
have also helped and would have served to complement a slower growth strategy as well.
The third problem with the new import substitution strategy was that it was too 
unfocused. Specific sectors need to be targeted for expansion if import substitution is to 
reach maximum efficiency. Costly projects (the steel, alcohol, and nuclear programs, in 
particular) were undertaken, which had spurious benefits. "Since such programs had a 
large import content, a more modest growth without these projects (or with those projects 
on a more reduced scale) might have brought the rate of growth of indebtedness down."78 
In addition, "projects were not vetted by careful analysis of benefits and costs, and 
certainly not by market forces. A simple appeal to import savings seemed to suffice."79 In 
other words, the range of industries within the categories of intermediate and capital 
goods was too broad. "[It is ] clear that a steady, and early, combination o f efforts, rather 
than one grand alternative was necessary to counter the more hostile external 
environment. . . . Instead, Brazil had been late to react and had then gambled on an 
ambitious plan o f import substitution."80 With the single grand alternative (ISI deepening), 
the state forestalled major reforms and undertook only weak reforms in the areas of 
export promotion, a devalued exchange rate, restrictions on imports, and slower growth. 
Decisive reforms in these areas would have made Brazil much less vulnerable to its 
balance of payments problems and less dependent on debt, but such action would have 
also required state leadership to determine which members of the private sector would be 
required to make which sacrifice. Such leadership was not to be found in a pre-aberttira 
government trying to please multiple social groups.81
77Fishlow. "Tale.” 95.
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The last major flaw was that the public sector played a major role in this deepening 
phase. This flaw had two dimensions. First, the local private sector resented the intrusion 
of public firms into economic space that they felt would be allocated to local capitalists. 
Second, the state enterprises did not turn out to be as solvent as originally envisioned.
This was because the public sector expansion "entailed increasing deficit finance and came 
to rely on external resources. The state became larger but also economically weaker.'1*2 
These two problems were complementary in that pacifying the private sector weakened 
the state financially since government used subsidy and price discounts on public goods to 
pacify a hostile private sector. The submission of the state to the private meant that the 
Brazilian state was not operating from a position of strength.*3
The third phase of policy which lasted from mid-1976 to the end of the Geisel 
regime has been characterized as one of "mild restraint."84 This strategy engendered a 
stop-and-go macroeconomic policy that intended to keep these imbalances at least 
manageable while supporting growth. Foreign loan capital continued to make growth 
possible even in the context o f mild stabilization.
The economic policy featured orthodox interest rate and monetary policy. The 
state employed high interest rates for two reasons. First, the government wanted to 
discourage debt-financed consumption. The Central Bank particularly discriminated 
against loans for consumer durables and housing. Conversely, the government wished to 
raise domestic rates of real savings. Second, the state wished to encourage the consump­
tion of external debt. "This would at the same time help to alleviate interest inspired 
inflationary pressures while closing the balance of payments deficit through capital 
inflow."*5 Monetary stringency was aimed at controlling inflation as well. Growth 
and inflation slowed.
Nevertheless, there were problems with the stabilization approach that emphasized
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high interest rate and monetary stringency. These problems comprised both internal and 
external economic spheres: the economic problem domestically was inflation, which 
originated from four sources. First, despite monetary stringency', capital inflows were 
absorbed into the monetary base as commercial bank deposits. This resulted in large 
increases in real liquidity for 1977 and 1978 and, consequently, rapid inflation.
Second, the magnitude of total subsidies (around %5 of GDP in the late 1970s) 
became burdensome. The coexistence o f low and high interest rates "became a destabili­
zing, expansionary force on the monetary base . . . [and] contributed to an increasing 
segmentation of capital markets."®6 Tax subsidies reduced revenue and credit subsidies 
depleted federal reserves. In addition, the state underwrote large investments by public 
industry. The state was being bled of resources from two directions, public and private 
firms. These factors contributed to the public deficit which also contributed to inflation.
Third, Brazil experienced problems with the system of indexing. In the presence of 
a weak state, the indexing system no longer controlled inflation but contributed to it: 
"political changes that began with the Geisel administration . . . explain the decision to opt 
for growth with debt. The same forces also explain the resurgence of inflation. . . . Once 
the 'fight for shares' took hold, the economy became increasingly indexed, which meant 
that the inflationary mechanism became increasingly dominant.. . .  [This was because the] 
price control agency was lenient in allowing energy and labor increases to be passed on to 
product prices. "®7 The runaway inflation that Brazil began to experience at this time 
marks a significant difference with Korea’s 1970s' deepening. While the autonomous 
Korean state was a master of manipulating prices in line with the dimensions of its 
development strategy, the semi-autonomous Brazilian state lost a handle on price control.
The Brazilian system of indexing was now working to the disadvantage of policy­
makers. It had helped in promoting deceleration of inflation so long as it had been 
manipulated to reduce real wages and when supply side shocks exerted a positive 
force. Now as civil society was increasingly voicing its demands, real wages could 
no longer be determined as residual income shares. Instead, controls proliferated 
at the expense of priorities. As the absolute level of subsidies increased, sectors 
and interests sought to defend entrenched positions. Pure market considerations
®6lbid.
®7Raer. Brazilian Fconomv. I l l ,  141. 155-156.
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were never further from being decisive in allocation of resources. Relative price
changes had to be minimized to avoid new inflationary impulses.88
On the external side of the equation, there were problems as well. True, Brazil 
increased its exports from 1974-1978 and, with the help of a higher coffee price, achieved 
a small trade surplus in 1977. Nevertheless, the balance of payments situation, because of 
a number of factors (the large foreign debt and insufficient attention to increasing exports 
being the chief among these) had become exceedingly precarious. "Brazil during these 
years was clearly becoming more vulnerable as its integration into the world economy was 
progressively more asymmetric: its share o f debt far exceeded its share of trade Were 
export growth not to manage to keep up, or rigid control over imports to be breached, or 
the larger debt to give rise to more costly interest remittances, or supply conditions to 
prove less favorable, the balance of payments constraint that overhung like a sword of 
Damocles could easily become operative."89
In the wake of the first oil crisis, the main thrusts of Geisel’s economic policies, as 
seen through the second and third pro-growth phases, were threefold. First, despite the 
failure to promote a rate of economic growth comparable to that of the miracle years, this 
regime did achieve a rather high industrial and GNP growth rate.90 Second, the Geisel 
policy resulted in a mounting foreign debt to pay for public sector investments, especially 
investments in imports of foreign equipment and intermediate goods. This resulted in a 
trade deficit.91 Third, the Brazilian state promoted a policy of accepting high rates of 
inflation as a counterpart to the growth strategy while curbing price increases through 
indexing. However, it tolerated high inflation because the elimination of such inflation 
would have entailed a full adjustment strategy. The Brazilian state did not have the 
strength to pursue debt-led growth in a non-inflationary way.92
The policies of debt-led growth, guided by a structuralist paradigm, created a
“ Fishlow. "Tale," 98.
89Ibid.. 99.
90Baer. Brazilian Economy. 100.
9tFor statistics on this see ibid.. 115.
92Fishlow. "Tale." 96.
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particular type of state alliance to different social groups. With all the rhetoric about the 
favored entity of state policy being the domestic private sector, this objective was contrary 
to reality. "State enterprises became the standard form of productive engagement in new 
sectors, frequently in association with foreign capital."93 The alliance structure changed 
perceptibly but not fundamentally from previous regimes: state firms became the focal 
point of policy, the local firms were again passed over, and foreign capital's influence 
diminished in proportion to the gain of state firms. This debt-led growth would eventually 
bring an end to the alliance that formed around the debt-led deepening of the 1970s and 
catapult the foreign banks (through the auspices of the IMF) into a more intimate 
relationship with the state than they ever had before. This established the same kind of 
relationship that had been in effect in the 1960s.
The Figueiredo Administration
In March 1979, Joao Batista Figueiredo, the last military president, took office.
In its will to economic problems and to achieve high growth rates, this regime had much in 
common with the predecessor governments. Figueiredo's "political program was to re­
store Brazil to a completely democratic regime and to hand over the administration to a 
civilian. These political aims were tested by economic crises . This regime was soon 
confronted with the dilemma of how to cope with the conflicting goals of confronting the 
rising rate of inflation . . . ,  dealing with a foreign debt whose servicing . . .  was already 
taking up two-thirds of export earnings, and keeping the growth rate from stagnating.1,94
The early Figueiredo administration called for free market reforms and made policy 
instruments more efficacious in producing economic results. These dramatic reforms were 
facilitated by granting the finance minister greater power. The new economic policy 
included the following characteristics.95 First, the state would reduce the amount of 
subsidized credit and would compensate the private sector for this reduction by explicitly 
increasing fiscal transfers. Thus, the inflationary effects of the previously segmented
93Ibid.. 95.
94Baer Rrazilian Economy. 107.
95These come from Fishlow, "Tale" 89-91.
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capital markets were eliminated. Second, the Finance Minister sought to restrain public 
expenditures, particularly those of state enterprises which had historically been hard to 
control. Third, import restrictions were to be modestly liberalized, a series of mini­
devaluations were to be scheduled, and export subsidies were to be removed. But such 
measures were not without costs: "The removal of tax incentives and subsidized credit for 
exporters . .. called for a stepped-up devaluation as a compensating measure. The 
problem, of course, was that greater devaluation would increase inflationary pressures and 
would substantially increase financial burdens on firms with foreign debts."96 Finally, 
slower growth was accepted to allow economic agents to finally adjust to the oil crisis.
Even before the petroleum price revolution, a chorus of complaints about the plan 
soon sprang from the public and private spheres.97 In the public sector, new ministers 
were eager to spend, not curtail expenditure, and state enterprises began to chafe at the 
new controls being placed on them. In the private sector, a number of groups voiced 
complaints. Industrialists, who were already experiencing difficulty, resented the further 
squeeze on their profits. Private banks complained about the entrance of the Bank of 
Brazil into direct competition with them as the gap in interest rates narrowed. The 
agricultural groups begged for abundant, subsidized credit in view of the poor harvests. 
Finally, workers experienced a shrinking share of national wealth as inflation intervened 
between the annual indexed adjustments and eroded real wages. The last B-A 
government, if it were to keep its commitment to abertura, could not completely close off 
the means of political expression as it once had.
In June, 1979, the second oil crisis struck. The oil crisis hurt Brazil's economic 
situation in a number of ways. First, the oil crisis hurt its balance of payments situation in 
at least three respects. It increased the price of oil imports, precipitated a rise in world 
interest rates which hurt Brazil's foreign debt situation, and helped to deteriorate Brazil's 
terms of trade. As previously described, Brazil was particularly dependent on cheap oil. 
Between 1974 and 1977, imports actually declined marginally. But in large measure,
^ a e r .  Brazilian Economy. 108.
97FishIow. "Tale." 101-102.
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owing to the oil crisis, the price of Brazil’s import bill by 1980 had nearly doubled.98 In 
addition, poor food harvests in 1978 and 1979 exacerbated inflation and required imports 
of staple foods. Brazil was no less dependent on low international interest rates (Brazil 
had acquired 70% of its foreign debt in variable interest rates).99 The tremendous growth 
of debt (in 1979 debt was 21% of GNP) in the context of less than spectacular growth of 
diversified exports and an explosion of imports created a situation where debt service rose 
to 63% of exports. Finally, the oil crisis contributed to a precipitous downturn in Brazil's 
terms of trade, which had begun to fall a year before. Such a turn o f events meant that 
Brazil would either have to adjust through a tremendous economic slowdown (and import 
restrictions) or increase production and exports to the point that its obligations were not 
so burdensome. However, such state coercion of economic units had never been seen 
before in Brazil, and an economic slowdown made debt harder to retire.
Second, the oil crisis also contributed to inflation. Domestic producers used the 
higher price of oil and credit (as well as the devaluation and higher wage law) as a reason 
to pass higher production costs on to the consumer. The maxi-devaluation and the new 
wage law also represented higher production costs which were passed on as inflation. 
Because the government was not strong enough to demand that sectors absorb these 
higher prices, Brazil's most serious instance of inertial inflation was ignited. The second 
oil crisis thus confounded the problem of adjustment to the first oil crisis that had eluded 
definitive resolution by the previous regime.
By August, five months after the new reform-minded administration took over and 
only two months after the oil crisis, the policies of stabilization and marketization were 
reversed. This reversal was symbolized by the change in the Finance Minister. Mario 
Simonson resigned and Antonio Delfim Netto entered the position o f Finance Minister. In 
terms of these men’s economic policy styles, there could hardly have been more contrast. 
While Simonson was a top level technocrat during the deepening and the stabilization/ 
marketization periods, Delfim had been Finance Minister during the miracle years.
98For these statistics, see Ibid., 98-99.
"Regis Bonelli and Pedro S. Mai an, "Industrialization, Economic Growth, and Balance of Payments. 
1970-1984" in State and Society in Brazil: Continuity and Change, eds. John D. Wirth, Edson de Oliveira 
Nunes, and Thomas E. Bogenschild (Boulder: Westview Press. 1987). 23.
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Contrasting with societal response to Simonson’s policy, Delfim’s initial policies enjoyed 
much political support. "Delfim promised a supply side approach that would make demand 
restraint unnecessary. That was sweet music to an administration pledged to validating 
wider popular political participation. . . . Delfim . . . was greeted by national euphoria and 
confidence in his capacity to save the day. In reality, he could have hardly selected a more 
unpropitious moment to return."100
The first phase o f Delfim's heterodox policy was primarily developmentalist in 
character, but it could not help but try to deal with the looming foreign debt, balance of 
payments deficits, and the inflationary impulse. To rectify external accounts, the policy 
emphasized agricultural exports and exchange rate devaluation. The state instituted a 
maxi-devaluation o f 30%. This devaluation eliminated the need for export subsidies and 
prior deposits on imports. In fact, it eliminated the need for the import barriers inherent in 
the Law of Similars, which was abolished. The irony was that, while this maxi-devaluation 
may have helped export competitiveness, it added substantially to inflationary pressures 
and made Brazil's large foreign debt harder to repay.
On the developmentalist side, the policy offered low interest rates, wage rate 
increases, deficit financing, and incentives for acquiring new foreign debt. The agricultural 
and energy sectors "were assured all the subsidized credit they wanted."101 Meanwhile, 
the industrial sector had little choice but to acquire new foreign debt, particularly after 
1980 when credit expansion was limited to 45%. The wage law of October 30, 1979, 
which was initiated under the previous policy phase, set the pace for wage policy in the 
1980-82 period. This law was designed to make Brazil's wage structure more egalitarian 
since the lowest paid incurred wage increases relative to inflation while the highest paid 
experienced wage decreases. "Since, however, the price control agency was lenient in 
allowing energy and labor cost increases to be passed on to product prices, the resulting 
inflationary conditions substantially diluted the real wage increases o f the lower income 
groups."102 Even if wage increases did not directly propagate high inflation, they made
I00Fishlow. "Tale." 102. Also see de Castro. "Renegade Development." 202.
l01FishIow, "Tale." 102.
I02Baer. Brazilian Economy. 111.
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high inflation difficult to roll back.
Delfim's first policy period also was supposed to enhance marketization and 
control inflation. Several policies were introduced in early 1980 which tended to focus on 
the reduction of inflation. Indexation was seen as the cause o f inflation so the economy 
was de-indexed. A novel anti-inflationary device was used: the announcement that 
indexation adjustment would not exceed 40% and the announcement that monetary 
expansion, credit expansion, and exchange rate devaluation would not exceed 45%. It 
was believed that if economic units could depend on a certain rate of inflation, inflationary 
expectations and inflation itself could be tempered. Rationed credit meant that the 
Brazilian government became more directly involved in credit allocation. These measures 
did not restrain inflation within the set parameters. Inflation during these months 
exceeded 100%. Pre-announcing the exchange rate was intended to encourage firms to 
borrow abroad since devaluation could discourage such borrowing by making it more 
expensive. However, exports became dangerously overvalued as the government 
temporarily stuck to its 45% increase limitation.
This hodgepodge o f policies was far from what the Brazilian economy needed at 
this juncture. Fishlow describes a number of reasons Delfim’s heterodoxy failed.103 First, 
the economy was already suffering from excess demand with substantial capacity utili­
zation which meant that increasing demand would only result in higher costs. This 
resulted from deficit financing, which was intended to increase demand but translated into 
inflation being that supply was inelastic. Conversely,, scarce finance in the tightly 
controlled financial markets also resulted in inflation. Second, while the shift of the wage 
adjustments from annual to semi-annual increments may not have had the result of 
accelerating inflation, it effectively prevented its deceleration. Third, the external 
economic context did not lend itself to international monetarism. In the midst of rising oil 
prices and debt servicing obligations, Brazil’s balance of payments situation was rapidly 
deteriorating. Brazil should not have, owing to balance of payments constraints, 
attempted to discipline domestic prices with the import of similar goods. Indeed, the 
maxi-devaluation served to instigate another wave of inflation as firms raised prices to
I03Fishlow. "Tale.” 104-105.
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compensate for the higher price of imported producers' goods. While this resulted in a 
temporary decrease in the real exchange rate (it lasted only a year), the long-term effects 
of this were negative since the gains were rapidly overcome by an explosion in inflation. 
Finally, considering the volatility of the external economic environment, Delfim tried to 
control inflation with a gimmick of pre-announcing monetary correction, credit expansion, 
and exchange rates. The only way inflation could have possibly been controlled at this time 
was through strict discipline placed on economic agents. However, such microeconomic 
controls were antithetical with abertura and such controls were not suited to Brazil's 
ideological set: such controls were a bit too radically statist even for an ideological set 
that permitted heavy intervention into macroeconomic price determination.
After the failed experiment with heterodoxy, the Delfim government entered into 
an era of increasingly strict orthodox policy, which lasted from 1980 to 1982. However, 
two features of policy were antithetical to stabilization. First, the public deficit began to 
expand rapidly. The reason for the explosion of the public debt was that, increasingly, 
it was borrowed from domestic sources at high interest rates. To counteract the growing 
deficit, the state had tried to shrink this deficit by raising taxes and the prices o f public 
goods, while cutting back on subsidies and public investment.
In late 1980 and thereafter, some reforms that had not worked in the past year 
were discarded. The de-indexation reforms were scrapped and full indexation was 
reintroduced. Pre-announced rates of indexation and currency devaluation were scrapped. 
Instead, a series of mini-devaluations meant that overvaluation would be less o f a problem. 
Export growth resumed as a result of the restoration of export subsidies in 1981. Foreign 
borrowing was no longer promoted and controls were finally placed on the growth of new 
foreign loans. Also, many orthodox reforms were implemented to control foreign debt, 
inflation, and balance of payments deficits. Monetary policy became very tight. Price 
controls on industrial goods were suspended. Prices on public goods were raised and 
subsidies were removed. In fact, the center of the 1980 stabilization concerned cutting 
public sector investments. However, such sacrifices could not be contained within the 
public sector. The result was general recession. The strategy hoped to temper import 
demand by inducing mild recession and to make exporting more attractive as domestic
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demand declined. This reform was an obvious concession to the IMF.104
The Brazilian authorities hoped that such policies would lead to "a short albeit 
severe recession [which] would permit Brazil to resume its access to external finance and 
economic growth."105 Urban employment, investment, and industrial output fell steeply. 
Falling levels of per capita income were actually worse than those experienced in the Great 
Depression. Still, modest success was achieved in reduction of inflation and in balancing 
external accounts. This recession was short, but it did not serve to resolve the underlying 
macroeconomic problem (foreign debt accumulation). In fact, Brazil's dependence on 
foreign creditors only intensified as its development strategy fell by the wayside.
The primary effect of the recession was to unloose a new flow of capital 
from commercial banks placing Brazil in further debt. Instead of conceding the 
need for more fundamental changes, and implementing them, Delfim’s primary 
stabilization objective was to retain international credit worthiness and liquidity.
. . .  It was, in other words, an unproductive recession, just as the 
preceding prosperity had been. . . .  To avoid going to the IMF, Brazil. . . [had 
intensified] stabilization to persuade international creditors of its sincerity. But in 
so doing it lacked a real program. . . .
. . . It was a . . . blending [of short- and long-term policy] that had been 
absent in the previous three years. . . . Delfim remained in office because there was 
not even governmental capacity to define an alternative strategy.106
A number of statistics illustrate Brazil's profound debt dependence. The external
debt became self-reinforcing.107 Seventy percent of the current account deficit resulted
from interest payments in the 1980-82 period. Moreover, from 1980-81, foreign loans
went almost entirely to interest payments. By 1982, interest payments outstripped new
foreign loans by $6 billion. Brazil was becoming increasingly entangled in a web of debt.
Also, the proportions o f this growing debt dependence are revealed by the fact that debt
service in 1978 had already consumed 58.8% of export earnings, but even this high figure
had risen to 83.3% in 1982.108 Since foreign debt had exploded out of proportion with
104Baer. Brazilian Economy. 111. 114.
l05Fishlow. "Tale." 107.
I06Ibid.. 106. 107. 108.
107For the statistics used below, see Baer, Brazilian Economy. 116.
108Ibid.. 115.
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export expansion, Brazil was now acutely dependent on international creditors.
Eventually, Brazil did go to the IMF. This period marked a significant intrusion o f 
the IMF into Brazil's economic policy. The high level o f dependence on debt is reflected 
in the high price Brazil paid for what it actually got in its negotiations with the IMF. It 
also seems that Brazil failed to maximize its bargaining position with the IMF because it 
believed capital flows would resume as soon as it signed an agreement with the IMF and 
because it also believed that the Fund would not enforce its provisions.109 Neither was the 
case. Brazil did get additional funds from the international banks. However, the interest 
rate on the old debt was not renegotiated on more preferential terms as it had been in 
Mexico. The performance criteria that the Fund asked for, and that Brazil readily agreed 
to, was overly optimistic. First, Brazil was obliged to produce a $6 billion trade surplus in 
1983. Brazil achieved this by a deeper cut in output. The revenues generated from this 
trade surplus were designated for loan payments. Second, the Fund set out to control 
inflation and redistribute wealth from Brazil to foreign creditors by a cut in real wages. 
Third, the Fund favored devaluation. In February, 1983, the Fund mandated a maxi­
devaluation of 30%. This devaluation, quite apart from stabilizing inflation, stimulated it 
to around 200%. Finally, reducing domestic demand remained a major goal of the plan. 
The Fund strategy conceived of controlling demand through policy reforms involving the 
public and private sector: as the state attempted to reduce its debt through higher taxes, 
less investment, and lower wages, a general decline in demand would result and would 
contribute to the decline in the private sector. Industrial output declined to -6.8%. Such 
a program explains the stagnation of GDP in 1982 and the recession in 1983 which was 
more severe than the one in 1981. If the 1981-1983 period is taken as a whole, GDP 
declined 5.1%, which contrasts markedly with the previous period (1974-80) when GDP 
expansion approximated 48%. The recession not only damaged Brazil’s economy but its 
developmental confidence that had characterized the actions of participants in the 
developmental coalition.110
Neither the Brazilian state nor the IMF was comfortable with the IMF imposed
109Bonelli and Malan, "Balance of Payments," 40.
110For details, see de Castro. "Renegade Development."
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stabilization. The Fund displayed unhappiness by Brazil’s noncompliance with targets by 
its refusal to reduce and reschedule old debt. The state’s discontent was reflected in the 
numerous letters of intent. Domestic critics seized on "the continuation of onerous 
external interest payments that came to rival the entire import bill in their magnitude."111
The critics also charged that IMF Plan did not help Brazil get back on the path 
toward renewed development but only acted to ensure that debt payments were met on 
schedule. Import reduction and export promotion contributed equally to the small current 
account surplus in 1984 that had risen from the $16 billion deficit in 1982. Though this 
accomplishment was indeed impressive, the surplus went toward meeting debt obligations 
instead of financing economic development.
In addition, the Plan, apart from its rhetoric, did not restore the internal 
preconditions for resumed growth but instead retarded them. Rather than stabilizing or 
decelerating inflation, it caused the rate to actually double. In addition, both public and 
private spheres of investment declined. On the one hand, private investment was 
discouraged by higher real interest rates, monetary stringency, and government sale of 
debt (which tended to turn economic activity toward speculation not production). On the 
other hand, public investment declined in accordance with the Plan, and this spilled over 
into the private sector. With the rapid declines of both public and private investment, the 
ratio of gross capital formation bottomed out at 16%, one of the lowest troughs reached 
in the post war era. Thus, despite the Plan’s pretensions about promoting economic 
development through slowing inflation and promoting investment, it did just the opposite. 
Because the Plan attempted to slow inflation through the monetarist model, which is 
inapplicable to Brazil, inflation was induced instead of abated. Also, because the primary 
emphasis of the Plan was to extract wealth from Brazil so that Brazil could meet debt 
service obligations and not to promote development, resources were channeled away from 
investors and toward the foreign banks. Fishlow describes these circumstances quite well:
To critics of the IMF stabilization approach, the stark asymmetry of the 
results came as no great surprise. Contrary to the IMF's implicit monetarist 
model, linking external and internal equilibrium, the Brazilian experience 
confirmed a very different interpretation. Improvement o f the external accounts
in Fishlow, "Tale." 108.
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has become cm important source o f the internal disequilibrium. [Emphasis mine] 
The very policies required to permit a large trade surpluses and payment of ex­
ternal interest add to inflation and subtract from investment. Thus aggressive 
devaluation of exchange rates reflects itself sooner or later, mostly sooner, in 
domestic inflation because of the ubiquity of indexing. In addition, the public 
sector must attract ever greater resources from the private sector in order to 
service the now largely public external debt. To do so on a  voluntary basis interest 
rates must be kept high and these costs are reflected in prices. In addition, govern­
mental deficits whether financed by money or internal debt, then replenish nominal 
demand to sustain the inflation. The State is to weak to accomplish the large trans­
fe r  needed in a non-inflationary way [emphasis mine].
The extensive resources that have been transferred externally, amounting to 
some 5 percent of gross product in 1983 and 1984 and reducing national income 
proportionately, have come primarily at the expense of investment. Consumption 
outlays have resisted further compression. Even with the changes in wage indexing 
arrangements required by the IMF, there were limits to further declines in the 
standard of living. Savings have not been responsive despite the continuation of 
real high interest rates; bank certificates o f deposits yielded about 25 percent in 
1983 and 1984.112
The events of the 1980s signalled a new developmental coalition for Brazil. The 
state in Brazil showed considerable continuity in its behavior. What was needed, and 
lacking in Brazil at this time, was a state strong enough to negotiate an amicable reschedu­
ling agreement with the IMF and strong enough to implement strict microeconomic policy 
on domestic agents. Instead, the state "knuckled under" to the IMF and opted for the 
more porous and less effective macroeconomic intervention. "[T]he weakness of the 
Brazilian State in directing the process of adjustment. . .  [is shown by the fact that it] 
neither commanded nor effectively cooperated with the private sector."113 This statement 
is not only applicable to the recession but to the 1970s' deepening period as well.
The state formed its strongest alliance with the foreign creditors after 1982. As 
described above, the IMF, as a spokesman for the international creditors, was the most 
influential agent upon Brazilian economic policy. This choice of an ally had much to do 
with Brazil's authoritarian nature: "it is a measure of the strong separation between the 
tracks of ongoing political liberalization and technocratic economic policy formulation that
I12Ibid.. 109.
ll3Ibid.. 110.
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he [Delfim] yielded to external influence rather than domestic critics."114 The Fund's 
influence was indirect in 1981 (becoming more direct as time progressed) but became 
explicit after 1982. "As it became increasingly difficult to finance the external deficit, the 
Brazilian government found itself forced to radically change its macroeconomic policies in 
the second half of 1980."115
In addition to these foreign pressures, new groups became powerful in the 
domestic coalition while others declined in their influence. The shifts in the domestic 
coalition had much to do with the oil, debt, and balance of payments crises. As 
government cut back support and protection from infant industry, this group suffered.
State firms took the brunt of the adjustment. State enterprises underwent a sacrifice for 
stabilization in the second quarter of 1980 and, again, in December of 1980 when 
investment rates were slashed across the board first by 8% and the by 15%, respectively. 
True, prices were raised for public goods; but since investments were curtailed, state 
enterprises' fortunes did not improve.
Figueirdo's policy initially favored labor, but labor lost power after the intervention 
of the IMF became explicit. The reason for this was a blatant appeal for widespread 
support of the military regime in the context of abertiira. The military regime, however, 
allowed price increases to be passed onto the consumer, since the state did not want to 
upset the industrial elite either. At first, Figueiredo introduced a more egalitarian wage 
scheme; but, after the IMF agreement, the minimum wage shrunk.
A number of sectors actually experienced more power with the crisis of industry. 
Exporters, whether from the industrial, agricultural, or service sectors, were favored for 
their potential to alleviate Brazil's external crises. Exports jumped from 6.8% of GDP in 
1972 to 12.8% in 1978. The favoritism of energy and agriculture had much to do with the 
government’s strategy o f dealing with the macroeconomic imbalances in the wake of the
ll4Ibid.. 106.
llsRaer. Brazilian Economy. 114.
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oil crisis for a variety of reasons.116 With this transition, state policy seems to have 
favored the service sector, particularly domestic banks, over the industrial sector. This 
resulted from the state's selling its foreign debt to domestic sources and instituting a 
regime of high real interest rates. Public debt from domestic sources increased from 5% 
to 15% between 1980 and 1984. Between 1980 and 1983, industrial production fell five 
percentage points in its share of GNP (from 38.1% to 33.5%), while services picked up 
five (from 51.9% to 56.7%0). In the early 1980s, as in 1964, debt dependence encouraged 
orthodox economic policy which benefitted exporters as well as the financial and the 
agricultural sectors, while industry experienced great hardship. On the other hand, the 
second oil crisis (when industry, particularly modem industries, suffered) contrasts 
markedly with the first oil crisis (when industry, particularly modem industries, expanded). 
Korean industry experienced similar reactions to the interactions of global events and 
economic policy. However, this was not the only similarity between Korean and Brazilian 
economic outcomes and policies. The last two chapters have relayed the developmental 
process of the case studies independently. In the next chapter, a comparison is drawn 
between the cases.
u6Thi s is true for a number of obvious reasons. First domestic food production would help alleviate 
Brazil's inflatioD stemming from a food shortage. Second, increasing agricultural export receipts would lessen 
the balance of payments problem. Finally, finding a domestic source of. or alternative for. oil would help 
alleviate the oil import crunch.




This paper will now "flesh out" the skeleton outline of Brazilian and Korean 
comparative process of economic development presented in figure 1. It will begin by the 
dependent variable and work backward to the independent variables. In both Korea and 
Brazil, significant changes in economic development can be seen to correspond to abrupt 
changes in political form. This type of analysis is simplified by historical coincidence. 
During the 1950s, both Brazil and Korea were formally democracies, though both were 
rather exclusionary ones. From the early 1960s to the 1980s, both regimes were of the 
bureaucratic-authoritarian mode.
Starting with the economic development, the dependent variable, and working 
backward, one can see a number of useful comparisons between Korea and Brazil. The 
major economic accomplishment of the Rhee regime, which endured from 1948 to 1960, 
was laying the basis for subsequent development. There were two major institutional 
outcomes which were accomplished at this time and which would constructively condition 
the possibilities for subsequent development. The first of these was not only creating a 
capacity for producing light manufactures but also was creating an impressive 
overcapacity in such production. The second was creating a group o f progressive 
millionaires. Both groups were local capitalists. The former group would be coopted in 
a coming strategy of capital accumulation that emphasized exports to fill overcapacity in 
productive means. The second would be coopted to be the spearhead of industrial 
modernization. Despite these impressive gains during the democracy at the end of this 
period, the economy was deeply depressed.
Brazilian economic development during this period was similar to Korea's. The 
most impressive gains were made in a group o f technology intensive industries which have 
been categorized as consumer durables. Most local firms were either pushed out of such 
areas by competition from the multinationals, bought out by them, or preempted by them. 
As a legacy of industrial production by local firms was founded in Korea, conversely, a 
legacy of foreign firms dominating production in the most dynamic sectors was established
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in Brazil. A precedent for the public sector in industry was developed during this time­
frame, as well, with the creation of the large public firms Petrobras and Electrobras. The 
rates of economic development, as judged by the average annual rates of GNP growth, 
were comparable in Brazil and Korea at this time. One difference in economic develop­
ment was that Korean industrial growth was markedly superior to that in Brazil. Another 
was that the rate of industrial modernization for Brazil, as judged by the rate of increase in 
shares of heavy industry vis a  vis light, was markedly superior in Brazil in comparison to 
Korea's at this time.1 The Brazilian economy only faltered twice during the democratic 
regime. As was the case in Korea, the falter occurred once at the onset of democracy and 
once at the collapse of democracy. The remedy for the latter in both Korea and Brazil 
was a military coup and ensuing junta.
Having discussed the comparative aspects of the independent variable in Korea and 
Brazil during the democratic period, this thesis will currently discuss the measurable 
variable which caused it, economic policy. This developmental outcome which laid the 
foundation for subsequent development in Korea was accomplished by a combination of 
interrelated economic policies. These included a combination of initiation import substi­
tution, sale of Japanese properties, and distribution of foreign aid spoils. It is important to 
specify that the Korean ISI encouraged expansion of light industries. It is also important 
to note that the major catalyst that the state used to affect economic development was the 
manipulation of macroeconomic price variables. Compared to the coming Korean regime, 
the Rhee regime disciplined firm behavior very little, though plentiful microeconomic 
controls existed. While primary ISI may have been constructed from the perspective of 
accomplishing a rational economic good, the sale of Japanese properties and distribution 
of aid goods were based on a narrow political calculus whereby economic favors were
'This assessment must be tempered. According to a UN study, average annual growth of production 
in light and heavy industry in Korea were 19% and 20%. respectively, between 1953-1958. In Brazil 
comparable figures for light and heavy industry for the same period were 4% and 14%, respectively. Korea 
showed little modernization in industry because both light and heavy industry were growing extremely rapidly. 
In Brazil, only heavy manufacturing was growing extremely rapidly so naturally the proportions would change 
more rapidly for Brazil. This is not to say that Brazil was alone in being outperformed by Korea. Of 36 
countries in the study. Korea outdistanced all of these other countries by a significant margin. For this study 
see United Nations. Patterns.
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explicitly based on political support, personal economic gain, or nepotism.2 Still, the 
outcomes for subsequent economic development were quite exceptional.
The economic policies in Brazil were geared toward import substitution in heavy, 
chemical, and technology intensive industries which have been termed secondary ISI. 
Especially in the early 1950s, tremendous incentives, the major one being high tariff 
barriers for such goods, were given for foreign firms to begin production in Brazil.
Another powerful incentive was the ability of foreign firms, which met certain conditions, 
to import equipment at the most preferential exchange rate. Foreign firms in consumer 
durables were interested in retaining the large Brazilian market for these goods. When 
tariff barriers blocked the import of such goods, they rapidly moved to produce these 
goods in Brazil and leap over the tariff barriers. Public oligopolies were also created 
during this time. While local firms were excluded from entering the most modem 
industries, policy towards them was hardly unfavorable as expansion o f the economy 
benefitted the lower echelons of the technological spectrum as well as the most advanced.
Brazil's democratic state resembled the Korean one of this time in that very few 
microeconomic controls were used to condition firm behavior. Instead, macroeconomic 
price manipulation was as rife as it was in Korea. While Korean macroeconomic price 
distortions on the whole would be smaller than Brazilian during the coming B-A regime, it 
is interesting to note that such distortions in Korea during the 1950s were actually higher 
than they were in Brazil during this period.3 The problem with heavy macroeconomic 
manipulation is that it results in economic distortions that tend to bring about economic 
crisis. However, in Brazil such developmental macroeconomic policies were frequently 
interrupted by unsuccessful and rapidly aborted attempts at stabilization. Though Collier 
criticizes Brazil's inability to carry out successful stabilization where this paper would 
criticize Brazil's inability to carry out sustained industrially supportive policies, she
2While ISI policies o f the Rhee regime may have represented a socially positive event (development). 
the\' also demonstrated the preference of the Rhee regime for a specific social sector, industry. In turn, the 
Rhee regime could not have been blind to the fact that such favoritism would entail political support from 
industry. Indeed, an important contention of this thesis is that even the most general economic policies of the 
state suggest a kind of alliance between it and society.
^For a comparison o f macroeconomic prices of Korea and Brazil at this time, see Soong, "Political 
Economy of Development." Appendices.
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effectively captures the equivocal commitment of the democratic regime to effect 
industrial development. Also, pro-industrial policies were implemented in the interests of 
the society at large. "Brazil reveals a record of nearly constant unsuccessful attempts to 
implement stabilization programs under every president since Dutra. These occurred in 
1953-54, 1955-56, 1958-59, 1961, and 1962-63. In the short-run, stabilization policies 
adversely affect the economic interests of many groups in society and may be the object of 
widespread opposition.. . .  In a regime characterized by shifting coalitions and competi­
tive party politics, the political costs o f . . . [such] opposition were unacceptable. . . .  In 
each case, the stabilization effort was abandoned and the government was immobilized."4
In other words, democratic Brazil was representing the interests of its people in 
industrialization. Industrialization can often be furthered by democratic regimes. How­
ever, exclusionary B-A regimes have the most potential for economic development, 
despite their sometimes abhorrent moral implications. What Collier does not clarify is 
that when Brazil entered periods of stabilization, it was following the directives of 
foreign parties, usually centered on the desires of the foreign banks. Collier suggests that 
the Brazilian state needed autonomy from domestic interest groups, but it may have also 
needed autonomy from foreign interest groups as well. The basic point, though, is that 
Brazilian policy showed an equivocal attitude toward industrialization because stabiliza­
tion policies were intermittently employed and these stabilization policies retarded 
economic development.
Monumental changes occurred in the political power of institutions in the 
developmental coalition during the Korean democracy under Rhee. Traditionally, 
the major empowered group in Korea (other than the royal court) was the landed elite. 
Some members of this group retained their properties through the Japanese colonial 
period. Initially, the Rhee regime looked as if it would favor this group as well. However, 
because of invasion, security considerations, and pressure from the US, the properties 
of the landed elite were redistributed to the peasants. While some of the Yangban class 
went on to become prominent politicians and businessmen, their economic interest in 
maintaining the economic hegemony of agriculture was broken. It is a significant
^ u th  Berms Collier. "Regime Evolution." 85.
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difference between Korea and Brazil that, while Brazil's agrarian elite lost in political 
power incrementally throughout the post-war era, Korea's agrarian elite was decisively 
destroyed or transfigured. This is because a hegemonic agriculture sector can sometimes 
represent a counter-industrializing influence on the state.
Other dramatic changes in Korea’s social structure occurred as well. The industrial 
sector was seized by some violent contractions that would result in the birth of a hearty, 
local private industrial sector. The withdrawal of the Japanese after World War II left 
Korea with some infrastructure for a light manufacturing sector. This was eventually sold 
with heavy discounts to the private sector. Even so, much of this property was destroyed 
or heavily damaged in the Korean War. The flood of US aid was integral to the rebuilding 
and overbuilding of the light manufacturing sector in Korea as well as the coddling of a 
group of progressive millionaires. On the one hand, the traditional industrialists would one 
day form the base of the export-oriented industrialization (EOI) strategy, while, on the 
other, the progressive industrialists would form the base of the industrial deepening 
strategy. A co-dependent situation resulted between the industrial sector and the state 
at this time: private firms needed the state to allocate aid goods to them, while the Rhee 
regime depended on the private local firms for political support. The local capitalist class, 
with the help of US aid and state support, rose up, sphinx-like, from the ashes of war to be 
a viable source of industrialization in the coming age.
The final monumental social change occurred in the nature of the Korean state. 
Korea had been a monarchy before it became a colony of Japan. Then, for a short time, it 
was administered by the US military. In 1948, it became formally a democracy with 
Syngman Rhee its as president. But the long history of autocratic rule sat uncomfortably 
with the rules of democracy; and, in a series of moves, Rhee attempted to strengthen the 
hand of the executive over the society and the legislature. The attitude of the Rhee regime 
toward industrialization was positive but equivocal. For Rhee, political goals, such as 
reunification and the maintenance of power and control, superseded any economic 
objectives. The single piece of evidence which epitomizes this equivocal attitude about 
industrial development is the fact that Korea bowed to US pressures and initiated a 
stabilization plan in 1957. Inflation slowed, but industrial growth rates fell more.
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Some of the social changes that occurred in Brazil at the same time were just as 
dramatic. True, there was no parallel in Brazil to major land reform which transpired in 
Korea crushing the landed elite there. The landed elite in Brazil continued to have a voice 
in economic decisions of the state even if the voice were diminishing. Indeed, the ISI 
strategy needed the foreign exchange generated by the agrarian exporters so that the 
exchange could be redistributed to the industrial sector to buy capital goods imports to 
further industrialization.
Still, other major social changes did occur. One of these was the entrance of 
copious amounts of foreign capital into the most dynamic and modem sectors of the 
Brazilian economy. Private sector firms were either preempted from entering such sec­
tors or shunted aside by being out-competed by the foreign firms or simply selling out to 
them. In this case, economic policy in Brazil resulted in the influx of large amounts of 
foreign firms which would, in turn, affect economic development. Local private capital 
would not be able to carry out the most important roles of capital accumulation and 
industrial modernization that it would in Korea. The snubbing of the local capital sector 
in favor of foreign firms resulted in surprisingly little resentment by the local private 
sector.5 In addition, public firms got their start during the democratic years. Electrobras 
and Petrobras paved the way for more public sector intrusion into forthrightly productive, 
industrial pursuits. This was an example of government policy that resulted in social 
group changes which, in turn, resulted in developmental outcomes.
Profound changes in the nature of the Brazilian state had also occurred at the onset 
of the democratic period. Brazil came out of an authoritarian period (1937-1945) under 
Getulio Vargas and entered a period of political democracy. However, much o f the 
executive autonomy achieved under the authoritarian period was retained. While the 
Brazilian executives tended in the democratic period to be pro-industrial, the congress 
tended to be more sympathetic to agrarian interests. This meant the state had a strong but 
equivocal commitment to economic development and industrialization.6 As seen through 
policy initiatives of the time, the state favors foreign firms over the interests of its own
5Skidmore, Experiment. 165, 168.
6Ibid.. 185-86.
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firms. Such an affiliation, of course, led to policy which affected the rapidity of develop­
ment. Development was positively influenced in the short-run (the 1950s) but would be 
hindered thereafter. The affiliation also led Brazil into some economic pitfalls as it 
overexpanded public firms as a means o f compensation.
Whether Brazil or Korea's democracy was more representative is a tricky issue.
On the one hand, Brazil, in contrast to the Korean situation, had a number of democratic 
presidents. These included Dutra, Vargas, Filho, Kubitchek, Quadros, and Goulart. Not 
only does this suggest a greater volatility in the policy outputs of these regimes but also a 
greater representativeness in democratic system. This was true because Brazilian elec- 
toriai laws prohibited consecutive reelections. Different nominees were forced to compete 
in an electoral system. These men were obliged to offer some political representativeness 
for the good of the party under which banner they ran. On the other hand, the Korean 
state promulgated the expansion of domestic firms in the dynamic sectors, while the 
Brazilian state sold out the local firm's potential for expansion into dynamic areas to 
foreign firms. This implies that the Korean state was more representative of the 
interests of an important domestic interest group than was the Brazilian state.
Summarizing the foregoing, one can say that there were many continuities and 
some divergences in Brazilian and Korean economic development under their circa 1950s' 
democracies. Both states demonstrated semi-autonomous characteristics and a strong but 
equivocal commitment to economic development. The nature of the states during this 
period was solidly similar in the cases o f Brazil and Korea. Both countries' policies 
encouraged import substitution industrialization through massive macroeconomic price 
manipulation. Correspondingly, there were similarities in the high rate of development.
However, there also were several differences. The Korean case was more 
dependent on foreign interest groups, as evidenced by its agreement amidst US pressure 
to undergo annual stabilization plans, while Brazil's commitment to stabilization programs 
was ephemeral. At the same time, Brazil's autonomy from domestic interest groups was 
less than that of Korea's. Policy was different in at least two respects. First, Korean 
industrialization policy encouraged import substitution in light manufactures, while 
Brazilian policy encouraged import substitution in more modem manufactures. Second,
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Korean policy was aimed at encouraging the expansion of local capital in the domestic 
economy, but Brazilian policy was aimed at encouraging the expansion of foreign capital 
in the economy. Part of the reason the policies were different was that these economies 
were in different positions in terms of modernization. Korea was rebuilding its light manu­
facturing base at the end of the Korean War. Brazil's import substitution in light 
manufactures, meanwhile, had reached its outer limits and secondary import substitution 
was required to push industrialization further. This explains the fact that modernization of 
Korean industry, as judged by shares of heavy industry overtaking light as a percentage of 
total industry, was basically at a standstill during the 1950s while Brazilian industrial 
modernization, accelerated at the most rapid pace that it would ever attain.
Now that this thesis has described the comparative features relevant to its hypoth­
esis for explaining economic development in Brazil and Korea during the democratic 
period of the 1950s, it will describe such relevant features for explaining economic 
development in these countries during the bureaucratic-authoritarian period (B-A). This 
thesis will begin by looking at the dependent variable, economic development, in Korea 
and Brazil. The democratic period held, for these cases, industrial and GNP growth rates 
that were basically similar ( albeit a bit higher in Korea). The transformation to a more 
modem industrial structure that was, nonetheless, more rapid in Brazil. However, the 
economic development was quite different in the case studies' respective B-A periods. In 
no quintile between 1962 and 1986 did Korea's industrial growth fall below double digits. 
Indeed, in one decade (1967-76), Korean industrial growth averaged above 20%.
Generally, Korean GNP growth doubled in the B-A period from what it had been in the 
democratic period. Korean economic development surged during the B-A period 
compared to the democratic.
Actually, the pace of Korean capital accumulation (aided by the export of light 
manufactures) and industrial modernizing investments was astounding. From 1962-72, the 
dynamic center of the Korean economy was capital accumulation through full utilization of 
productive capacity in light manufactures through intensive exporting activities by small 
local capital. This did not mean, however, that industrial modernization was absent. From 
1960 to 1975, heavy industry gained from 29% of total industry to 42%. From
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1972-1980, the dynamic center o f industry became the modernization of the industrial 
structure through intensive investment in new industries by large local private capital. 
Correspond-ingly, the share of heavy industries jumped from 42% in 1970 to 58% in 
1986. What is perhaps the most surprising is that, while Brazilian growth rates fell 
markedly in the 1970s1 deepening phases from the quintile before, Korean growth rates in 
its 1970s' deepening period remained at a very high level. Korea had made the transition 
from a primary EOI economy, in the first period, to a secondary ISI one, in the second 
period. It should be made clear, nevertheless, that modernization was a strong 
undercurrent to the primary economic dynamic of light industrial exports in the first 
developmental period (primary EOI), while export expansion was a strong undercurrent of 
the primary economic dynamic of second developmental period (secondary ISI).
Development can also be measured in terms of dependence on foreign resources.
In terms of ownership of the means of production, Korea was also outstanding. First, the 
capital accumulation Korea experienced during the primary EOI phase was dominated by 
local firms. This meant that the capital stayed at home and was likely to be invested there. 
Only after the windfall profits had been exploited from this phase were foreign firms 
allowed to enter these sectors. Second, the massive drive into modem industries was 
spearheaded by large local capital with some "gap filling" by state firms. Foreign firms 
were routinely excluded from dominating the dynamic center of the economy in Korea.
A final institution not only supported local firms in their economic hegemony of the 
economy and shielded local firms from the intrusion of foreign firms but also led local 
firms to behave in the way that they did: this institution was a strong, interventionist state.
In Brazil, economic development progressed rapidly, albeit with less rapidity and 
with more contradictions than in Korea. As was shown above, one way to measure 
economic development is through growth statistics. Total Brazilian GDP growth 
throughout the B-A period was similar to that of the democratic period, but the pace of 
industrialization lost ground in the B-A period from what it had been in the democratic 
period. Economic development, measured by these indicators, declined slightly in the B-A 
period from what it had been in the democratic. This is quite a contrast to the trend that 
developed in Korea between these two periods.
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Another way to measure economic development is the level of capital 
accumulation and the rate of modernization the industrial structure has reached. Between 
1964 and 1984, heavy industries increased their share of total industrial product from 
51.1% to 57%. This was much slower than the rate of industrial modernization that 
occurred in Korea as heavy industry increased from 29.1% to 57.8% in roughly this same 
time frame. The level of modernization of the industrial structure is reflected in the policy 
phase. A good way to characterize the Brazilian developmental stage at this time is by 
calling it interrupted secondary ISI. Actually, it is hard to argue that Brazil experienced 
much secondary ISI between 1964 and 1973. This was true because most of the price 
manipulations associated with ISI simply were not present during this period. The only 
major change in macroeconomic policy occurred when, in the 1967-74 period, the state 
backed a looser monetary policy, which fostered a period of capital accumulation. From 
1967-73, Brazilian average annual industrial and GNP growth—at 12.7% and 11.3%, 
respectively—was similar to the Korean. The political model also became very similar to 
Korea's in that the B-A nature o f the state became extreme. Industrial modernization pro­
gressed rapidly even though the capital coefficient was low. Because the level of 
accumulation was so high, rapid modernization of industry was bound to occur. The 
investment pattern only began to skew toward an era of industrial deepening in the 1970s.
In a way, economic development in Korea and Brazil was not that different in its 
phasing. First, both countries experienced an economic and political crisis in the early 
1960s; but, in Brazil, the economic crisis endured longer, until 1967. In Korea, this crisis 
has been explained as a result o f the end of primary ISI, while in Brazil, the crisis has been 
linked to an end of a cycle of capital accumulation under secondary ISI. Second, both 
countries, beginning in the 1960s and lasting to the early 1970s, went through a period of 
simple capital accumulation whereby existing capacity was utilized. Then, both countries, 
beginning in the 1970s and lasting to the early 1980s, experienced a period of industrial 
deepening whereby investment was skewed toward the more modem industrial sectors.
The first oil crisis, at the onset o f this deepening phase, did not bring a stop to this pattern 
of investment in either of these countries; the second oil crisis surely did in both countries.
Finally, economic development can be interpreted through the structure of
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industrial firms. Because of the incentives to foreign firms offered in the 1950s to enter 
the most modem industries, Brazil was left with a firm structure with foreign capital in the 
most enviable position in terms of capital accumulation, dominating the most dynamic 
sectors in the Brazilian economy. After the initial surge in the 1950s, economic 
development was slow beyond this phase since foreign firms had every incentive to keep 
cutting edge technologies at their base of operations in the core countries. Moreover, the 
risky area of basic industry was unappealing to foreign firms and implausible for local 
industry to enter. Consequently, the state tended to enter production in basic industry and 
infrastructure with its own firms, while it reserved the capital goods sector for private 
firms. The Brazilian state did not have the autonomy from domestic opposition to move 
into the productive sector in such a massive way without providing the private sector with 
subsidies that amounted to kickbacks. Besides, this state's role as a service provider 
became confused with its new role as a corporate profit maximizer, and corporate 
decisions were often made on the basis o f the former consideration. In summary, neither 
foreign firms nor public firms have characteristics conducive to the maximization of long­
term economic development. With such firms, Brazil's economic development was rapid; 
however, the Korean model, which emphasized the role of the local private sector under 
the tutelage of an autonomous state, seems preferable for the prospects of very rapid 
economic development. To repeat, "The State became larger, but economically weaker.
. . . The Brazilian problem, at root, was a weak, not a strong, State."7 The weakness of 
the Brazilian state may have been pronounced in relation to the East Asian NICs, but in 
comparison to most LDCs, Brazil had a rather strong state.
However, to find important clues to the characteristics of the pace and stage of 
economic development, one must look back to a dependent variable that influences it, 
economic policy. This paper has already touched on how economic development is 
affected by the trade regime. Korea went through two trade regimes during its B-A 
phase. The first trade regime, primary EOL, encouraged exports of light industrial 
products. Credit and other incentives merged with coercion to pressure manufacturers of 
light industrial products to export in the 1960s and early 1970s. The second trade regime,
7Fishlow. "Tale." 94. 96.
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secondary ISI, encouraged, through import barriers, credit incentives, other incentives, 
and coercion, a group of progressive millionaires to invest in heavy and technology 
intensive industries.
Another way to view the economic policy is to look at the degree of macro- 
economic price manipulation vis a vis microeconomic firm  and sectoral manipulation as a 
means to accomplish economic objectives. Macroeconomic policy relies on price signals 
manipulated by the state to give firms an incentive to behave in a certain way. Micro- 
economic policy, on the other hand, is employed by the state giving a particular firm a 
command to behave in a certain way. Korea used macroeconomic price manipulation far 
less during the B-A phase than the democratic phase. However, Korea used microeco­
nomic incentives far more extensively during the secondary ISI than during the primary 
EOI. Such microeconomic manipulation was employed by the bureaucracy (or the 
president) expressing its (his) wish that something be done. The state employed micro- 
economic controls, or coercion, through the nationalized banking system. If the state's 
wishes were fulfilled by a firm, then the firm could expect a financial reward (loans offered 
at preferential rates). But, if these wishes were left unfulfilled, then the firm could expect 
to face a severe penalty, if not bankruptcy (loans given at market rates or not at all).
While microeconomic controls may be more crude than macroeconomic price 
manipulation, the former may have the advantage of being more influential on changing a 
firm's behavior in a shorter amount of time. On this point, Jones and Sakong write: 
"Discretionary command is fast, but veiy risky and accordingly needs to be administered 
with skill or luck or both. . . . [Developmental changes in Korea] might well have 
happened eventually with sufficient parameter manipulation, but they occurred as early as 
they did as a result of command. The question, then, is not whether or not command is 
necessary to rapid economic development, but the wisdom of the ends towards which it is 
directed and the degree to which it is enforced."8 Furthermore, if a greater use of 
microeconomic controls (or discretionary command) lead to positive developmental 
consequences without heavy macroeconomic intervention (or parameter manipulation), 
then their use may be preferable. This is because heavy macroeconomic intervention
8Jones and Sakong, Ciovernment 134.
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tends to create distortions in the economy which can lead to economic crisis. Microeco­
nomic controls may be preferable not only because they can promote faster development 
but because, if used wisely, they also create fewer obstacles to it. In the 1980s, Korea 
endorsed secondary EOI, reorganization, liberalization, and stabilization policies.
In B-A Brazil, economic policies also affected the rate and phase of economic 
development greatly. For instance, Brazil underwent the policies of interrupted secondary 
ISI during its entire B-A period. First, it went through a period of neoliberal policies to 
stabilize its economy from the excesses of populist ISI. One by one, neoliberal policies 
were eschewed in favor of state intervention in the area of macro- and microeconomic 
intervention to promote development. The first neoliberal policy to be eschewed was 
monetary stringency. In 1968, the loosening of monetary stringency ushered in an era of 
capital accumulation based on exploitation of excess capacity. Increased exports played a 
significant role, though increased domestic consumption exercised more power in bringing 
about the Brazilian economic miracle. By 1975, other macroeconomic prices were man­
ipulated to encourage investment in newer industries. This ushered in a period of renewed 
secondary ISI in which investment was encouraged to expand capacity in existing high 
technology and heavy industries and to channel investment into newer industries. In 
Brazil, secondary ISI was interrupted not only by neoliberal macroeconomic policies that 
coincided with and contributed to a lengthy economic recession, but also by expansionary 
monetary policies which resulted in a miraculous economic recovery. Thus, secondary 
ISI, which had its origins in the democratic phase, was interrupted from 1964-1974 before 
it was re-initiated in the 1975-1981 period.
While macroeconomic intervention to promote development may have been 
eschewed in the 1964-67 period, such intervention was actively pursued thereafter, 
especially after 1975. Thus, intermittent macroeconomic intervention was the dominant 
method of development intervention in Brazil. In addition to intermittent macroeconomic 
intervention, Brazil, at least in regard to the banking system, practiced incomplete micro- 
economic intervention. The Brazilian state's control of credit allocation and pricing was 
only partial, owing to the fact that Brazil never resorted to the drastic measure of 
nationalization of the entire banking community. This meant that, while the most
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favorable rates on credit were available through the Bank of Brazil, Brazilian firms were 
always free to seek loans from the private sector. As a result, Brazilian firms could opt to 
disregard state demands which ran concomitant to allocation of Bank of Brazil and 
BNDES loans. Brazilian firms were free to seek loans elsewhere in the Brazilian or 
international capital market without the paranoia of having to face a hard state that might 
force a firm into bankruptcy as was the case in Korea. Moreover, the large presence of 
MNCs in the economy meant that these firms had access to international capital in a way 
that Korean local firms did not.
While the banking system is an important resource of state microeconomic 
intervention, it is not the only one. In Brazil, the most important source of microeco­
nomic intervention was the expansion of public firms into infrastructure and basic 
industries. The banking system may be important in a situation where there is a distinct 
separation between the state and firms and, thus, presents potential of an adversarial 
relationship between these two bodies whereby the state asserts its dominance through 
such mechanisms as credit. However, the private sector (neither foreign nor local) was 
not to be the main engine of 1970s' development in Brazil. State firms were the primary 
instrument of economic modernization in the period of renewed secondary ISI. Since the 
state did not have to coerce existing firms to invest in newer industries, it created or 
diversified public enterprises to do this. Korea did not eschew public firm expansion but 
used it much more sparingly than Brazil. In the 1980s, Brazilian policy became radically 
reoriented with stabilization and liberalization as it had in the middle to late 1960s.
One can draw strong comparisons between Brazil and Korea in their respective 
economic policy phases. Both Brazil and Korea went through distinct economic periods. 
There were policies encouraging capital accumulation and exports in both countries. In 
Brazil, monetary expansion encouraged full utilization of built-up capacity, while, in 
Korea, policies encouraging exports accomplished this same result. Both countries 
followed up their stage of capital accumulation with a deepening stage. In both countries, 
the oil crisis ended secondary ISI. Both countries increased exports, reduced some forms 
of intervention, and stabilized their economies. However, Korea fomulated a policy, 
including reorganization, which helped its economy recover rapidly. Brazil initiated few
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plans beyond stabilization, and liberalization and its economy suffered through the 1980s.
In addition to economic policy phases, one can also examine the comparative 
aspects of microeconomic and macroeconomic policy intervention. Such intervention 
reached its apex during the secondary ISI phases these countries underwent during the 
1970s. In both countries, the state used heavy macroeconomic price manipulation and 
microeconomic controls to encourage investment in new industries during secondary ISI 
in both Brazil and Korea. The Brazilian state did distort macroeconomic prices much 
more heavily in the 1970s deepening phase than did the Korean.
In Brazil and South Korea, stabilization policies have been applied to correct for 
price distortions and international shocks. While growth was sacrificed in Brazil on the 
altar of stabilization policies, this was not so for Korea. In Korea, one gets the sense that 
the state, having successfully accomplished its major goals o f economic development, was 
fine tuning its microeconomic prices to equilibrium levels. In Brazil, however, one comes 
to the conclusion that there were still some grave macroeconomic problems (foreign debt 
and hyperinflation) for which the Brazilian state applied both orthodox and heterodox 
solutions with very limited success. To recall Amsden's words, "If the Korean economy 
has outperformed the late learners of Latin America, the reason cannot be said to lie in 
short-term austerity measures to manage external shock, because the response of the 
Korean government to external shock was not to batten down the hatches."9 The Korean 
state coupled stabilization measures with heavy foreign borrowing to compensate for 
balance of payments difficulties, bailouts of troubled chaebols, and intense pressure to 
push exports out and resume growth. If Brazil often tried to circumvent stabilization, so 
did Korea. Paradoxically, the Korean economy may have had fewer and less pronounced 
price distortions than the Brazilian, but the Brazilian state may have had more faith in free 
market principles than the Korean. Whatever Korea lacked in terms of macroeconomic 
controls, it more than compensated for by microeconomic controls. This is why one can 
contend that the absolute level of intervention was greater in Korea than it was in Brazil.
This thesis suggests that the economic policies and economic development have 
institutional correlates. The two institutions which received focus here are the two that
9Amsden. Giant 93.
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had the most profound impacts on economic policies and economic development, firms 
and the state. The Korean state is presented here as highly autonomous. The state has 
autonomy not only from non-industrial sectors but also from the industrial sector toward 
which it directs most of its policies. The differential treatment of firms through micro- 
economic intervention throughout the B-A period implies a heavy amount of autonomy. 
Relatively disfavored industrial firms would be expected to protest their treatment by the 
state. This was not the case in Korea because of the state's autonomy from such firms. 
Further, the Korean state's autonomy can be seen by the fact that it accomplished its goals 
through microeconomic coercion and incentive for certain sectors often over the objec­
tions of the leading industrialists in those sectors. This was true in the primary EOI phase 
when light industrialists resented pressure from the state to massively increase their 
exports. It was also true in the secondary ISI period when larger firms resented state 
pressure for them to enter more modem areas of production. In both periods, the state 
had to resort to coercion as well as incentive to accomplish its goals.
The Korean state's autonomy from such firms can also be seen in the ease with 
which the state switched its policies from favoring capital accumulation (via pressures on 
the light industrial sector to export intensively) to favoring industrial modernization (via 
the diversification of large local capitalist into newer industries). The switch in policy 
favoritism implies that the formerly favored light industrial sector might protest the states' 
relatively less receptivity to their interests during secondary ISI. This was not the case, 
however. Because of extreme autonomy, which only increased during the 1970s' 
secondary ISI, the state was free to radically reorient its policies to accommodate its 
developmental goals and the dictates of the stage of late development that it had reached.
The autonomy o f the Brazilian state approximated but did not reach the level of 
the Korean state's autonomy for two reasons. First, the interests of the agrarian elite 
continued to have some sway over the state's policies. This was especially true during the 
first few years of military rule. The fact is that the Brazilian state, considering the coun­
try's rich endowment of land, could not afford to ignore this potential engine of growth 
entirely. In actuality, agrarian exports gave the balance of payments some buoyancy, 
which tended to counteract the drag created by the import-substituting policies. Import
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substitution was inclined to discourage industrial exports as well as be import intensive on 
some producers' goods. Both conditions hurt Brazilian balance of payments and, conse­
quently, the Brazilian state depended on agrarian exports to help balance its accounts.
Second, Brazil had less autonomy from the industrial sector than Korea did. The 
Brazilian state had limited freedom to impose its will on the dominant industrial group, 
foreign firms, during the 1964-1974. While such firms could be coerced to a certain 
extent, if the state insisted that such a firm correspond to a certain dictate and the parent 
company felt strongly that such a dictate would seriously jeopardize the firm or the parent 
company's profitability, then the parent firm might decide to close the subsidiary. Clearly, 
the Korean state had more power to coerce local capital than did the Brazilian state to 
coerce foreign capital. In fact, the inability of the Brazilian state to control the behavior of 
this type of firm may have influenced the shape of development and the pace of industrial 
modernization. The pace of modernization was affected because MNCs could not be 
induced to invest in certain new industries. The shape of modernization was affected 
because the Brazilian state's inability to direct MNCs led to policies which dramatically 
increased the dominance of public capital over the most modem sectors of the Brazilian 
economy. In that public capital did not serve to maximize capital accumulation in Brazil, 
the alternative of public firms slowed developmental progress.
There is also some indication that the Brazilian state had less autonomy from local 
capital than the Korean state had from such capital. During the democratic phase, foreign 
firms, not local ones, were selected to spearhead a drive into modem industry. This 
implies that during the 1950s the state had a great degree of autonomy, although local 
firms were partially compensated by the growth they experienced during this general era 
of expansion. During the deepening phase of the 1970s, local firms were passed over, 
again, but this time in favor of public ones. The compensation of local firms was more 
explicit in the 1970s. The Brazilian state gave the local sector generous subsidies which 
served little developmental purpose than to buy its complacency. Not only was this tact 
ineffective (significant protest against state entrepreneurship was voiced by local capital 
anyway), but it was also developmentally harmful: (1) the could superfluous subsidies to 
private capital could have been better spent as investment capital to new industries, and
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(2) these subsidies also weakened the state financially when it could ill afford to be 
weakened any more. The ability o f the state to pass over local capital for the most 
privileged position in the industrial alliance implies some autonomy. However, the 
necessity of the state to compensate the local sector (especially during the return to 
secondary ISI in the 1970s) and the existence of protest by the local capitalists (mostly 
during the 1970s' secondary ISI phase), suggest that the state in Brazil may have been less 
autonomous from local capital than was the case in Korea. Also, the fact that Korean 
autonomy was joined to a "development first" mentality meant that developmental goals 
preceded political concerns. In Brazil, there is evidence that, in some cases, the reverse 
was true.
To contend that the states in both Korea and Brazil were more autonomous in the 
B-A phase than they were in the democratic is not to contend that these states were 
completely without alliances to the productive sector. In turn, these alliances between the 
state and business had an impact on economic policies and economic development. This is 
not to say that these institutions have equal impacts on economic development and eco­
nomic policies. While the influence of firms on economic policies may be less direct than 
the state's, the effect o f firms on economic development is necessarily more direct than the 
state's. This is true even if the state intervenes heavily to influence firm behavior.
In Korea, the B-A state preferred to form strong alliances with local capital rather 
than foreign or public capital. Nevertheless, Korea witnessed a distinct shift in the state's 
alliance to different forms of local capital. In the first phase, state policy clearly supported 
the interests of light small local capitalists in light industries who agreed to utilize excess 
capacity in intensive exporting behavior. As a secondary policy initiative, the state 
encouraged the diversification of large capital into more modem industries. While the 
autonomy of the state in Korea may have given the state significant freedom of policy 
choice, the state definitively responded to the presence of a specific interest group, 
primarily light industrial firms, at this time. This characterized the alliance during the 
policy/developmental phase which is crudely called primary EOI.
In Korea, the converse of this alliance arrangement is evident in the policy 
developmental phase bluntly called secondary ISI. Here, the state formed a primary
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alliance with large local capital to diversify into even more modern areas of production 
than such capital even wanted. To make such diversification plausible, the state offered 
large local capital generous incentives and stiff coercion. This is not to imply that light 
local capitalists were entirely ignored or that exports of more modem products were 
eschewed, but it is only to say that such goals were placed on a back burner. Again, the 
state was responding to the presence of a specific interest group, primarily large local 
capital, in the formation of its policy during this period, despite the greater autonomy that 
the state achieved from interest groups during the 1970s.
As has been shown above, local capital in Korea held a dominant position in the 
most dynamic sectors of the economy. The state not only responded to certain subsectors 
of local producers in policy formation; but the policy, once formed, influenced economic 
development. In this scheme of development, foreign and public firms played lesser but 
important supporting roles in local capital’s hegemony of the economy. The contention 
of this paper is that the state was just as rigid (in not more so) on foreign firms and public 
firms where its developmental goals were concerned.
The supportive role of different kinds of foreign firms basically parallelled the two 
periods in which the different varieties o f local firms rose to a position of hegemony in the 
Korean economy. Just as the rise of the local firms was conditioned by premeditated state 
intervention, so was the supportive role of the foreign. In addition, the foreign firms had 
to face the same "hard" state that local producers did. There is reason to believe that the 
state in Korea, in contrast to the state in Brazil, was "harder" on foreign capital than local. 
This stemmed from the Korea state's greater distrust of foreign in comparison to local 
capital. This "hardness" was not only felt in the in the detailed entrance agreements that 
foreign firms were required to negotiate with the state but also in the strict way these 
agreements were enforced. In Korea, the state began its dealing with the different social 
productive groups by humbling them from the outset. This occurred through the legalistic 
threat to the local capitalists after the military coup and through the entrance agreements 
required by the state of foreign capital. The maintenance o f  such dominance was achieved 
through legalistic and extralegal norms. Through these acts, the Korean state established 
dominance and bent the different sectors o f capital to its developmental will.
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If the state made it so difficult for foreign firms, one might ask, why did they enter 
in the first place? The answer is that often they declined to enter. This outcome fit the 
designs of the Korean state which wanted foreign capital, but only the foreign capital that 
agreed from the outset to conform to its wishes. The relentless attitude o f the state 
toward foreign firms can be seen by the fact that so little foreign capital was allowed to 
enter Korea. Correspondingly, the size o f foreign direct investment remained a small part 
of total capital inflow. In the 1960s, the ratio of foreign direct investment to total capital 
inflow was around 4%. It swelled to nearly 8% in the first half of the 1970s but fell to less 
than 4% in the 1976-84 decade. By comparison, Brazil's foreign investment as a share of 
total capital inflow approximated 23% in the first half of the 1970s. It is important to 
remember that foreign capital's share in investment and GNP was a small but significant 
source of development in that it contributed to local firm expansion.
If foreign capital did not enter in droves as it did in 1950s' Brazil, then that was 
fine with the Korean state. This condition only reflected the Korean state's preference for 
local capital to accomplish the state's developmental objectives and the state's fundamental 
distrust of foreign capital to respect its developmental wishes. Thus, foreign capital was 
never allowed to denationalize the Korean economy of powerful local firms as foreign 
capital did in 1950s' Brazil. The state held the attitude toward foreign firms that they 
could profit from a supportive role to local firm expansion, but they could not capture 
windfall profits by displacing local firms. If foreign firms had full control of the most 
profitable sectors of the economy, the profits could be repatriated; but if local firms held 
such sectors, the profits should stay at home where they could be reinvested. Moreover, if 
local firms could be induced to leam new technologies through joint ventures, then the 
Korean economy would not be dependent on wholly-owned foreign firms for it.
The parallel movements of Korean local and foreign firms is described as are the 
requirements that the Korean state placed on foreign capital. Such requirements made 
foreign capital the handmaiden of local capital. As previously described, during the EOI 
phase, the state formed a primary alliance with light manufacturers who agreed to export. 
To complement a local firm's own efforts at finding foreign markets for its products, the 
state enlisted the support o f foreign firms. "The only way on which labor-intensive foreign
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investments would aid the domestic economy was through foreign investors' knowledge 
of, and access to, foreign markets."10 Enlisting the participation of foreign firms in the 
project of increasing light industrial exports through joint ventures would be expected to 
increase the export potential of local firms more than the local firms could have done solo. 
While these firms might well have been interested in entering the Korean market, the 
domestic market was strictly reserved for local firms. The state could afford to be very 
tough in regard to this form of foreign investment where the technological gap was small 
and where many foreign investors showed interest. As a compensating mechanism, the 
state gave foreigners other incentives to produce in Korea. Only recently have regulations 
been relaxed in Korea in the light industries to allow greater penetration of foreign firms in 
the light industries. The Korean state has extended less liberalization in the area of the 
dynamic industries.
During and anticipating the secondary ISI phase, the state enlisted foreign capital 
to help modernize Korea's structure of industrial production. Again, the state tried to 
facilitate the expansion of local capital through joint ventures. However, in this instance, 
the primary aim of such partnerships was to facilitate technology transfer. The state 
pressured foreign firms to form joint ventures with local firms so such transfers could be 
realized. The state always negotiated with a view toward increasing the rate of technology 
transfer. The state also worked to increase the advantages of local firms in other ways. It 
sought to limit foreign firms' access to the domestic market, it worked to expand the raw 
materials the foreign partner would supply to the project, and it tried to maximize the 
amount of surplus that would go toward reinvestment in the project and minimize the 
amount of surplus available to the foreign partner for repatriation. To allow local partners 
to rapidly gain access to technology, the state worked to give local partners controlling 
shares of the project from the outset. If control could not be established immediately, the 
state negotiated on how rapidly local partners could gain controlling shares.
While the Korean state could afford to be strict in its conditions for firms entering 
light industries where the technological gap was small and foreign interest was large, the 
state had to relax some of its strictness where the technological gap was large and few
l0Mardon. "Control of Foreign Capital," 133.
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foreign investors had interest. Such compromises meant that, at least initially, foreign 
investment agreements in very technologically intensive sectors had to reflect the "global 
rationality" of the MNCs in maximizing profits and retaining control o f technological 
secrets. Nevertheless, wherever and whenever possible, the state worked to make these 
agreements reflect its own "nationalist rationality" of protecting the interests of large local 
capital and bending foreign firms (and local ones) to its developmental will. As time went 
on, the technological gap narrowed, and other foreign investors became interested in 
investing in the more modem sectors in Korea. The state still supported the expansion of 
local capital's interests relative to those of foreign capital. Foreign firms were never 
allowed to denationalize the economy of local firms as was the case in Brazil as it entered 
its secondary ISI phase during the 1950s.
In Korea, public enterprise assumed the role of facilitating the modernization of the 
industrial structure by local capital before and during the phase of secondary ISI. During 
the 1960s, Jones and Sakong document a dramatic upswing in the number and GNP share 
of public enterprise production. These new public firms also tended to be concentrated in 
the more modem industries. "Roughly speaking then, the old enterprises were basic (plus 
revenue), while new enterprises were motivated by developmental and power consider­
ations."11 These authors imply that this phenomenon was just another example of the 
Third World development model in which public enterprise is called on extensively to 
speed national development by assuming an ever larger role in the economy by capitalizing 
on new dynamic sectors. However, from hindsight, it is clear that state enterprises were 
only "gap-filling" and spearheading development in the dynamic sectors to make it safe for 
the ranks of large local capital that would be increasingly called upon to carry on the 
project of modernizing the industrial structure. In particular, state firms tended to enter 
areas of modem production which provided a market for major private sector initiatives 
into HCI industries, had a particularly low initial profit rate, had a very high start-up cost, 
or were otherwise acutely dangerous for the private sector. Outside of Korea, public 
firms carry the stigma of being inefficient for a variety of reasons. Jones and Sakong's 
analysis as to why Korea had efficient public firms is put well.
11 Jones and Sakong, Government. 158-159.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
176
[T]he public enterprise sector operates relatively well for the same reason that 
other forms of intervention are effective. Public enterprise is one form of discre­
tionary command, and the potential for abuse o f this form of intervention is 
minimized by leadership commitment to growth administered by a competent 
hierarchy, producing a hard state with a pragmatic non-ideological approach to 
choosing means. . . . [B] latent inefficiency . . .  is eventually brought to the atten­
tion of the Blue House; then things happen quickly. Public enterprises may thus be 
less inefficient in "hard" states where political authority is able to act decisively. 
Similarly, the anti-public ownership ideological bias makes the government less 
tolerant of public enterprise abuses.12
It seems that the Korean hard state produced positive developmental results for its 
economy by not only being exacting on the local, foreign, or public firm alone but also by 
being demanding of all three firm types together.
In the B-A period, a degree of difference existed between the Brazilian state in 
comparison to the South Korean one. Instead of being highly autonomous from the 
productive sector, Brazil was only semi-autonomous. In both the Brazilian and Korean 
cases, the level of autonomy increased from the democratic to the B-A phases. However, 
the leap in the Brazilian case was by degree, and the leap in the Korean case was in 
quantum fashion. While the state autonomy from domestic interest groups during the 
initial years of B-A was necessarily high, the state autonomy from the foreign financial 
community was low. Foreign banks, under the auspices of the DV1F, pushed austerity 
policies on a state that was only too willing to find an alternative to the populist policies 
on which it blamed Brazil's crisis during the 1960s. However, the cure was as bad as the 
disease in that these policies prevented the restoration of industrial growth. Indeed, when 
the state introduced policies that caused the economy to finally rebound and industrial 
growth to return, the policy reforms were based on political considerations calculated to 
appease industrial firms that had suffered through many years of recession. Growth of the 
money supply not only brought about a return of economic health but also slowed 
inflation. This is ironic since three years of recessionary neoliberal policies only began to 
put a dent in inflation; but looser money also contributed to the control of inflation while it 
permitted rapid growth.
In Brazil, the late 1960s and early 1970s ushered in a period of capital accumula­
t e d . .  162.
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tion when there was relative harmony between the state and industrial institutions (local, 
foreign, and public). These groups forged a "triple alliance" whereby the state worked 
through public firms to build joint ventures with foreign firms and include local capital 
whenever applicable. State firms grew in stature to rival foreign firms, and these forms of 
capital brought local firms into this alliance not only to legitimate the dominance of foreign 
firms but also to increase the legitimacy of the growing dominance of public firms.
The state's behavior immediately following the oil crisis is instructive in terms of 
autonomy because this was when the harmony o f the triple alliance fell apart and the dif­
ferent industrial interest groups cried out to the state for relief As the state responded 
to these divergent pressures, its policies became somewhat contradictory; and, thus, 
efficiency at accomplishing development was not maximized in Brazil as it was in the 
Korean case. The state found its economy in the early 1970s in need of some drastic 
changes. The state could choose one of three main directions in which to implement 
changes. First, the state could choose the neoliberal route which would mean a choice 
to absorb the oil shock through recession. Second, it could try to rectify some of its 
developmental deficiencies and attempt to grow in spite of the oil shock. Third, it 
could employ some combination of these two strategies.
The state chose the second option with some vacillation toward the third. One of 
the deficiencies that troubled Brazil at this time was insufficient productive capacity in the 
sectors (dominated by foreign companies) that had thrived during the miracle years; the 
other deficiency was that Brazil lacked a strong base in some of the more modem 
industries which were to be dominated by public firms.13 In the first case, the state made 
producers' goods imports cheap so that (primarily) foreign firms could rectify their deficit 
in capacity. However, this partially undercut the state's attempt at secondary ISI 
deepening. This occurred because some of the very producers' goods imports (which 
were made less expensive) were some of the very goods for which the state wanted to
13Choosing public capital for the project of ISI deepening responded not only to the public firms' 
desire to diversify but, more importantly, to the state's nationalistic desire to wrest control of the dynamic 
industries from the foreign firms. The reason the state wanted greater control of manufacturing is that it had 
not a small amount of difficulty in enticing foreign firms to diversify into the producers' goods sectors. The 
reason the state chose public capital over local capital for the entrepreneur of this project was that local capital 
had a serious technological backlog which would be difficult to overcome.
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develop a productive capacity locally, ironically enough, through import substitution. 
Meanwhile, local capitalists who had seen themselves cheated of their chance to engage in 
modern forms of production by a massive influx of foreign capital now saw themselves 
largely cheated, again, but this time by an expansive public sector. Local capital protested. 
To calm the protest, the state granted local firms generous financial subsidies which served 
no good economic purpose. Instead, the basis of the compensation was political. In turn, 
these subsidies undercut the financial strength of public firms to soundly invest in the new 
industries. Political turmoil was created by the economic crisis from whose fires brewed a 
cauldron of contradictions that can only be explained by the lack of state autonomy. This 
paper should not leave the impression that secondary ISI deepening was a "boondoggle."
It may have led in the end to an even deeper economic crisis, but the path, itselfi resulted 
in rapid industrial growth at a time when other countries were experiencing depression.
The foregoing is posed as an explanation of why Brazil experienced less success in its 
1970s' secondary ISI deepening than Korea: political autonomy was greater in Korea than 
in Brazil, leading to greater coherence in economic policy.
The state's equivocal commitment to economic development can be seen not only 
in its rejection of nationalistic development in the mid-1960s but also in its similar rejec­
tion of such development in the early 1980s. In both cases, the state adopted neoliberal 
policies in an attempt to rectify macroeconomic imbalances, reverse recession, and to meet 
its foreign debt obligations. In both cases, only the last of these objectives was accom­
plished. Recession was not reversed nor was the most important of the macroeconomic 
imbalances remedied: though conservative prices were allocated to macroeconomic 
variables, rates of inflation remained very high. Nor should this be surprising, since the 
state in both cases was pandering to the interests of the foreign banks' interests (wealth 
extraction), the main objective could not be economic expansion. Thus, the Brazilian 
state's commitment to economic development was equivocal.
Even during the periods of economic growth and industrial modernization, the 
state's commitment to economic development was less than myopic. As we have seen 
above, the state often let political concerns intrude on its objective to maximize economic 
development. The competing concerns of public, local, and foreign firms undermined a
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coherent strategy of economic development if this strategy is viewed from a vantage point 
of purely the economic concern of maximizing development. If one considers that the 
Brazilian state had not achieved the degree of "hardness" that is evident in the Korean 
case, then the strategy becomes rational from a political perspective. The strategy 
consisted of the state's political rationale of accommodating the particularistic interests 
of different firm types plus the state's economic rationale of maximizing development.
To make better sense of the developmental policies adopted by the state and the 
developmental outcomes, one must look not only at the autonomy of the state but also at 
the division o f labor between the different productive groups and the hierarchy o f domi­
nance this implies. While, in Korea, the state assumed the role of senior partner in the 
developmental alliance between state and local private sector, in Brazil, the state assumed 
the role of junior partner and allowed the market, skewed though it was, to determine 
economic outcomes (at least to a greater extent than in the Korean case). Through the 
interaction and the independent actions of the three social groups of production—state, 
local, and foreign capital—the Brazilian model of accumulation was bom. Of these three, 
foreign capital was the most empowered during the miracle years. The next decade 
witnessed the growing dominance of public capital in the economy.
Though it can be argued that the state achieved dominance over the three firm 
types during the first three years of B-A, foreign capital was the dominant form of capital 
between 1964 and 1975. This was the case because it had achieved hegemony over the 
dynamic sectors of the Brazilian economy (with state complicity) during the 1950s.
Foreign capital was also influential in the alliance because it possessed the most valuable 
resource to industrial modernization, high technology. The impact of foreign firms on 
economic policies during the first decade of B-A in Brazil was only compromised during 
the first three years of that rule when Brazil's vulnerability to foreign debt made the state 
more amenable to influence by foreign banks. This slowed the pace of economic develop­
ment since policies were largely a function of an exogenous interest group, foreign banks, 
that had little concern for Brazil's national development other than debt repayment. Even 
when foreign firms regained their dominant position in the miracle years, the rationale 
guiding economic development sometimes became an arena for the contest of wills
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between the state's affinity for nationalist development and the foreign firm's orientation 
to maximize profits and minimize risks (global logic). At other times, shared interests in 
rapid economic growth contributed to rapid development. Thus, the globalist logic that 
the MNCs used was not always contradictory to the goals of nationalist logic, but some 
conflicts emerged. These arose from MNCs desire to repatriate their profits and keep 
technological secrets to themselves, while the state desired companies to invest profits 
locally toward industrial diversification and have foreign firms share high technology with 
local partners. Indeed, the fact that Brazil was short on productive capacity at the end of 
the miracle years can probably be traced back to the insufficient investment on the part of 
MNCs, preferring to repatriate their profits. If the state pushed too hard in imposing its 
nationalist logic on the foreign firms and such firms perceived that such interventions 
would be unprofitable, then the MNCs might decide to withdraw from Brazil and place 
their investments elsewhere. On the other hand, if the state did not push its objectives 
rigorously enough, then economic development would likely progress at an unacceptably 
(in the state's view) slow pace.
In Brazil, there existed a mixed economic message that seemed to call for 
stabilization, on the one hand, and for secondary ISI deepening, on the other. On the 
political side, forces pushed in favor of ISI deepening. The state's nationalist agenda to 
modernize the economy was blocked by the reluctance of MNCs and the inability of the 
state to coerce them to increase the rate of modernization. Foreign firms were also 
pressuring the state for incentives to increase their deficient capacity. This set in motion 
a policy which the state hoped would expand the capacity in past dynamic sectors (dom­
inated by foreign firms) while new sectors were entered (slated to be dominated by public 
firms with some private firm expansion). While this plan may have been contradictory, it 
certainly signalled a profound shift in the hierarchy of productive social sectors in the 
developmental alliance as well as a shift in the importance of the different firm types in 
the economy. The role o f the state in the economy grew as it elected its progeny, public 
firms, to assume dominance of the triple alliance. The choice was a natural one consider­
ing the social arrangement that the 1950s had created. This legacy meant that foreign 
firms were technologically advanced but unwilling to diversify. It also meant that private
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capital, while eager to regain its position of dominance, had neither the technological 
backlog nor the capital reserves necessary to carry through such a project. Public firms, 
which were the second most technologically advanced and had access to large reserves of 
capital, were the natural choice to undertake this project. As a result of state command 
and policy, such firms began to diversify rapidly. When they needed the closely-held 
technology of the foreign firms, they formed joint ventures with them. In both Korea 
and Brazil, the most important result of the joint venture was technological transfer. The 
difference is that, in Brazil, joint ventures formed the base of the Brazilian developmental 
model, while, in Korea, such ventures occupied a small, but necessary part of the Korean 
developmental strategy. In this way, realities in the developmental alliance influenced 
economic policies in Brazil and worked to reorient the hierarchy of institutions in the 
developmental alliance and in the economy according to the requisites of the state's new 
development agenda.
Local capitalists, then, were brought into the double alliance between public firms 
and foreign firms whenever it was convenient to do so. Two factors encouraged the 
inclusion of local firms into the alliance whereby the triple alliance was forged. The first 
was the ability of the local partner to contribute something positive to the joint venture. 
The other was a political motive. The state endured much criticism from local firms that 
felt they had been excluded from this new era of expansion just as they had been in the 
1950s. One way the state chose to diffuse the animosity of the local capitalists was to 
include them in the joint venture. Often foreign firms also sought local partners for 
political reasons. The dominance of foreign firms, particularly in sensitive sectors, was 
often offensive to the general public. However, if a local partner is brought in, this 
diffuses the opposition's argument. Further, MNCs often sought out local firms because 
of their political connections within the state. As Evans observes, "the best cards on the 
side o f the locals are political. The multinationals’ best cards are technological."14 Local 
capitalists may have protested against the new expansion of the state into the economy, 
even though they may have been partially quieted by the kickback of subsidy and joint 
venture. Despite this, they did not play a larger role in the economic expansion of the
l4Evans, Dependent Development- 202, 203.
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1970s1 secondary ISI deepening than they played in the 1950s' secondary ISI. The 
arrangement initially favored foreign capital and then public firms to produce in dynamic 
sectors. Both arrangements had many positive developmental outcomes. However, the 
infusion of local capital into the dynamic sectors of the economy seems to be the maximal 
way to achieve development.
The contrast of Brazil’s developmental social structure to Korea’s is quite striking. 
Korea had a developmental social structure in which domestic firms were the primary 
developmental agents, unlike Brazil, where such agents were foreign firms. Three 
implications follow from this. First, if technological innovation were to occur at all in 
firms based in Korea, it would have to be done by domestic firms. Corollaries to such 
R&D are royalty payment and joint ventures which have been popular devices of acquir­
ing technology in Korea. Domestic trials at technological acquisition were required in the 
absence of foreign firms. Korea’s method of employing research and development (R&D) 
locally to a greater extent by the utilization of domestic firms may be preferable in the 
sense that, once technology is owned by a domestic firm, no "incremental" technology 
transfer from MNC to a domestic firm is necessary. Though Korea’s method implies a 
stronger commitment and greater effort in the area of technology acquisition on the front 
end, this effort was advantageous because Korea did not experience a lengthy dependence 
on foreign firms for technology as was the case in Brazil. Korea was able to make a more 
abrupt break with dependent development in the area of acquiring new technology while 
Brazil’s dependent development in this regard was more of a continuous process.
Second, the Korean model, which employs the use of domestic firms more 
intensively in its developmental alliance, seems to be preferable in terms of the state’s 
enhanced ability to orchestrate development. The Brazilian state was able to use 
unidirectional tax and credit subsidies as well as public firm expansion in its policy to 
encourage incremental successes in achieving greater industrial diversification and 
manufactured export increases. The Korean state, on the contrary, was able to force 
greater advancements in technology and breakthroughs in export expansion through 
coercion and policy inducements. On the pressure side, the Brazilian state was 
constrained by the fact that, if it pushed too hard, MNCs were liable to withdraw from
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Brazil with the valuable technology which state nationalists wanted Brazil to keep. In 
Korea, patriotic and nationalist interests aside, domestic firms were to a greater degree 
"stuck" in the nation. This meant that Korean domestic firms would be compelled to abide 
by the government's wishes to a greater degree than Brazilian MNCs. This meant that 
Korean domestic firms would be likely to be easily persuaded to make drastic changes in 
their behavior if this promoted the national good than Brazilian MNCs would. Moreover, 
Korea's nationalized banking system gave this country a policy tool to work with the 
private sector that Brazil only approximated in lackluster fashion. In Brazil, negotiation 
between the state and foreign firms were a delicate matter for the state while, in Korea, 
the state handled its negotiations with its dominant industrial group (local capital) much 
more bluntly. Under these circumstances, the dominant productive group in Brazil 
(foreign firms) were much more free to act according to their own interests than the 
dominant industrial group in Korea (local capital). The harmony of interests between 
local capital and the state in national development seems much greater than the gulf 
which separates the nationalist logic o f the state and the globalist logic of the MNCs.15
Because Brazil had a legacy of MNC dominance, inherited from the 1950s when 
the democratic regime had welcomed massive FDI inflow, the MNCs were much less in 
tune with the nationalist developmentalist objectives from the onset. The Korean state's 
extensive screening of foreign firms before any FDI was allowed to penetrate the economy 
permitted this state to bend MNCs to their developmentalist will. In Brazil, the MNCs, 
having already gained dominance over the dynamic sectors of the economy, were much 
less willing to compromise with this state when conflicts over national development versus 
profit maximization arose.
The above has emphasized the differences between the alliance structures of 
Brazil's greater affinity for foreign capital during the first decade of the Brazilian B-A in 
contrast to Korea's greater affinity for local firms. What o f Brazil's greater affinity for 
oligopolistic public firms during 1970s in contrast to Korea's greater affinity for oligop­
olistic local firms at this time? First, let us look at the issue in terms of alliance shifts.
Both Brazil and Korea went through rather dramatic alliance shifts during their B-A
15Ibid.. 176-177.
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regimes. Of course, the reordering of dominance between productive groups is a project 
likely to bring about social conflict. To minimize such conflict, the state must be autono­
mous, and the gap must be small between the old and the new dominant productive group. 
In the first place, it appears that the state was more autonomous (harder) in the case of 
Korea than in Brazil. Secondly, in Brazil before the 1950s, industrialization was largely a 
project for light, local capital. Then, in the 1950s and 1960s, the project of diversifying 
the industrial structure was taken further by the foreign firms. Thereafter, in 1970s' Brazil, 
the state firms took over the project of modernizing industry. Korea may have undergone 
the major project of switching policies from primary EOI to secondary ISI, but it stuck 
with local capital throughout. Granted, these were not the same groups of local capital. 
Korea's transition from different types of local firms during its B-A was less of a leap than 
Brazil's shift from local to foreign capital and then from foreign to local capital. In any 
case, Korea was better able to smooth over the rough areas in the transition with its more 
autonomous state.
In addition to alliance shifts, one can also compare the logic of the primary agent 
carrying out secondary ISI in 1970s' Korea (large local firms) to the primary agent that 
engaged in secondary ISI in 1970s' Brazil (public firms). Above, this thesis has argued 
that foreign firms have less developmental harmony with the state than local firms. 
However, a difference in the logic of public firms and local firms can also be drawn.
Public firms in most counties have been considered "unlimited liability companies."16 This 
is to say that profitability is not always the overarching concern in public firms. Whatever 
conclusion is drawn about the differences of local and foreign firms in terms of being 
swayed by nationalist logic, it is clear that there is great commonality between them in the 
area of globalist logic. All private firms seek to make a profit. The case studies illustrate 
this point. While the Brazilian state called upon public firms in Brazil to provide their 
goods to the private sector at prices that compromised their viability, the state never asked 
this of private sector firms. Brazilian public firms were made to be the "whipping boy" of 
the developmental alliance, particularly after the second oil crisis; and, consequently, they 
suffered proportionately greater hardship than the private sector. However, the Korean
16Jones and Sakong, Government. 163.
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private sector engaged in modem forms of production and, after suffering for a short time, 
rebounded to become a star performer in Korea's economic recovery. Thus, the surviv­
ability of local firms may be greater because of their greater conformance to the principles 
o f economics.
Finally, the performance o f the public firms in Korea and Brazil is compared.
Brazil had a public sector that eclipsed the foreign sector in its dominance over the 
economy. In Korea, public firms were used only to facilitate local private expansion into 
modem industries. If Brazilian public firms are less efficient that their Korean counterpart, 
the difference seems to be that the Korean state demanded a high level of economic per­
formance from all its firms, while the attitude of the Brazilian state has historically been 
a more diffuse control. The research has revealed that in terms of institutions, develop­
mental coalitions, economic policies, and economic development, the similarities in the 
case studies are stronger than the differences. However, some critical differences in these 
cases suggest some characteristics that helped Korea to develop more rapidly than Brazil. 
A conclusion is offered below in regard to this argument.




This chapter summarizes the findings and offers some interpretations of them. 
However, before this is done, a review of the framework of the argument is in order.
The composite hypothesis is that the most important institutions influencing development 
in the case studies are the states and firms. These institutions of the case studies enter into 
developmental alliances. Such developmental alliances have important implications for 
economic policy. Economic policy, in turn, is a primary determinant of economic develop­
ment. Two thesis questions are posed: (1) Why did both Korea and Brazil develop so 
rapidly? and (2) Why did Korea develop more rapidly than Brazil in the postwar period, 
particularly in the 1980s? The project of this paper has been to apply the hypothesis to 
the case studies (Brazil and Korea) to determine if the hypothesis is valid to the historical 
process of development in both cases. A secondary project of this paper has been to 
establish a comparison of the two cases to ascertain whether the assumptions concern­
ing the "ideal" characteristics that tend to maximize development on the periphery are 
applicable to the cases. If so, the thesis questions can be answered by these character­
istics. This thesis argues that, to the extent that both conform to the ideal characteristics, 
the first question is answered; and, to the extent that Korea conforms better to the ideal 
than Brazil, the second question is answered.
The next few pages provide a summary of the findings of this thesis concerning the 
characteristics of the relevant variables (institutions, developmental coalitions, economic 
policies, and economic development). It was convenient to divide the developmental 
histories of the cases into two periods, the democratic of the 1950s and the bureaucratic- 
authoritarian period that lasted from the 1960s to the 1980s. The convenience sprang 
from the coincidence of regime sequencing found in both cases and the fact that major 
changes in the characteristics of some variables occurred between periods in each case. 
The first period is the 1950s' democracy through which both countries progressed. In this 
period, the institution of the state was not so different in both cases. Both Korea and 
Brazil had a semiautonomous state with an equivocal commitment to industrialization.
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Nevertheless, both states found it in their interests to intervene heavily in favor of industry 
most of the time. The technocratic component of the state was limited in its influence in 
both cases, but the technocratic component within the Brazilian state was more influential 
in policymaking than was so in the Korean case.
The institution of firms did show some interesting trends. Industrial firms in Korea 
came to dominate the dynamic center of the economy. In Brazil, industrial firms had 
already established hegemony over the economy. While Brazil and Korea became more 
alike in this respect, there were also strong contrasts with firm types. The dominant firms 
in Korea were small, light, local manufacturing firms that tended to operate in a semi- 
competitive market structure. However, the Korean economy also contained a kernel of 
progressive, local manufacturing firms that tended to be larger, more diversified, and 
dependent on corrupt favors from the state for a good share o f their profits. The domi­
nance of public capital diminished during this period as a wave o f privatization diminished 
its ranks. Foreign firms did not hold significant shares of the market at this time. Brazil, 
by contrast, showed a trend toward large, diversified, oligopolistic, foreign firms control­
ling the dynamic sectors of the economy. Local firms were largely displaced or preempted 
from the dynamic sectors of the economy by foreign firm inflow. Still, Brazilian local 
firms—which tended to be smaller, less diversified, and competitive-continued to hold 
most of the domestic market for more traditional industrial goods. While public firms 
were privatized in 1950s' Korea, public firms were being established at this time in Brazil 
in the "strategic" sectors such as oil, power, and infrastructure. Brazilian state firms 
tended to be oligopolistic. Later, these firms would tend toward largeness and 
diversification, although initially their directives were narrow.
The dominance of different firm types within the economy paralleled the power of 
the different firm types within the developmental alliance which they entered into with the 
state. This thesis assumes that the state is the most powerful member of this alliance 
because of its monopoly on legitimate violence and in economic policymaking. Below the 
state, firms were the most powerful members of the developmental alliance in both cases. 
However, different types of firms proved influential. In Korea, dominant firms tended to 
be small, undiversified, light, local producers with a small—but important—contingent of
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larger, diversified, more modem producers. In Brazil, large, diversified, oligopolistic 
foreign firms experienced a dramatic expansion of influence within the developmental 
alliance. Small, undiversified, competitive, local firms experienced a proportionate decline 
in their power within the developmental alliance relative to foreign firms. Finally, oligopo­
listic public firms established an important foothold within this alliance. To some extent 
certain firm types seduced the state into a partnership in the developmental alliance. 
Though, to a greater extent, the state's independent initiatives created and coopted 
certain firm types as dominant members of the developmental alliance as well as 
hegemonic producers in the economy.
Out of the developmental alliances which these countries formed, specific 
economic policies emerged for each case. Economic policy also shows some similarities 
among the case studies in the 1950s. In both case studies, macroeconomic and micro- 
economic policies helped foster industrialization, though macroeconomic policies were 
used most heavily in both countries. Such pro-industrial policies were tempered by 
periods of stabilization (in both countries) and by counter-industrial policies favoring the 
agricultural elite (in Brazil). However, there were also some differences in each country's 
trade-linked developmental policies. Brazil pursued the policies of secondary ISI, which 
were associated with fostering the expansion of the foreign, large, oligopolistic firms in the 
more modem industries. Economic policy also favored the creation of public monopolies 
in a few sectors. To finance this expansion, the state pursued a policy to attract and 
maximize foreign loans. Korea relied on policies of primary ISI that encouraged the 
growth of local, small, competitive firms in light industries, with its micro- and 
macroeconomic policies. Simultaneously, the state favored the minute contingent of local, 
large, diversified, oligopolistic firms with primarily microeconomic policies. To finance 
primary ISI, the Korean state followed a policy to acquire and maximize foreign aid. In 
partial summary, this paper has emphasized several similarities of the characteristics of the 
independent variables as they occurred in the case studies. First, there were similarities 
between the cases' states in terms of interventionism, semi-technocracy, semi-autonomy, 
and sympathy for industry. Second, there was the similarity of firms as being the most 
important interest group in the developmental alliance with the state. Finally, there was
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the similarity of largely pro-industrial policies.
From the similarities in the independent variables sprang rapid economic develop- 
meet via industrialization in both cases. Nevertheless, there were differences in economic 
development. Korea's expansion of light industry was a foregone conclusion. This was 
because foreign donors earmarked aid for light industry, ISI fostered the development of 
light industry, and Korea was at an early stage of development when light industry was the 
growth point. Similarly, Brazil's heavy industry (particularly consumer durables) was 
destined to experience the most rapid growth. This was because foreign loans were chan­
nelled to heavy industry, foreign firms entered this area as a result of secondary ISI and 
other subsidies, and traditional industry had reached the outer limits of its dynamism 
(meaning one of the next logical steps was the development of heavy industry). Both 
countries experienced rapid industrialization, but Korea's was of the horizontal variety, 
while Brazil's was of the vertical kind.
After these countries entered their B-A periods, the cases also showed some strik­
ing similarities and subtle divergences in terms of institutions, developmental coalitions, 
economic policies, and economic development. With the arrival of B-A, the institution 
of the state became more autonomous and technocratic in both cases. However, both the 
autonomy and technocracy of the Korean state was greater than it was in the Brazilian. 
Differences can also be seen in the trends in autonomy and technocracy over time.
Brazilian state autonomy and technocracy peaked during the first decade of military 
rule and declined thereafter, but Korean autonomy and technocracy peaked during the 
second period of military rule. Both states continued to intervene in favor of industry, 
but Brazilian intervention was more equivocal and less effective.
The institutional component of industrial firms also showed some interesting 
comparative trends during the B-A period. In Korea, local firms continued to be the 
dominant form of productive unit. However, the type of local firm changed over time. 
During the 1960s, the dominant local firm in Korea was inclined to be small, competitive, 
undiversified, light, and export oriented. During the 1970s, the dominant local firm tended 
to be larger, more diversified, oligopolistic, and more geared toward domestic production 
than its predecessor. Public firms increased their shares of output but never came close to
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eclipsing the dominance of the local firm. The state allowed a minority of foreign firms to 
enter Korea under strict regulations that ensured their contribution to national develop- 
meet and their servitude to the interests of large local capital. In the early 1980s, large 
local capital began to suffer. The state reaffirmed its alliance to large local capital by a 
bail-out plan that prevented widespread bankruptcies. The state intensified oligopoliza- 
tion as it carved the carcasses of modem industrial complexes that had been badly 
managed and tossed these industries to deserving members of the private sector.
After the heavy industry sector recovered, it became more export oriented.
Though Brazilian dominant firms during the B-A period were large, diversified, 
oligopolistic ones, like the ones in Korea in the 1970s and 1980s, there were also some 
important differences. In the first years of Brazilian military rule, the dominance of 
industrial firms in the economy receded as stabilization policies caused a deep recession 
in the economy. Such policies also muted the dynamism of different firm types so that the 
division of labor between local, foreign, and public firms remained largely static. In the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, industrial firms forged the triple alliance. Such alliances were 
forged through joint ventures. Foreign firms dominated the center of this economic 
alliance with technology, diversification, and large firm size as their chief assets. The 
public firm experienced rapid growth and was the second most valuable partner with their 
assets being political connections, large firm size, and willingness to produce inputs for the 
foreign firms at a low price. Other members of the joint venture invited the participation 
of local capital because local firms offered the alliance their political connections and more 
manual, less technological services. Foreign firms became more export oriented in 
response to generous subsidies for exporting. In the early 1970s, public firms expanded 
rapidly in response to a deepening initiative from the state and technological help from 
foreign firms. This profoundly changed the productive alliance as public firms enveloped 
larger economic shares and foreign firms declined proportionately. Local firms held then- 
own in the economy. When the second oil crisis struck, the more modem firms were the 
first to suffer. The state tried to localize this suffering within the public firms; but, due to 
the extreme integration of firms, the recession leaked out to other firms. While firms 
became more export oriented, they also faced prolonged hardship in the 1980s.
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Again, the dominance o f firm type in the economy reflects the dominance of form 
type within the developmental alliance. In both Korea and Brazil, the state was the most 
powerful member of the developmental alliance with its monopoly on legitimate violence 
and economic policy making. To some extent certain firm types pursued the state into a 
partnership in the developmental alliance. To a greater extent, however, the state's inde­
pendent initiatives tended to create and coopt certain firm types as dominant members of 
the developmental alliance and powerful producers in the economy. Below the level of the 
state, the most powerful members of the developmental alliance were industrial firms. 
Nevertheless, there were differences in the types of firms with which the state forged its 
primary alliances. In Korea, this meant that local capital was influential within the 
developmental alliance throughout the B-A period. In Korea, small, light, local firms 
operating in a competitive setting were the most influential in the 1960s, while large, 
heavy, local firms in an oligopolistic setting were important in the 1970s and 1980s.
While Korean local capital may have been a powerful player in the developmental 
alliance, local capital in Brazil never rose above a tertiary status in the developmental 
alliance. Another contrast between these two countries is that, in Korea, industrial firms 
always held an important place in the developmental alliance; but, in Brazil, during the 
early years of the military regime, other interest groups besides industry (particularly the 
IMF) were influential in the developmental alliance. However, in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, foreign firms regained their dominance and public firms gained dominance in the 
developmental coalition. After the early 1970s, public firms eclipsed foreign firms in the 
developmental alliance. The power of the public firms in the developmental alliance 
diminished monumentally as the IMF took a favored position within the developmental 
alliance and attempted to put Brazil's financial house back in order.
Economic policies during the B-A period also show some interesting points of 
comparison for the case studies. Microeconomic policies were frequently used in both 
cases, but the types of microeconomic policies differed. Brazil used direct intervention via 
public firm expansion into more modem industries during the 1970s, while Korea relied 
heavily on reciprocal credit subsidies that demanded conformance with export or modern­
ization targets to qualify for subsidized loans. Brazil also used credit subsidies, but such
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subsidies were mostly unidirectional, not reciprocal. In Korea and Brazil, macroeconomic 
policies became more conservative during the first decade o f military rule, but pro­
industrial macroeconomic policies proliferated during the 1970s. Brazil used the less 
effective macroeconomic manipulation more heavily than the more effective microeco­
nomic intervention, since its microeconomic subsidies, being unidirectional, were less 
effective than Korea's microeconomic policies were.
The contents of the trade-linked developmental policies of the case studies show a 
surprising degree of similarity and some minor dissimilarities. Policies in both countries 
facilitated the rapid accumulation of foreign debt to finance different stages of such 
developmental policies, leading to both countries being the most heavily indebted 
countries in the world during this period. Policies in both countries during the initial 
years of military rule focused on increasing export orientation and stabilization. Brazil 
concentrated more on the stabilization side; however, while Korea focused more on 
achieving increased industrial exports. While Korean policies continued to be pro­
industrial in the initial years of military rule, Brazilian policies in the formative years of 
military rule were not. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Brazilian policy converged 
further with the Korean as Brazil joined Korea in developing policies that encouraged 
utilization of industrial excess capacity. In Brazil, the state did this by loosening mone­
tary policy that encouraged expanded consumption and offering incentives for firms that 
increased their exports. In Korea, the latter continued to be the primary emphasis. Both 
case studies in the 1970s employed policies that encouraged the expansion of large, 
oligopolistic firms producing heavy industrial products. The Korean state aimed this 
policy at local firms, while the Brazilian state directed such policy at public firms. In the 
1980s, both countries experienced economic hardship and resorted to stabilization and 
liberalization. While Brazilian policy showed little more to its policy than these aims, 
Korea overlaid such policies with unorthodox intervention that partially contradicted the 
stabilization and liberalization policies and provided a supportive environment for industry.
In partial summary, it was emphasized that both the Brazilian and the Korean 
states gained autonomy and technocracy after the onset of B-A and intervened heavily in 
favor of industry. This paper also submitted that the state in both cases formed a primary
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
193
developmental alliance with industry. This research relayed the fact that industry, in both 
cases, during periods o f secondary ISI, tended to be oligopolistic and large. Finally, this 
study found that, in both cases, policies contained a mixture of macroeconomic and micro- 
economic tools which at times fostered import substitution and export promotion. These 
similarities in variables contributed significantly to the rapid economic development that 
was experienced by both countries.
However, Korea's development was more rapid than Brazil's. The contention is 
that Korea's higher level of economic development was achieved by coming closer to the 
"ideal" characteristics that predispose a country to achieve maximum development and to 
overcome market failures on the periphery. Korea's state was more technocratic and 
autonomous than Brazil's. Korea built its industrialization around the local firm, while 
Brazil based its industrialization on foreign and public firms. In terms of the 
developmental alliance, it is likely that Brazil's strong influence of foreign capital made a 
less harmonious alliance with the state. This is because of the varying logic the state 
(nationalist logic) and foreign firms (global logic) bring with them. Because the Korean 
develop-mental alliance contained parties (state and local capital) that were both more 
conducive to nationalist logic, policy incentive and firm response could proceed on a more 
even course than was the case in Brazil. In terms of overcoming market failure, local 
capital tends to be better than other forms of capital. The local firm normally keeps its 
profits at home and seeks to acquire technology, while the foreign firm is inclined to remit 
profits and keep technology transfer minimal. Also, local firms are better attuned to 
market signals and profitability than public firms. Pro-industrial intervention in the Korean 
case was more profound than in the Brazilian because of Korea's greater use of reciprocal 
microeconomic interventions. Korea engaged in stabilization (which did not encourage 
industrialization) less singlemindedly than Brazil did. Moreover, Korea was more 
singleminded than Brazil about intervention. While Brazil sometimes intervened on behalf 
of other interest groups besides the industrial, Korea never strayed far from pro-industrial 
intervention.
The developmental patterns in the B-A phases of both countries showed some 
similarities and differences in response to the similar and different institutional, alliance,
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and policy influences. In the initial phase of B-A in Korea, economic policy reached out 
to the light local manufacturer to fill excess capacity by intensive export behavior. This 
resulted in a capital accumulating phase in the light industries. However, the Korean state 
in the primary EOI phase also used policy ministrations, to a lesser extent, to encourage 
large local capital to diversify and modernize its industries. Consequently, both capital 
accumulation and modernization were facilitated. In the early years of the military regime, 
the state felt that industrialization had been pushed too far by democratic governments.
As a result, the state adhered to stabilization policies. The outcome was recession. In the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, capital accumulation was facilitated by filling excess capacity, 
by increasing exports, and by encouraging domestic consumption. Such policies resulted 
in the most dramatic surge in industrial growth that Brazil had ever experienced. To a 
lesser extent, the state encouraged industrial modernization and diversification through 
secondary ISI resulting in a rapid deepening of industry. While economic development 
during the Brazilian and Korean military regimes started very differently, Brazil soon 
developed a level and a substance of economic development bearing close resemblance to 
Korea's.
In the 1970s, these countries engendered a substance, if not a level, o f economic 
development that nearly matched. Both countries channeled foreign credit into more 
modem industries. Policy ministrations in Brazil were directed toward expansion and 
diversification of public firms, while Korean policies encouraged the expansion and 
diversification of large local capital. While public firms became large in the economy, 
industrial modernization progressed at a much slower pace than it had during the miracle 
years. Such modernization in Brazil also progressed at a much slower pace than it did in 
Korea. Part of the explanation for Korea's faster modernization lies in the advantages of 
Korea's local, private firm expansion as opposed to Brazil's public firm expansion.
Another part of the answer lies in the fact that Korea used its microeconomic policies to 
coerce firms to meet modernization targets. Policy coercions were less widely used in 
Brazil. Brazil relied more heavily on the pure subsidy method.
In the 1980s, Brazil and Korea experienced economic hardship in the wake of the 
second oil crisis. Korea and Brazil both responded with liberalization and stabilization.
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However, the Korean state, still faithful to its allies in the productive sector, responded 
with reorganization, bail-outs, and export push policies that helped this country recover 
growth in the industrial sector. Brazil, under a greater debt burden, both because its debt 
was secured under more unfavorable terms than the debt Korea had acquired and because 
Brazil's more inward orientation made foreign debt harder to repay, had to succumb more 
fully to IMF-style austerity plans. Such plans left little room for policies o f industrializa­
tion promotion. As a result, the 1980s are sometimes called the "lost decade" for indus­
trialization in Brazil. Though this paper has made several assertions about the qualities 
that are conducive to the maximization of development, these deserve some qualification.
First, this paper has emphasized that a technocratic, autonomous, interventionist 
state can aid LDCs in overcoming market failures. Nevertheless, this project does not 
imply that authoritarianism is a necessary component of heavy state intervention. Authori­
tarianism carries with it social costs that may more than counterbalance economic gains.
In Korea's first decade of military rule, repression o f society was not extreme though 
control of economy may have been. In cases such as these, one is tempted to applaud the 
benefits of military rule. However, encouraging authoritarianism is not acceptable since, 
once an authoritarian regime is in power, there are few controls on social repression. In 
addition, as was shown by the case of Brazil, authoritarianism does not necessarily lead to 
superior levels of economic development compared to those that can be produced by 
democratic regimes. Some insulation of the technocracy from the broad spectrum of 
interest groups may be conducive to faster development than would otherwise be the 
case. Furthermore, some leadership role from the state over the private sector may 
drive development faster than a followership role from the state would. But the leader­
ship role need not be extreme: Even governments that mix their allegiances with the 
industrial elite and the various social sectors and enter a partnership role with the 
industrial elite have potential for a moderately fast rate of economic development. 
However, the cases of Brazil and Korea imply that other developing countries can 
maximize their development by an insulated, technocratic, leadership state.
Second, despite the contention that local firms are preferable to foreign or public 
firms, one should not interpret this paper as promoting a policy of expropriation of foreign
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firms. Nor should one come to the conclusion that it is appropriate to effect the hasty sale 
of public firms to private buyers in countries that have a large concentration of foreign 
and/or public enterprises. Countries that do sell their public enterprises to the private 
sector should make sure that these enterprises fall into the hands of competent, local 
entrepreneurs to maximize development. A radical plan of confiscation of foreign 
firms would lead to the country's being ostracized globally and would result in economic 
suicide. However, nowhere is it written that countries which have a large contingent of 
foreign firms cannot work with these firms and insist that developmental goals are 
addressed. The comparison o f Brazil and Korea implies that large, diversified, oligopo­
listic firms concentrated in the local sector maximize long-term development in the 
secondary EOI and secondary ISI phases.
Finally, though this paper has contended that microeconomic policies are more 
effective than macroeconomic policies, this does not mean that this paper contends that a 
late developing country should not pursue wise macroeconomic policies as well. A late 
developer must realize, however, that both policy tools should be used with caution and 
with the recognition that each has its pitfalls. Macroeconomic distortions, if used in 
excess, can contribute to balance of payments problems and inflation.1 Microeconomic 
policies, if used unwisely, can lead to economic havoc. Even with this said, a combination 
of microeconomic and macroeconomic interventions may be necessary in most developing 
countries to help their economies progress past market failures. Industrial policy is more 
crucial for countries in the initial stages of their drive to industrialization than at the end of 
this drive. Nevertheless, if the economy of one o f these newly industrialized countries 
ever takes a drastic downturn, it may be wise for the state to bring technocratic expertise 
and intervention swiftly to bear on the problem. The case studies suggest that pro­
industrial, microeconomic, and macroeconomic policies that offer protection from imports 
and encourage exports give the LDC the optimum chance for economic development.
In conclusion, one issue still needs to be addressed in future research. This paper
1 Ironically enough, in the 1980s. the primary problem Brazil had was not inflation caused by its 
plentiful macroeconomic distortions but inflation caused by structural factors. In this case, state discipline of 
its social groups who were fighting for shares of wealth would have been a preferable alternative to 
macroeconomic orthodoxy.
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has limited itself to discovering the characteristics that led Brazil and Korea to develop 
rapidly as well as the characteristics that led to the minor differences in economic 
development in these cases. This paper has not inquired into the ways that the findings 
presented here can be applied to still less developed countries. Can less developed nations 
learn from the progress of these two NICs? Can the political economic models repre­
sented by Korea and Brazil be adapted to other developing countries today? Could these 
models be analyzed for specific interventions that would successfully mold economic 
development in other developing countries? If the Brazilian models can be adapted to 
other cases of development, they must be adapted with care. Models that operated well 
within the political and economic framework in Korea and Brazil may not function as well 
in countries where political and economic conditions differ markedly. In addition, models 
that worked well in the past context of global economic and political conditions may not 
be well suited to the present such context. Nonetheless, there are obvious, urgent reasons 
for further study in this area.
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